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THE RIGHT HON.

JOHN CHARLES HERRIES

VOL. I.

LONDON: PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
AND PARLIAMENT STREET

MEMOIR

OF

THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE RIGHT HON.

JOHN CHARLES HERRIES

IN THE REIGNS OF GEORGE III., GEORGE IV.
WILLIAM IV. AND VICTORIA

BY HIS SON

EDWARD HERRIES, C.B.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY SIR CHARLES HERRIES, K.C.B.

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IN TWO VOLUMES—VOL. I.

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
1880

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INTRODUCTION.

THE immediate cause of the publication of the following volumes is the appearance of a book by Mr. Spencer Walpole entitled a 'History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 1815,' in which an account is given of Mr. Herries's share in the formation and dissolution of the Goderich Administration, so entirely erroneous and so injurious to his reputation, that it would be impossible for those who are interested in maintaining his good name to allow such calumnious misrepresentations to remain unrefuted.

It is true that Mr. Walpole's statements are to a great extent repetitions of those to be found in Lord Palmerston's Autobiography, and in Mr. Greville's Memoirs, and that some answer should have been made on the appearance of the first of those publications.

Such was originally my intention, but the accident of a long illness and other pressing avocations prevented me from fulfilling it at the proper time, and the opportunity passed away. The task has been resumed now by my brother and, I venture to think, accomplished with a completeness which must preclude all future attempts, such as that of Mr. Walpole, to vilify Mr. Herries's character.

But although it might have been better, had the refutation of Lord Palmerston's and Mr. Greville's inaccuracies appeared some time ago, I do not admit that those publications are to be regarded in the same light as Mr. Walpole's. They neither of them profess to be Histories. Lord Palmerston's reminiscences are those of a strong political partisan, written evidently some time after the events, and conveying the impressions left upon his mind by an engagement in a desperate struggle for supremacy, in which his friends had been worsted by the unbending resolution of Mr. Herries.

Mr. Greville's memoirs are in fact the gossip of the day, and worth no more. But a history of England is a very different thing. Those who turn to it for information are entitled to assume, and generally do assume, that the writer has, to the best of his ability, set before them a true representation of all important transactions and of the characters and conduct of the actors in them, that he has neglected no opportunity of obtaining information on the subjects of which he treats, and that he has carefully weighed the statements from which his narrative is compiled. It is therefore very much more important to refute calumnies which are embodied in Mr. Walpole's work than in those of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Greville, even if he had done no more than transcribe them. But he has done much more. He has not only brought them all together so as to add to their effect upon the public, but he has collected much to the same purport from hostile newspapers of the day, and from the violent attacks in Parliament of unscrupulous assailants: and all this he

has given to the world without one word of caution that they are not to be accepted as indisputable truths. He has even gone further. He has endeavoured to support one at least of these misrepresentations by independent evidence, with what success will be seen at page 218 (Vol. I.) of this book.

Even if it were open to him, as a historian, to plead that he merely followed the calumnies of others, he is clearly convicted of something more than carelessness when he enhances them by matter of his own collecting.

But this is not all. It is known to a large number of persons that Mr. Walpole's position with respect to Mr. Herries would naturally incline him rather towards Mr. Herries than against him, and the effect, therefore, of his injurious treatment of that gentleman's character would be attributed to no less than a deep sense of duty to the truth of history. For Mr. Walpole is the son of Mr. Herries's esteemed friend and colleague in the first Derby Cabinet, and the grandson of Spencer Perceval, the Prime Minister, to whom Mr. Herries was Private Secretary and with whom he was on terms of intimacy and friendship.

Such being the case it would appear almost incredible that Mr. Walpole should have depicted Mr. Herries in the black colours he has adopted, if as an honest man, he could have come to any other conviction respecting him.

That he is absolutely unwarranted in his convictions, if convictions they be, is, I think, demonstrated in the following pages. To what, then, are we to attribute his distorted portraiture? Possibly to nothing more

than carelessness. Mr. Walpole seems to have written on without pausing to verify the statements he adopts, culling a sharp expression here from Greville, there from Lord Palmerston, and to have been quite satisfied so long as there was something sparkling in every page. The inaccuracy which is exposed in the following Memoir, will probably be found by those who are at the pains to inquire, to pervade the whole of Mr. Walpole's work.

I have no doubt that much has been sacrificed by Mr. Walpole to his style. So little, indeed, does this writer appear to care for historic accuracy that, although in treating of the Goderich Ministry he must have been well aware that there was much that was unexplained, he never made an application to me or any member of Mr. Herries's family for information or papers. Had he done so all that is now published would have been placed freely at his disposal.

But I am glad to take leave of this unpleasant subject.

It will readily be understood from the account here given of the origin of this work, that it is not intended for a complete biography of Mr. Herries. Had it been possible indeed to confine it to a history of the events of the Goderich Administration our purpose would have been answered. But it was necessary to show the groundlessness of the charge that a 'Treasury Clerk' was suddenly pressed forward by King George IV. into the place of Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the design by the King of having in that office a creature of his own, who would assist him in profligate expenditure

of the public money. The foundation of the whole story, as told by Mr. Walpole, is the assumed fact that Mr. Herries was a most unlikely person to be appointed to such an office unless there were reasons of the kind suggested. Hence it was essential to extend the scheme of the work so as to show what had been the previous career of the person who is called sometimes a Treasury Clerk, sometimes Auditor of the Civil List, but who was at the time and had been for some years, Secretary to the Treasury.

The true story of the formation and dissolution of the Goderich Administration has never before been made public; and the detailed account of all the intrigues and negotiations by which the King was harassed by the Whigs is so curious as to be interesting as a mere narrative, besides clearing away the mystery which has hitherto surrounded the events of that time.

Much valuable information which may be regarded as an addition to the history of the nineteenth century has been disinterred by my brother in his researches, more especially as to the financial measures by which we maintained our army in the field in the contest with Napoleon, and supported the combination of Europe against him.

The searching examination to which previous writers have been subjected will be found to affect the accuracy of some of more established reputation than Mr. Walpole, and it may be a consolation to him that such an illustrious historian as Sir William Napier is clearly convicted of error in many of his statements about the Commissariat; and that a very strange and

almost incredible story told by him about the coinage of French money under the Duke of Wellington's orders by accomplished forgers who were found in the ranks of our army in Spain, is shown to be simply a romance.

Some few particulars respecting Mr. Herries's family and early life may here be inserted for those who choose to read them.

John Charles Herries was born in the year 1778 and was the eldest son of Charles Herries, better known to his contemporaries as Colonel Herries of the Light Horse Volunteers of London and Westminster. Colonel Herries, the son of a Dumfriesshire Laird established, as his family had been for some generations, at Halldykes near Lockerby, had engaged in business as a Spanish merchant, residing for some time in Spain and finally in London. His brother, Sir Robert Herries, older by a great many years, was the founder of the banking firm in St. James's Street, now known under the name of Herries, Farquhar, & Co., but of which Sir Walter Farquhar is the head. The Laird of Halldykes traced his descent from the Lords Herries, before the title passed into the Maxwell family in 1566, through whom it has recently been revived (after the forfeiture by attainder in the times of the Jacobite Rebellion) in the person of Mr. Constable Maxwell. When the claims of this gentleman to the title were first mooted some of the leading Scotch genealogists were anxious that Mr. Herries should contest them; but he had no desire for

a peerage and did not see his way to anything beyond an expensive litigation.

There is so much which would be interesting even to the general reader in the history of the Light Horse Volunteers, that I may be excused for giving some account of the corps.

It was, if not the first, certainly one of the earliest of those regiments which afterwards, under the impulse of the French Revolutionary Wars, became so numerous and efficient. It dated from 1779, and if not entitled to claim priority of formation, it was undoubtedly distinguished by its composition, and by the care which, at least in the earlier part of its history, was taken in the selection of its members. Originating with certain merchants and bankers of London who used to hunt together in Surrey (I believe with Lord Derby's hounds) it was at first limited to 50 members, and it was with some difficulty at a later period that Colonel Herries obtained permission from the King to increase the numbers, his Majesty remarking that 'he cared more for selection in that corps than for number.'

Most valuable indeed, at that time and for many years after, as a demonstration against lawless violence, was the mere list of names borne on the rolls of the regiment. It comprised many of the leading well-known commercial men of the City of London, together with members of the legal profession, and of both Houses of Parliament. The Light Horse Volunteers had stipulated that they should receive their orders from the Secretary of State or the Commander-in-Chief, the com-

missions of their officers being signed by the King himself, instead of by the Lord-Lieutenant of the county as in other corps of Volunteers; but although as a rule the Duke of Portland, during the most troublous times of their service, was the medium of communication with the Colonel, they never stood upon ceremony when the Lord Mayor called upon them to protect the lives and property of the citizens from the armed mobs who, at the instigation of the 'London Corresponding Society,' were attempting, feebly and spasmodically, an imitation of the Parisian excesses.

But indeed, from the first, and before the cause of order had become identified with that of resistance to the propagation of the revolutionary doctrines of France, the Light Horse Volunteers were looked upon by the citizens of London as their most efficient protectors against insurrectionary violence. In Lord George Gordon's riots in 1780, they were under arms day and night for a whole week, and were frequently brought into conflict with the rioters. But it was chiefly during the period from 1794 to 1810 that their services were in constant requisition, for the suppression of disturbances, such as we of the present day, happily, have never witnessed, which kept London in a state of apprehension sometimes for days and weeks together, and might have led to the most serious consequences. Some of the latest of these disturbances were those known as the Burdett Riots. When Sir Francis Burdett had become a Conservative and voted in the House of Commons with Mr. Herries against the Whig party, the latter used sometimes to observe, that it was strange to re-

member that he had been kept out of bed night after night, patrolling the streets in arms against the mobs incited by that same Sir Francis to violence which might have led to revolution.

It will be inferred from what has been said, that this was no mere show regiment, but one on which the constituted authorities felt that they could rely for real service in case of need. Perhaps the most remarkable proof of this was given in 1797 when, about three o'clock on the morning of May 26, Colonel Herries received the following letter :—

'Great George Street,
'Friday morning, 2¼ o'clock.

'Sir,—A report having at this moment been made to Field-Marshal the Duke of York, of a mutiny having broken out amongst the Artillery at Woolwich, I have it in command from his Royal Highness to acquaint you, that you are to assemble the corps under your command and march as expeditiously as possible to the barracks at Woolwich, there to follow such orders as you may receive from the Master-General, the Marquis Cornwallis, or other artillery officer commanding on the spot. I have the honour to be, &c.,

'William Fawcett,
'Adjutant-General.'

The march was performed with all possible speed, at a trot over the pavement, and at a gallop from the end of it to Blackheath, where they were to assemble, but before they reached Woolwich the mutineers, who had at one time been in possession of the guns, had

returned to their duty. It is noted as showing the spirit and composition of the corps, that in the first detachment which appeared on the ground, among many other eminent men were, the Duke of Montrose, Lord Manners, and Nicholas Vansittart, afterwards Lord Bexley.[1]

Enough has been said to make it evident that a corps on which such reliance was placed by the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief, must have been in a very high state of efficiency as a cavalry regiment. This it owed entirely to Colonel Herries. He seems to have been born to such a command. One of the first swordsmen in England, at a time when the use of the sword was part of the education of every gentleman—second to none as a horseman, not merely as a rider but as one who made horses his study, and knew and understood them thoroughly—he was, moreover, peculiarly qualified for the difficult task of keeping together, under very strict discipline, the body of independent gentlemen whom he commanded, by the gift of a most winning and polished manner, which seems to have fascinated all who knew him. The devotion of every member of the corps to their Colonel is said to have been something marvellous. He was destined to receive a splendid proof of it before the end of his career.

[1] The figure of this amiable and excellent man was not quite that of a light dragoon, and gave occasion for a Treasury witticism when he was secretary there. One of the clerks having met him coming in from drill in full uniform is said to have exclaimed that he for the first time understood what 'army extraordinaries' were, that being a 'heading' in the finance accounts.

I have said his business was that of a merchant, and it will readily be understood that absorbed as he was in his military duties, his interests in the City were somewhat neglected, and this at a time when, from the disturbed state of our continental relations, more than ordinary vigilance was required. But the catastrophe which produced Colonel Herries's bankruptcy in 1798, was more immediately connected with the fall of the firm of Boyd, Benfield, and Co., and the repudiation by the French Government of the responsibilities of the French East India Company.

It was on that occasion that the corps showed their gratitude and affection to their Colonel by subscribing such an amount as should procure for him an annuity of 1,000*l.* a year, and at his death in 1819 they insisted upon giving him a public funeral in Westminster Abbey, where they placed a monument to his memory, with a bust by Chantrey.

His bankruptcy, as may be supposed, had a decided influence on the career of his son, who had been destined to succeed him in the mercantile business. With this view he had been educated chiefly abroad, and had completed his course of study at the University of Leipsic—at that time much in vogue among the English. He had been previously in France, and both father and son spoke French with remarkable facility and purity of accent, so that when the crash came he had the advantage, which at that time was comparatively rare, of an intimate acquaintance with both French and German. But neither French nor German were available as an immediate means of subsistence, and it was a great

boon to him to obtain a clerkship in the Treasury at 95*l.* a year. This was his entrance to official life. I believe no other instance can be found of such a career as his, for it must be borne in mind that no step on the ladder was gained through Parliament or through influential family connections; and instead of sneering at a man who, starting from the position of a Treasury Clerk became a Cabinet Minister, one would think that Mr. Walpole who, if not a Radical, is at least a Liberal, would consider him worthy of all honour for carving his own fortune without the aid of aristocratic support.

He entered the Treasury July 5, 1798, and it was not long before his unusual ability became marked in the office.

But his first rise in salary was in a great measure due to the incapacity or indolence of those immediately above him. A vacancy occurred in the Revenue Department of the Treasury. It was a post which was not to be trifled with. 'No idler need apply,' might have been the notice to applicants, and the consequence was that no one did apply, though the salary was 300*l.* a year. It was left for the youngest clerk in the establishment, who eagerly grasped the opportunity of possible distinction and certain increase of emolument. Fortunately for him—perhaps in the event for the public service—the head of the department was a gentleman who concerned himself as little as possible with the business of his office, and he very soon saw that in the new clerk he had one who was able and willing to work for him. Of how many the department then consisted I know not, but it was not long before the whole of the

more important business was thrown upon young Herries, then about the age of twenty-one. So much was this the case, that before he had been three years in the service he was employed to draw up for Mr. Pitt the Resolutions by which one of Mr. Tierney's financial onslaughts was to be met in the House of Commons. It had become at that period an established practice for Mr. Tierney to formulate his objections to Mr. Pitt's operations in finance during the year in a series of Resolutions dealing in detail with the measures which had been adopted, and they were met by the Minister with counter-Resolutions disproving alleged facts or controverting inferences, as the case might require. It was therefore an important and anxious task for so young a man to prepare counter-Resolutions such as these, which occupy many columns of the volume of 'Hansard' for 1800. But they were considered so satisfactory by his immediate chief, and he showed such an intimate acquaintance with the subject, that he was desired to take them himself to the great Minister and explain them if necessary. He found Mr. Pitt in the Treasury Board-room. His manner was cold and ungracious. He read the paper slowly, asking a few questions, but said nothing in the way of thanks or approval.

Under Addington's Administration which succeeded Pitt's in that year, young Herries became Private Secretary to Vansittart, the Secretary to the Treasury—an appointment which he probably owed in some measure to Vansittart's connection with Colonel Herries's regiment. At this time he wrote a good deal in defence of

the Government in newspapers, and published a pamphlet in answer to Cobbett's attack on the administration of the finances, by which he gained much credit. Addington condescended to thank him in a most ceremonious manner. The description of the scene, which Mr. Herries used to give is too characteristic of Addington to be omitted.

The great man had walked with Vansittart and his Secretary from the Treasury, without a word about the pamphlet. Arrived at his own door he seemed about to say something, but it was apparently too important for a few words on the doorsteps, and he courteously invited the young clerk to come up stairs with him, as, he said, he had something to communicate. Then, having taken up a proper position on his own hearth, he expressed in choice and measured language his thanks for the useful assistance afforded to his Government and—nothing more. The solemnity of the proceeding had raised hopes of a lucrative employment.

Of Mr. Perceval, whom he afterwards served as Secretary, he always spoke with great respect and regard, and Mr. Perceval was loud in praise of his Secretary to all his friends. His goodwill was not confined to verbal expressions, but showed itself substantially by several valuable appointments, the most lucrative of which was that of Secretary to the Order of the Bath—an office with a small salary, but in which the fees, on an enlargement of the Order, produced quite a little fortune. He admired Perceval's uprightness of character and straightforwardness. Next to him I think he liked Mr. Canning best of all those with whom he

served in public life. The boldness, even to rashness, of that Minister was more congenial to him than the extreme reserve and caution of others, and for the same reason he had a liking for Lord Palmerston, whose future eminence he predicted long before it was attained. Sitting one day next to Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons when Palmerston was speaking, he said: 'You may depend upon it that man will be the leading spirit in the House some day'; to which Peel replied in a tone, and with a manner of the utmost contempt, 'Do you really think so?'

There is but little for me to add, as the details of Mr. Herries's career from this period are given in the following volumes.

There is no intention of following the custom of the day in giving minute accounts of private life, copies of letters to and from members of the family, and lists of people who gave or received invitations to dinner.

All that is published is believed to have some bearing on the main object of the work—a vindication of his character by showing what he was and how he acquired the reputation which led to his being asked to accept high office.

It is almost going beyond our purpose—but the work might be otherwise incomplete—to state that in 1814 he married Sarah the daughter of John Dorington, Clerk of the Fees of the House of Commons, and, as the custom then was, combining with his office the business of Parliamentary agent. The loss of his wife in 1821 was a blow from which it was long before he recovered, and which had an unfortunate effect upon

him as a public man, by removing one of the inducements to frequent society and to form connections which would have been useful. He was much too prone to despise and neglect the means by which all but the very foremost statesmen keep themselves before the public. I do not think that he ever attended a public meeting, except at his elections, or spoke at a public dinner—invitations to which he almost invariably declined. This was unfortunate, because he was well fitted to shine in society, and the conversation never flagged when he entertained his friends at dinner.

From his father he inherited—that is to say, he acquired from precept and example—the love for horses which I have noted in Colonel Herries. After his early youth he had not time for hunting, but he always rode good horses, and no horse—though he owned many vicious ones in his time—succeeded in beating him. His sporting, however, was confined to shooting.

But I must not fall into the error which I have condemned, by relating matters which can be of no interest to the general reader.

It remains only to add, that we have received the most gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to make public the communications with King George IV., which will be found in the following memoir.

CHARLES JOHN HERRIES.

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MEMOIR OF J. C. HERRIES.

CHAPTER I.

Literary occupations—Translation from Gentz—Letter from the Author—Spencer Perceval's private secretary—Employment in Ireland—Nomination to various posts—Appointment as Commissary-in-Chief.

THE early life of the subject of this memoir has been sufficiently sketched in the Introduction. It has been seen how soon, even in the modest station of a junior clerk in the Treasury, his intelligence and capacity for work attracted the notice of superior authorities. Out of the sphere of his official duties he made himself known by literary labour, which obtained for him the applause of no mean judge, one of the most eminent among the Continental publicists of his age. In 1802 Mr. Herries, being then private secretary to Mr. Vansittart, Secretary of the Treasury, translated for the benefit of English readers Gentz's famous book in refutation of Napoleonic falsehoods—*Von dem Politischen Zustande von Europa vor und nach der Französischen Revolution*[1]—with the addition of an original

[1] *On the State of Europe before and after the French Revolution, being an Answer to 'L'État de la France à la Fin de l'An VIII.,' by Frederick Gentz, Counsellor at War to his Prussian Majesty, &c. &c. Translated from the German by John Charles Herries, Esq. London: Hatchard*, 1802. A second edition was soon called for.

introduction, devoted especially to the vindication of the conduct of Great Britain towards neutrals and of the principles of maritime law maintained by the British Admiralty Courts and enforced by British arms. How well the task of the translator was accomplished appears from the following remarkable letter addressed to him by the author :—

Mr. Gentz to Mr. Herries.

'November 10, 1802.

'Till yesterday it was only in my power to thank you for your good intention when you undertook the translation of my work, for the honour you thereby conferred upon me, and for the inestimable advantage which thence accrued to me of being made known to an English public. Now, however, the case is very much altered, and my obligations to you are infinitely increased by my present knowledge of the admirable manner in which you have executed an undertaking so flattering to me. When I speak of the masterly performance I have read, I would be understood as not alluding to the excellent additions with which you have enriched my work ; my province is only to testify the pleasure I have received from the extraordinary merits of the translation itself, considered merely as such. Notwithstanding the favourable opinion of the translator with which I was prepossessed, yet I confess to you that I was not without some apprehension ; I am too well acquainted with the difficulties which our somewhat untoward language opposes to works of this nature, and have thought too much upon the many

things indispensably necessary to constitute a good translation (in my opinion very far indeed from an easy work), not to be cautious of expecting much even when the undertaking falls to the share of considerable abilities. I leave you to judge what my opinion is of yours when I assure you that I read it from beginning to end with the same pleasure which I should have received from the perusal of a new production, while at the same time I everywhere found my own thoughts and meanings correctly expressed, and not seldom in my own manner. It certainly requires more than common talents to make both these impressions at once upon the author of a book by the translator of it.

'I acknowledge now no difference between your work and mine. I must request you to permit me to adopt the former as my own child, without, however, taking anything from your exclusive right to your improvements upon your original, and I request of you to say on all occasions—which I shall likewise both say and write as opportunity offers—that it is my desire to be tried and judged abroad by your translation of me and by that alone.

'I have the more satisfaction in making these acknowledgments to you as the French translation which has lately appeared of my work, though executed partly under my own eye and by one of my best friends, is yet by no means equal to my expectations. It is such that I wish with all my heart it were undone. It is *the antipode of yours*, and it is impossible to say more against it.

'I have only one thing now to request of you

You know that the work which you have so kindly interested yourself in is unfinished. This is obvious to every person who reads the distribution of the heads at the beginning (p. 5 in the English). Even the third division is not completed. The important question concerning the preponderance of the British marine (or, as the stupid partisans of the French express it, *the naval tyranny of the English*), which involves the rights of neutral flags, remains to be discussed; and there is likewise wanting a general recapitulation, in which I intended to represent in one picture the present political state of Europe. The fourth division, which was to have treated of the effects of the new constitution of France in the interior of that country (one of the most extensive, instructive, and interesting subjects of the present day), is wanting altogether. You know that a third part was to have been published, but I was prevented from fulfilling my intention in this respect partly by the changes which occurred in the state of affairs and partly by circumstances of a private nature, but most of all by the troubles in which I was involved by the reception my two first publications experienced from a part of the Prussian Ministry.

'You have supplied in your introduction what was wanting on the subject of neutral navigation in a most satisfactory and masterly manner as far as your purpose required. This question (which I consider as one of the most intricate, perhaps the most difficult in the whole sphere of public law) has indeed been lately discussed and explained exceedingly well in England, and reduced almost to perfect evidence in a variety of

learned and ingenious writings, speeches, and judgments. But the case is very different indeed on the Continent. There is no point of public law in which such gross ignorance prevails, not only amongst the public but in the ministerial cabinets and courts of justice. I could relate to you some anecdotes in proof of this which would be highly entertaining to a British public. All the productions on this subject in France, Germany, Denmark, &c., of late years (for I am not speaking of Grotius, Puffendorf, Bynkershoeck, Vattel, &c., and other writers of reasonable times) are monuments of the most consummate ignorance or the most shameful dishonesty. I had resolved, therefore, to discuss this question in all its bearings, for which purpose I read whatever has been written concerning it in any country from the sixteenth century to the present day. I studied and collated all treaties, conventions, and separate statutes and laws; I employed myself during eight months in this pursuit, and was resolved to give the public at once a philosophical and historical account of the whole business. As a third part to a work already very extensive this publication would evidently have been too voluminous. I resolved, therefore, to publish it alone, especially as I had at that time given up my intention of continuing the other work; and though I have been withheld from the execution of this plan by the unsettled life which I have led since the beginning of this summer, I have by no means renounced it. I conceive that a work such as I have chalked out and partly executed would be useful and instructive for the Continent, and very far from unim-

portant to the interests of Great Britain. I even dare to carry my hopes further; and though I thankfully confess that without the writings of British authors on this thorny subject I should never have obtained that knowledge of it which I now possess, yet I flatter myself that I shall be able to place the matter in some particular points of view which even for my masters and instructors may have the charm of novelty at least.

'I am now much pleased that I kept back the chapter on the influence of the new constitution of France upon the internal welfare, the morals, and social relations of its inhabitants; for although I should never have written in the belief that France possessed anything in the least resembling a republican constitution, yet should I not easily have foreseen in the autumn of 1801 that the despotism of the military usurper, then disguised (however imperfectly) by some constitutional forms, would so soon break through all bounds and show itself to the world in all its naked deformity? All that Hauterive has said about the supposed accordance of republican principles with the wants and inclinations of civil society is now rendered perfectly ridiculous; but I am convinced that, in other points of view, this is a very serious and highly important subject, one of the greatest and most delicate that can at present engage the attention of the politician; and I will certainly soon or late direct my feeble efforts to it.

'In order that such part of the English public as have honoured my works by their attention may receive some explanation of the abrupt and almost fragmental shape

of the book you have translated, and at the same time an assurance that I shall not cease to contend for the approbation of the worthy and enlightened among your countrymen by future works, whose object will be the true interests of Europe and of England (they are both the same), I should earnestly desire that you would take any opportunity (were it even after my departure from hence) to communicate to the public in a few words the most material part[2] of what I have here taken the liberty of addressing to you; you will thereby complete my obligation and further increase the gratitude which I shall ever entertain for what you have done for me. May you on your part speedily give to the public some of the results of your reflections and your labours, that I may repay you by a similar service in my language. Till then I must request a continuance of your esteem, and assure you of my very high and sincere regard, &c.'

Traces of continued correspondence appear at a later period. We find a copy of a letter in French from Mr. Herries to Gentz, dated November 1811, in answer to one from the latter on the subject of the prices of the precious metals. Two pamphlets, published anonymously by Mr. Herries some time previously, are mentioned as being enclosed, and the writer expresses his impatience to receive a forthcoming work announced by Gentz.

'A Reply to some Financial Misstatements in and out of Parliament,' written by Mr. Herries in 1803

[2] It was published in the second edition of the translation.

in defence of the Addington Government, against some attacks upon it by Cobbett in his 'Political Register' and by Lord Grenville in the House of Lords, has been noticed in the introduction to this memoir. It was probably this publication which led many official persons, not long after the formation of Mr. Pitt's second Administration, to fix erroneously upon Mr. Herries the authorship of a satirical pamphlet, called 'Elements of Opposition,' against Addington's assailants, which contained many allusions to Cobbett's 'Register' and Grenville's speeches. The ridicule thrown by this production upon some of Windham's irrational utterances —his vindication of bull-baiting and prize-fighting in particular—made it very obnoxious to the friends of the new Government, and the supposed writer was anxious to repudiate all connection with it, as he did in the following letter to his cousin, Mr. Robert Herries, the head of the banking house of Herries, Farquhar, and Co. :—

'Dear Robert,—I cannot sufficiently thank you for your unsolicited interference in my behalf with Mr. Huskisson, although I should have perhaps prevented the application if I had known you were about to make any in my favour. But what I am very much astonished at is the circumstance you mention of some of the members of the new Administration being disposed against me on account of a pamphlet of which they consider me to be the author. If your information did not coincide with something that I have heard, but paid little attention to before, I should have taken it for granted that you must have misunderstood Mr. H. alto-

gether. What I allude to is that I was told some time since that Mr. Rose had positively asserted me to be the author of the "Elements of Opposition," published, I believe, about a year ago.[3] I took no pains to contradict this report, because in the search for the unknown writer of a political tract it often happens that there is no man too remote from the real one to be fixed upon either by his friends or his enemies, and I took it for granted that I should soon be exonerated from the blame, or, with equal justice, stripped of the praise, that might attach to the performance in question. So I thought no more of it; and I declare to you upon my honour that to the present day, though I have looked into some parts of it, I have never read through the work which I am accused of having written, and that I am even entirely ignorant of its origin.

'Whatever may be the wit and talent it displays (which I think are sufficient to have secured me from all suspicion), I should be sorry to have written it, because it abounds in personal satire and bears entirely the character of a party publication. I hope there is nothing of that kind to be found in the only things that I have ever printed, the translation and preface to Gentz and 'A Reply to some Misstatements.' The former is of too general a political nature to admit of it, and the latter is entirely directed against the shameful falsehoods of a shameless gazetteer and what I did and do consider to be the errors of Lord Grenville on the subject of finance.

'You will therefore do me a favour by positively

[3] In 1803.

contradicting, whenever you may hear them, any assertions respecting my authorship beyond those two productions. Yours truly,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

When Mr. Perceval became Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Portland Administration, his friend Colonel Herries (Spencer Perceval was a Light Horse Volunteer) mentioned his son to him as a suitable candidate for the post of private secretary. The answer was satisfactory :—

'I did not think it convenient to give any answer to your letter till I had made enquiries respecting your son, because, with every disposition to have gratified you in this matter, I could not possibly have sacrificed my own essential accommodation so far as to have appointed a person who would not have been able to render me effective service in the situation of my private secretary. Those enquiries, however, have been so perfectly satisfactory that I beg you will acquaint him that I shall have the greatest pleasure in appointing him to the situation of my secretary, and that I should be glad to see him here between nine and ten o'clock tomorrow morning in Lincoln's Inn Fields.

'Permit me to assure you that the circumstance of being serviceable to *your* son gives me a real pleasure.'

The correspondence now remaining between Mr. Herries and Mr. Perceval or other political persons during the next two or three years is, unfortunately, very meagre, being confined to a small number of brief notes. A few extracts relating to public affairs may be taken as specimens.

From Mr. Vansittart (not in office).

'July 27, 1809.

'By desire of D'Ivernois [Sir Francis, the well-known Genevese anti-Napoleonic publicist] I enclose you one of his *cahiers*, which he sent to me for my remarks. The subject is really curious, as it would have been, antecedent to experience, impossible to believe that our trade would have suffered so little as it did from the sort of universal interruption under which it was for some time placed. D'Ivernois seems to me to injure a good cause by pushing the argument too far, and contending that we have not suffered at all and that Ireland has been a gainer. I think it probable that the present year, or at least the half-year from April to October, will be among the most flourishing in the annals of commerce.'

September 28.—'I am very much obliged to you for your curious and interesting narrative. We shall remove on Saturday to Torquay, where we have taken a house for a few weeks. It is easy to see great difficulties in any political arrangement. God grant it may take a beneficial and satisfactory turn. I shall be sorry if you lose Huskisson,[4] who seems to have done his business extremely well. Yours faithfully,

'N. V.'[5]

[4] Then Secretary to the Treasury.

[5] This and the three following letters relate to the Ministerial changes which took place when Mr. Perceval succeeded the Duke of Portland as First Lord of the Treasury in 1809. We learn from Mr. Spencer Walpole's *Life of Perceval* that Mr. Herries was sent to Torquay to negotiate with Vansittart for his junction with the Ministry.

From Mr. Perceval.

'My dear Sir,—Lord Sidmouth will not help us to Bathurst, and Bathurst would not come without Lord S., if Lord S. would let him. His Lordship would not come himself either at present, because somehow, most unaccountably, he seems to think that the idea of union with Lords Grey and Grenville is not yet quite desperate; and till he is satisfied of that he would not encourage anything else. You know and can explain how desperate that idea is.

'It cannot be, according to Lord Grenville, without *dereliction of principle*; for as to *that* it matters not whether it be accession to an old Government or formation of a new one with the same people—unless, indeed, he may hope that though he will not relinquish *his* principles we may *ours*.

'The material thing is his postscript, which is in these words:—

'"P.S. With respect to your proposal to Mr. Vansittart, I can only say that I wish to leave it entirely to his own decision."

'Do not frighten him with the necessity of leaving his wife immediately. I will gladly give him time. Of course he will feel that I want him; but I want him for *hereafter* so much more than for now that I will gladly forego the present for the future. Yours very truly,

'SP. PERCEVAL.

'Ealing: October 8, 1809.'

'Admiralty: Thursday, —.[6]

'My dear Sir,—Huskisson has been with me, and knows all respecting Lord Melville.

'He thinks it quite impossible that we should allow ourselves to be bullied by Lord M., and as impossible to stand our ground without the Scotch interest.

'He thinks Lord Palmerston's a very bad appointment,[7] and thinks not much better of Croker's. . . . Ever yours,

'C. A.'[8]

From the same.

'I am so anxious that you should be my colleague[9] that I have just written to Mr. Perceval about it.

'I am sure that we could not do so well, and now that we have a better chance of standing I am desirous for it on your account. . . .'

From Mr. Perceval.

'February 24, 1810.

'In making your calculations on Mr. Lowndes's plan to show its operation on the capital rather than the annuity, be so good as to try it upon my idea—namely, by making the loan, the interest of which is to be charged on the war taxes, comprehend, in addition to the money to be borrowed for the service of the year, the supplemental loan to make good the deficit on the

[6] Date uncertain—in October 1809?

[7] As Secretary at War. Mr. Croker was made Secretary to the Admiralty.

[8] The Right Honourable Charles Arbuthnot.

[9] In what capacity? Probably as one of the joint Secretaries of the Treasury.

war charges, leaving the sinking fund on the whole, as in Lowndes's plan, to be provided for by new taxes. It seems to me that this is an improvement on his plan, or rather a more extended application of his own principle, and that it must have the effect of diminishing the quantity of new taxes to be required.

'I wish you also, besides calculating the amount of new taxes to be required for the sinking fund on the loans of both descriptions and the growing effect of such sinking fund, to trouble yourself with making another calculation on the supposition that a sinking fund on these loans should be raised to $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., and to trace the effect for the same number of years of such increased sinking fund both on debt and new taxes; for there can be no doubt it will be a great additional recommendation to the plan if it not only provides the means of not increasing the capital of the debt during the continuance of war, but also if it furnishes the means, even during war, of diminishing the debt. I am sorry to add to your trouble, but I am much impressed with the idea that this subject is a most important consideration.

'I think you had better not mention it till we see our way more clearly one way or the other in it.'

From Sir Francis d'Ivernois.

'Rappel du Décret de Berlin.

'Vous voyez pourtant, mon cher Herries, que j'avais eu toute raison de vous annoncer que les décrets de Berlin et de Milan seraient abandonnés le 2 de ce mois, et je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que cet événement me

rattache de plus en plus à l'idée que javais soumise à M. P. Bonne ou mauvaise, il n'y a pas un moment à perdre pour l'adopter ou la rejeter, et je vais la développer ici de mon mieux, sous le double point de vue du *point de droit* et des convenances. . . .'

From Mr. Perceval.

'I have read Sir F. d'Ivernois's paper, and beg you to return him my thanks for his anxiety upon the important subject to which it relates and the friendly communications of his suggestions. You may mention to him that he appears to me to have overlooked a most important consideration connected with the repeal of the decrees of Berlin and Milan—namely, that, whether it be sincere or not, it is *conditional*, and that the conditions are *alternative*: either that G. B. should, upon the declaration of that intended repeal (which, at the time of its publication, was at best prospective), not only repeal her Orders in Council, but also renounce her *new* principles of blockade. Now, what does France mean by our *new* principles of blockade? Does she mean merely the blockade under the Orders in Council? Certainly not, for the repeal of the Orders in Council would be a renunciation of that blockade. We must look, therefore, elsewhere to find her meaning; and if you refer Sir F. d'I. to the preamble of the Decree of Berlin, he will find the *new* principles detailed, one of which is (I believe in about the fifth article; but I have it not at hand, so I am not certain) that a place should be deemed blockaded which is not a fort and which is not completely invested *by land* as well as *by sea*—

which scarcely any place that G. B. ever can blockade is likely to be.

'This is the condition on our part, which, if I am right in my understanding, it is impossible for us to comply with. The alternative condition is on the part of America; they are to be repealed also if, we refusing to comply with the condition imposed on us, the Americans resent our refusal by interdicting intercourse with us and opening it with France. As America has announced her intention to do this on February 2, and as *it is said* these decrees have been repealed in practice since that date, I suppose the matter stands upon the footing of their being repealed because America has considered that our refusal to repeal our Orders in Council on these terms justifies her considering the whole injustice and irregularity of the system arising out of the Orders in Council as now attributable to us.'[1]

At the beginning of 1809 Mr. Herries was appointed Secretary and Register to the Order of the Bath—a place with a small salary and probably little business. The average annual emoluments arising from fees were, before the augmentation of the Order, trifling, but on the occasion of the creation of a large number of Knights Grand Cross they brought in nearly 7,000*l.*

When Mr. Perceval was made First Lord of the Treasury as well as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1809, he proposed to Mr. Herries that he should take the double post, with double salary, of his private sec-

[1] This note, which, like others from Perceval, is scarcely legible, was evidently written in the greatest haste.

retary in each capacity. The offer, however, from motives of delicacy, was declined with a recommendation of a friend in the Treasury[2] for the other secretary's place.

At a later period the want of a person of experience and capacity to assist Mr. Wellesley Pole,[3] when he went to Ireland as Chancellor of the Exchequer there in 1811, induced Mr. Perceval to allow him to have temporarily the services of Mr. Herries, to whom about the same time an offer was made of a seat at the Irish Treasury Board. It was, however, declined.

He was in Ireland when the patent place of Comptroller of Army Accounts having become vacant, Mr. Perceval immediately offered it to him; but the kind intentions of the chief were well-nigh frustrated by a smart intrigue, a promise in favour of another person having been obtained from the Prince Regent. On hearing of this difficulty Mr. Perceval went at once to Carlton House, and insisted so strongly—saying that it was a question whether he was or was not Minister—that he returned with the apppointment at his disposal. But the person upon whom it was conferred never actually took his seat at the Comptroller's board. His patent had hardly been made out when the Prime Minister showed his appreciation of his merits by selecting him for the much more important office of Commissary-in-Chief, although opposition was anticipated on the part of some of the persons surrounding the Prince Regent. Mr. Perceval wrote to his friend on August 8, 1811:—

[2] Mr. Brooksbank.

[3] Afterwards Lord Maryborough and Earl of Mornington.

'Colonel Gordon's removal to the Quarter-Master-General's office is now determined. . . . He is very anxious to have his successor appointed. . . . —— is still urgent and importunate with me to appoint him to succeed Gordon. I cannot say that I know enough of him to justify my refusal to appoint him as incompetent to the situation, nor have I any *officer* of my acquaintance whom I could justify myself in representing as better qualified. But I think you would do the business better, or at least I have more confidence that you would do it excellently well. Were it not, therefore, for your situation with Pole in Ireland, I would certainly propose you as Gordon's successor. Should I do so now you must leave Pole much sooner than he wishes or expects; but still the situation, if I could without much difficulty and contest obtain it for you, is so far superior to that which you have got at the Comptroller's, both in emolument[4] and comfort, that I confess I feel it unjust by you to let your temporary service with Pole stand in your way. If you have Gordon's office you certainly must be here by the *middle of September at latest.* The long and short of the matter, therefore, is this: Let me know what you, after communicating with Pole, think upon the subject. Do not let this transpire further. If you decidedly wish to have the Commissariat, let me know without loss of time. I will apply for the appointment for you. I will not promise to urge it as indispensable, but I will propose it strongly, and you shall be out of your uncertainty speedily; but my reason why I wish you to keep

[4] The salary of the former was 2,700*l.*; that of the latter, 1,500*l.*

it to yourself is, that if I meet with a very strong resistance I shall not think it a ground to quarrel upon.

'There is one objection which I feel strongly to this arrangement, and it is this: that I think it cuts you off completely from Parliament, where I think your services might be *most useful* to the country. You can hardly expect a situation in Parliament which would be worth your changing with the Commissariat. You may show this letter to Pole. . . .'

The conclusion of the proposed arrangement was for some time uncertain, and it was not until the 21st that Perceval succeeded in obtaining the Prince's final approval.

The Minister's sentiments on this occasion were pleasantly expressed in the following note to Colonel Herries:—

'I am sorry you should have felt it necessary to give yourself the trouble of calling on me, and still more so that I was not at home. I accept your thanks for your son's preferment. I assure you I have very great satisfaction in having at length been able to provide for him. But I am so truly sensible of the value of his services to me that I shall always think him less indebted to me than I am to him. Permit me to add that it gives me an additional pleasure to think of the satisfaction which I am sure the appointment in question has given you.

'Ealing: Aug. 22, 1811.'

Colonel Herries wrote in reply:—'A thousand thanks for your kind note from Ealing. . . . How gratifying

for me to know that he is and has been attached to you beyond expression ever since I had the good fortune to recommend him to your notice. . . . .'

The declarations in these two notes were most sincere. There subsisted between the private secretary and his chief—whose memory he ever cherished with affection—a mutual feeling of the strongest attachment. Spencer Perceval, who has been the object of so much party hatred and invective,[5] had, indeed, all the qualities which claim the admiration of those who are capable of appreciating sterling worth. The person who, out of the limits of Perceval's domestic circle, perhaps knew him best—who possessed his entire confidence, who was familiar with all his actions, and we might almost say with all his thoughts—was wont to speak on every occasion of his former chief as the model of a high-minded, high-principled, truthful, generous, chivalrous gentleman, *sans peur et sans reproche.*

It seems probable that Mr. Herries at this period made himself obnoxious to the Opposition by the zeal and activity displayed by him, as Mr. Perceval's secretary, in the cause of the Government. The strong animosity against him, which showed itself in a very marked manner afterwards, began now to appear, and particularly on the part of Mr. Tierney, who subsequently manifested his hostility most conspicuously on every opportunity. Some passages in the following

[5] What can be more deplorable than the fury with which Napier 'tears his passion to tatters' whenever he mentions the name of Perceval? What can be more revolting than the manner in which Lord Holland, in his *Memoirs of the Whig Party,* dwells upon a fancied resemblance between the features of Perceval and those of Robespierre?

letter to Mr. Wellesley Pole, which is curious in other respects, strengthen this belief :—

'Great George Street: Oct. 24, 1811.

'My dear Sir,—I have to thank you for your letters of the 14th and 17th, and to congratulate you on the manner in which the business of the 19th[6] went off. I saw Perceval just after he had received your private letter to Ryder, and he appeared well satisfied with the event. The conduct of the Catholics has certainly given great advantage to the Government throughout this recent contest; and in no other respect so much as by its influence on the policy of York House, where it has deprived their own cause of the benefits it must otherwise have derived from the strong and ancient bias which previously existed in its favour. The Catholic question, if it had been prudently managed, would inevitably have embarrassed the Government in the highest degree, and most probably have expelled Messrs. Perceval, Pole, and Co. from their stations. It is fortunate for the country that this powerful organization is in unskilful hands.

. . . . . .

'Arbuthnot, after coming back again to us for a day or two, is returned into the country, and during his absence that kind of news which would be interesting to you does not so frequently reach me. Perceval stays more in the country than he used to do, and I am so much occupied here that I have scarcely time to prowl about in quest of secret intelligence of the

[6] A Catholic meeting, of which there is a humorous account in another letter from Mr. Wellesley Pole. It seems to have been a paltry affair.

enemy's movements. They threaten to turn me out when they come in. When Gordon mentioned this to me, I gave him a hint that it would be a bad precedent for him as well as for me. It might be a bad fashion to turn out officers on the staff at every change.

'I believe it was only a bluster of Tierney's, which he was very glad to repeat. Believe me, &c.,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

CHAPTER II.

Office of Commissary-in-Chief—Its origin and duties—Defects and reforms in Commissariat service—Peninsular war—Supplies to British and Allied armies—Historical errors—British Government vindicated—Napier's false assertions refuted—Herries's correspondence with Wellington and others—Extensive labours.

THE office of Commissary-in-Chief, which Mr. Herries[1] held from October 1, 1811, to October 24, 1816, when it was abolished, was created in 1809. The duties of this functionary consisted primarily in providing for the troops at home (not including those in Ireland) bread and forage,[2] as well as various stores required for the barrack department and the departments of the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Hospitals, and the Surgeon-General; and, for armies and stations abroad, all such supplies as the Lords of the Treasury might direct to be sent from England. He was also bound to collect accurate statistics of the resources and means of communication both of Great

[1] The papers relating to this period of his public life are exceedingly numerous, comprising, besides official correspondence, eighteen bound volumes of his own private or semi-official letters and memoranda, as well as a great quantity of statements and accounts (filling many large boxes and drawers) not intelligible to the uninitiated without much study. The limits of the space allotted to this work will allow us to produce only a few extracts from these records, many of which have considerable historical interest.

[2] The purchase of meat, for a long time provided by commanding officers, was ultimately transferred to the Commissary-in-Chief.

Britain and of foreign countries where British troops were stationed, and to exercise a general control—no easy matter—over the Commissariat everywhere except in Ireland and the East Indies.

The organization and management of the British Commissariat, originally very defective, were greatly improved by Colonel (afterwards General Sir Willoughby) Gordon, the first head of the new department. Further improvements, suggested by experience, were introduced by Mr. Herries; but, in spite of all his efforts to secure regularity and check abuse, there still remained many imperfections, never entirely removed. This branch of the public service, in which undoubtedly there were to be found many officers of great ability and zeal, but a large number of others in all ranks possessing neither of these qualities, and not a few who were devoid of common honesty, seems to have been at one time looked upon as a refuge for the destitute. A place in the Commissariat was an object of general desire on the part of those who could find no other means of subsistence. It is quite amazing to read the multitude of letters which Mr. Herries had to write in answer to applications on behalf of candidates for employment or promotion made to him every day by persons of all conditions, from dukes and duchesses to inhabitants of provincial 'Red Lions' and 'Blue Posts.'

The patronage of the department rested with the First Lord of the Treasury, whose first appointments to junior clerkships were made, however, subject to test examinations, and who apparently gave promotion only to persons recommended by the Commissary-in-Chief

under certain well-defined conditions, the object of which was to make advancement depend upon good service alone.

'There is a rule,' Mr. Herries writes, in reply to a request, 'strictly adhered to with respect to promotions in the Commissariat in the Peninsula, which I am sure you will admit to be a very proper one—viz. to proceed in all cases upon the recommendation of the senior officer of the department, approved by Lord Wellington. This rule is adopted by the Treasury with a perfect reliance that such recommendations will only be made on the ground of merit in the service, and not on account of private favour.'

Mr. Herries's anxiety to prevent jobbery is shown by extracts from two other letters, the first of which is to Commissary-General Bisset, dated January 30, 1812:—

'I have done what I could to send you a good batch of clerks to meet your last requisition. I have rejected several of those sent to me by the Treasury, and have given my friends there warning that I shall in future deal very strictly in the examination of the persons they appoint, and by no means submit to the practice which has hitherto obtained too much of making the Commissariat a general depôt for everything else. I will endeavour to introduce a better system, and to receive none but well-educated young men and as much as possible *gentlemen*, into the department.'

The other letter is to the Secretary of the Treasury, dated May 1812:—

'I feel that I am getting into terribly hot water in

consequence of my endeavours to purify this department. It is generally by the recommendation of some considerable person that even the worst subjects are introduced into it, and unfortunately those persons are disposed to be offended if their protégés are rejected or dismissed. If their resentments were properly directed, they would be against the parties who discredit their recommendations and not against me. But justice is a rare thing in this world.'

A curious description of the qualifications of a rejected clerk having what is called *good interest* is given in a letter to a friend of the patron :—

'Having alleged that he was *flurried* at his first examination, I allowed him a few days to collect himself. The second epistle was the fruit of his renovated studies. His written answers to the questions which are put to all clerks before they are examined are equally illiterate and *heterographical.* He says he is "a lernging a letel french." In arithmetic he is likewise deficient. This will, I trust, enable you to satisfy Mr. —— that I could not possibly have admitted Mr. —— into a department in which his sole business would have been writing and arithmetic.'

To the last the Commissary-in-Chief was intent on reform.

He wrote on August 18, 1815, to Mr. Rosenhagen, Comptroller of Army Accounts at Paris :—

'Your last letter has given me much satisfaction. *Your* confidence in the ultimate success of the plan leaves no doubt upon my mind that we have laid the foundation of an improvement in the administration of our military

expenditure which must have the most important consequences. I have lately seen enough of Commissariat accounts and conduct to make me shudder at the old system (if roguery and carelessness could be called system), and wonder at John Bull for having endured it so long. There are undoubtedly some good, honourable, and clever men in my corps, but as a body I often feel seriously ashamed of them. In addition to other faults which I have to find with them I have been unlucky enough to have met with a tone of conceit, or Jack-in-officeness, among those who have come across me which to me is offensive in the highest degree.

'I perceived by some orders which I saw at Brussels that the Duke was supporting you firmly against the negligent and refractory accountants. But you seem to think that some further bedevilling may be necessary. . . .

'The accounts of the military chest have always been regular. I am pleased to find that my organization of that branch has answered well. . . .'

And later, on the subject of a new system for the simplification and prompt examination of accounts:—

'When we shall have once brought matters to such a state we may confidently challenge the thanks of the public and the accountants. . . . We have a good many clever young men in the Commissariat, and when a better system is thoroughly established in the administration of it we may expect to draw good service from them. . . .'

In endeavouring to effect improvements in the British Commissariat the head of it did not disdain to

be taught by the enemy. From a French commissary, prisoner of war in England, he obtained, by a promise of release, full information concerning the working of the French system ; and a quantity of useful details was also procured for him by his brother, Captain (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir William) Herries, then serving on the staff of Sir John Hope in Spain.

Justice has rarely been done to the energy, perseverance, and ability with which immense difficulties on all sides were overcome by those in authority at home, and without which neither the indomitable spirit of this nation nor the heroic valour of its soldiers—not even the genius of their great commander—would have availed to bring the contest to a successful and triumphant issue.

The popular judgment, swayed by the passionate invectives of Napier, which, throughout his History of the Peninsular War, represent the British general as painfully struggling against the negligence, the incapacity, or the ill-will of the Government, and by the impatient complaints published, without the replies to them, in the Duke of Wellington's Correspondence, has been pronounced without examination of the evidence which, if brought forward on the other side, would have afforded a complete refutation of many assertions allowed to pass current because those who could have answered them were unwilling to enter into disputes concerning bygone transactions. The person best acquainted with these matters was for many years in confidential intercourse with the Duke of Wellington, and could not, therefore, have stirred up a public con-

troversy respecting despatches containing expressions hastily written and too hastily printed. But, in private conversation, Mr. Herries always emphatically denied the truth of the charge of neglect, so frequently made and insinuated in books, pamphlets, and newspapers, against the Government in general during the war, but most particularly under Mr. Perceval's Administration.

'I could tell a very different story,' he said, 'if I chose to speak. There is not the least ground for pretending that the Duke was not supported to the utmost.'

It is not easy for an Englishman of the present generation rightly to appreciate the magnitude of the task which had to be accomplished by this country and its Government in the years between 1809 and 1814—a task as far exceeding in difficulty and labour that which was undertaken to so little substantial advantage twenty-five years ago, as the achievements and results of the war in the Peninsula surpassed those of the war in the Crimea in splendour and duration.

Instead of a few days several weeks were needed for the conveyance of an urgent demand from the seat of war to England. Instead of huge steamers ready at any moment to ship regiments or stores, and speed on their voyage unhindered by adverse gales or by enemy's cruisers, there were heavy sailers, neither capacious nor swift, often lying wind-bound at the Motherbank, or detained in port with their little cargoes on board for want of a convoy, not always to be furnished. In 1854 and 1855 there was no risk of molestation from Russian ships, which dared not show themselves upon the high

seas; but during the Peninsular war the passage was so insecure that transports were often captured off the coast of Portugal, and we even read of a packet so hotly chased by a privateer close to Falmouth that she was obliged to throw her mails overboard.

Instead of being able to draw supplies from all the markets of the world, our commerce was excluded for many years from those of the whole continent of Europe (Spain and Portugal excepted) as well as of the United States. From the Bay of Biscay to the Gulf of Finland, from Cronstadt to the North Cape, from Barcelona to the Bocche di Cattaro, every port and every coast were barred against us. The 'prostrate communities' for whose independence England, 'standing alone erect' (the phrase *single-handed*, so terrible to the ears of many feeble Englishmen in our day, did not make our fathers tremble), had fought, and was still fighting, were in declared hostility to her. It was only in the dominions of the 'unspeakable Turk' —friendly to his ancient ally in spite of recent aggression—that a British ship could find a hospitable harbour. The industrial resources of the United Kingdom, compared with what they became between forty and fifty years later, were slender; and yet from this country, not only for our own troops, but for those of our allies (whom we paid besides), all things needful had to be provided—clothes, arms, food, blankets, and stores of every description.

It is puerile to contend that at such a time, in such circumstances, such a work can have been done—and thoroughly done it was—without enormous exertion.

But we are not writing a history of the Peninsular war, nor are we called upon to give a detailed account of the prodigious supplies constantly kept flowing from these shores; we can do no more than exhibit a few illustrations of the manner in which the Commissary-in-Chief's department was conducted—the forethought he displayed and the embarrassments to which he was exposed from external causes.

Not the least of these was the frequent, perhaps unavoidable, failure on the part of different contractors to fulfil their engagements in respect both of the quality of the articles furnished and of the time of their delivery; gross frauds also, which called for severe measures, being sometimes detected. One of Mr. Herries's first administrative acts was performed in dealing with a case of this description, and his just treatment of it called forth the following warm eulogium from Mr. Wilberforce, although friendly to the delinquent, in a letter addressed to Mr. Perceval:—

'Yoxall Lodge: Oct. 28, 1811.

'My dear Perc^{l} (*sic*),—

. . . . . .

'I have since received your Commissary-in-Chief's letter concerning Mr. ——'s contract for Blankets, and I really might be suspected of flattery or insincerity if I were to endeavour to express fully the impression it has produced upon me. So much consideration, so much fairness and candour, I have seldom seen displayed. The paper certainly does Mr. Herries the highest Honour. All I dare say is that, from the universally respected character which, in a situation

where He[3] has been open to continual observation, his conduct during a rather long life has obtained for him, I am convinc'd that there was no bad Intention, and consequently you will be dis[p]os'd to press on him as lightly as a sense of duty will allow you. I should also add that certainly it is for y[e] public Benefit to encourage Competition, and therefore, so far again I must limit it as Duty will permit, it must be desirable to prevent all but very great Capitalists being so alarm'd by this Example as to be deterr'd from offering for the Supply of any article for public Use. I have really thought it right to acknowledge y[e] impression Mr. Herries's letter has produced, but I hope you will not let what I have written be seen by Mr. ——, himself, as he might scarcely understand it; tho', believing him to be a worthy man, I shall certainly endeavour to produce in him y[e] same conviction which I feel myself when I can have a fit opportunity. . . .'

Few instances of dishonest intention are mentioned, but vexatious delays and bad workmanship are frequently complained of in the correspondence.

'I am quite sick of contractors,' writes the Commissary-in-Chief in one letter; 'they are growing worse and worse.' And in another letter he writes to the Storekeeper-General, 'Your account of the supineness and backwardness of the Spaniards makes me regret the efforts which we made to accelerate the supplies which they are so little prepared for. On the other

[3] In spite of grammatical construction *He* must be taken to mean the contractor and not Mr. Herries.

hand, it smoothes the disappointments which the cursed contractors, notwithstanding all our exertions, have occasioned us. The whole of the infantry clothing[4] is but just now completed—I believe not all delivered.' The Storekeeper-General writes on April 10, 1812, 'I presume you have heard of all the misdeeds of the contractors mentioned in the enclosed?' (here follows a long list of failures); and on May 7, 'I have now only to trust that you are convinced of what dependence can be placed on contractors, and will hang up a few of them.'

Endeavours were made to avoid some of these difficulties by dealing directly with the principal manufacturers of Yorkshire for cloth, &c. For that purpose Mr. Herries went in person to Leeds. But it appears, from a strong remonstrance to a leading firm, that the manufacturers themselves undertook to do more than they were able to accomplish.

The tardiness and inaccuracy of requisitions from the seat of war were other causes of constantly recurring inconvenience, of which the military authorities, who had themselves to blame for it, did not fail to complain.

In a letter to the head of the Commissariat department at Dublin we read this passage:—'I am afraid the cargo for Sicily will necessarily be delayed by the difficulty of procuring cloth exactly to match the patterns which they have sent me. The orders from abroad are generally accompanied with patterns or directions such as to render it difficult, if not impossible, to execute them.'

[4] For the Spanish (or Portuguese) troops. With the exception of great coats and shoes, no clothing was supplied for British regiments by the Commissary-in-Chief.

On October 9, 1812, the Treasury were informed that, on account of the delay which had taken place in the transmission of the patterns, it had become impossible to ensure the delivery of the clothing and other articles for the Portuguese forces under Marshal Beresford within the period specified in the requisition; and it appears that the carelessness with which these patterns had been prepared led to some ludicrous results, the width of the coats being quite insufficient for men of ordinary chest development, while the length of the trousers was supernatural. Sir William Beresford pressed for buff accoutrements, but from Spain there came through the Foreign Office a not less urgent demand for black accoutrements, although, observed Mr. Herries, 'not only they are not durable, but I understand the Spaniards have a great dislike to them, and even paint them white to make them appear like buff.' He pointed out at the same time that there were in store at Lisbon 24,000 sets of these perishable articles, which might with advantage be used before new ones were ordered. He never failed to remonstrate against such reckless waste, many instances of which are recorded, even in matters not belonging to his own department. Thus on September 20, 1813, he brought to the notice of the War Department the fact, which he had discovered from periodical returns, that thirty-six field guns (described as Mr. Roebuck's) and a quantity of other ordnance stores had been for a long time lying, apparently overlooked, on board four transports kept at Corunna, at a very great expense for daily demurrage.

While transports were so employed in Spanish harbours it is not surprising that there was a deficiency of shipping in England. 'The Transport Board,' wrote Mr. Herries in 1813, 'has not yet been able to assign more than about one-half of what the Storekeeper-General requires for the articles which I am providing. . . .' And again, 'I am exceedingly anxious to despatch the hay wanted by Lord Wellington as speedily as possible. I fear that the great pressure upon the Transport Department will not allow them to supply the tonnage for this and other objects so quickly as it is wanted. . . . I have 17,000 bags of biscuits now waiting for transports, which are not assigned to me even sufficiently fast to keep up the current supply, and I have no hope of getting rid of this arrear. I therefore strongly recommend that no time should be lost in allowing me to forward my supplies in foreign bottoms.'

. . . . . .

The absence of a convoy, without which British ships were not allowed to sail, was sometimes a serious difficulty. In the autumn of 1813 the army in the north of Spain was straitened by the want of cattle, and a failure of the supply of fresh meat in the winter was apprehended. The Commissary-in-Chief lost no time in making arrangements with a house at Cork,[5] which undertook to send live stock at regular intervals to Spain in vessels provided by itself. But there was no convoy, and the cattle ships, even if they could go to sea, were liable, under existing regulations, to be stopped by British cruisers and turned back. The

[5] Messrs. Callaghan and Sons.

Admiralty was vainly implored to grant special licenses; all that could be obtained by Mr. Herries, after a long negotiation, was permission for the departure of the Irish bullocks. Many indications may be observed of a strong desire on his part to give a large share of army supply business to Irish industry, which seems to have been not quite capable of using all the opportunities offered for its benefit.

What most conspicuously emerges from his correspondence is the constant care displayed in making preparation beforehand for meeting possible demands; but the anxiety so manifested was not always well looked upon by the illustrious commander of the British forces. On one occasion it brought censure upon a highly meritorious Commissariat officer for having, in compliance with directions from his chief, furnished him with 'materially useful' information, enabling him to provide for requisitions not yet received through the regular official channel.

It was not easy for the civilian departments at home (especially the Treasury and all connected with it) to escape the general's displeasure. A disposition to find fault with everything said or done by them is clearly perceptible throughout his Peninsular despatches; but the harsh and precipitate judgments therein recorded may be proved by documentary evidence in almost every case to have been erroneous.[6] Of such a

[6] This conclusion is arrived at after a very careful comparison of the Wellington despatches not only with official statements, but with private letters on business in progress or completed. We have found no single instance of a condemnation, reproof, or complaint, in opposition to which there is not convincing evidence.

kind is the sentence pronounced in his despatch of February 11, 1812, to Lord Liverpool:—

'I shall be very much obliged to your Lordship if you will desire that the Storekeeper-General may take some measures to ensure a supply of articles by his department of a better description. Everything in the way of entrenching and cutting tools supplied by his department is so bad as to be almost useless; and, indeed, all the stores supplied by this department are nearly of the same description.

. . . . . .

'It is really shameful that the public should be so badly served. . . .'

This assertion is adopted by Napier, who adds to it an imputation suggested by his own imagination.

In his observations on the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, as to which he remarks, first, that its duration was twelve days, 'or half the time originally calculated upon by the English general,' and immediately afterwards, with some inconsistency, that 'the inexperience both of the engineer and soldier, and the very heavy fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed than might have been expected' (but not actually expected by the general), he says, 'But the worst obstacle' (to what?—to the prolongation of the siege to the time calculated?) 'was caused by the disgraceful badness of the cutting tools furnished from the Storekeeper-General's office in England; the profits of the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected. . . .'

We have just seen what was the Storekeeper-

General's disposition towards contractors. His letters sufficiently show that the last clause in the sentence quoted above conveys nothing but an odious slander.

The Duke of Wellington's charge deserves more attention. The compiler of his despatches omitted, while publishing the accusation, to mention—as common justice demanded—the answers which disprove it. We now produce them.

Mr. Herries to the Earl of Wellington, K.B.

'(Private.)

'Great George Street: March 17, 1812.

'My Lord,—Colonel Bunbury having communicated to me that your Lordship, in a private letter to him, had expressed much dissatisfaction with some entrenching tools supposed to have been received in Portugal from the Storekeeper-General, I thought it my duty to lose no time in making enquiry into the cause of this mismanagement (for which I could not but consider the Commissary-in-Chief as being in a great degree responsible), in order to take such measures as might prevent the recurrence of it.

'The first step, however, in this enquiry relieved me from the vexation which I felt while I apprehended that some blame must attach on this occasion either to my department or to that of the Storekeeper-General. It appears by a letter from Mr. Barker, which I have the honour of enclosing, that no entrenching tools have been sent by the Storekeeper-General to Spain or Portugal, except some which were very recently procured from the Ordnance for the Portuguese Government.

'In what manner the tools in question were introduced into the Commissariat stores (from which I presume they must have been issued to the Quartermaster-General) I have no means here of ascertaining. I have enquired of Mr. Kennedy whether he was aware of any purchases of such articles having been made by the Commissariat on the spot, but his recollection does not enable him to satisfy me on that point. I conceive, however, that this must have been the case; but as implements of this nature could not be purchased by the Commissariat except under the direction of the Quartermaster-General, that officer will perhaps be able to remember whether he has at any time issued instructions for such a purpose. I am confirmed in this suspicion by a circumstance which has been reported to me—viz. that some entrenching tools, rejected some time ago on inspection by the Ordnance, were sent by a contractor on private speculation to Lisbon.

'We have very good information that this is far from being the only case in which stores rejected by the departments here have found their way to Portugal. In the article of shoes it has occurred to a very considerable extent; and I have the strongest reason to believe that such shoes have not only been purchased for regiments by quartermasters and others, but even our commissaries have bought large quantities of them. I have already written to Mr. Bisset[7] on the subject of this very inconvenient practice, which is the less justifiable because there has always been a large stock

[7] Afterwards Sir John Bisset, Commissary-General with the army in the Peninsula in the absence of Sir R. Kennedy.

of shoes in the depôt at Lisbon (by the last returns about 170,000 pairs), and I trust that he will take care to prevent any such purchases in future.

'I have been led to advert to the circumstance in order to meet the general observation with respect to the stores forwarded by the Storekeeper-General which accompanied your Lordship's complaint of the entrenching tools; for, after having witnessed the extreme care and diligence with which Mr. Trotter[8] superintends the execution of the duties belonging to his department, I feel confident in asserting that the instances of improper supplies which have come under the notice of your Lordship must have originated in purchases made by the commissaries abroad, and confounded with the stores sent directly from hence. So much pains, indeed, are taken to ensure the strictest conformity of the deliveries of all stores that pass through his hands to the patterns upon which the contracts are made, that I apprehend the fault, if any, must be in the patterns themselves. These have, however, generally been adopted upon the best information that could be procured from the military offices, and always more with a view to the fitness of the article for the service than to the price of it, the latter being considered as entirely subordinate to the former. Any alterations which your Lordship may think advisable shall be punctually attended to if you will direct them to be pointed out to me. . . . I have, &c.

'J. C. HERRIES.'

Enclosure in the above letter:—

[8] The Storekeeper-General.

Mr. Barker, Deputy Storekeeper-General, to Mr. Herries.

'February 28, 1812.

'In reply to your note of this day I have the honour to acquaint you that not any entrenching tools have ever been shipped by this department for either Spain or Portugal, excepting some recently received from the Ordnance Department for the Portuguese Government, which were shipped on the 31st of last month.'

In his reply, dated Niza, April 16 (received on May 8), Lord Wellington persisted in maintaining his former assertions, in spite of the positive declarations to the contrary which had been laid before him, and stated the number of bill-hooks, felling axes, pickaxes, spades, and shovels in the magazine of Castello Branco 'classed under the head of entrenching tools, all received from the Storekeeper-General and all bad of their kind.' He did not believe that any such articles had been purchased in the Peninsula. And in regard to shoes he said that he had authorised their purchase as well as that of blankets; 'but not, as you say, when there were 170,000 pairs of shoes in store. I believe,' he continued, 'that his Majesty's Government and the British Public would not be much pleased with me if they heard that any service had failed for want of shoes. But, notwithstanding the care which I take to make requisitions for shoes in time, and the care taken by the Secretary of State to order them, the stores have been more than once exhausted, and I should not have done my duty by the Army and the Publick if I had not availed myself of offers of good, not bad, shoes for sale. . . .'

It is quite clear, however, from the preceding and following evidence, that the commander of the forces was mistaken on all the points in question.

Mr. Herries to his Excellency the Earl of Wellington, K.B.

'Great George Street: May 11, 1812.

. . . . . .

'The return which has been made to your Lordship of the stores at Castello Branco, in which *pickaxes*, *spades*, and *shovels* are described as having been received from the Storekeeper-General, has led me to make new enquiries into the subject, and I am now enabled with much confidence to assure your Lordship that there is the strongest ground for believing that there must be an error in that return.

'Your Lordship is well aware that the Storekeeper-General does not provide the articles which he has the custody and distribution of. They are for the most part provided by the Commissary-in-Chief. But the Storekeeper-General inspects them, and is responsible for their being delivered agreeably to the pattern upon which they are contracted for, and which he likewise prepares.

'The *bill-hooks* and *felling axes* mentioned in the return alluded to were, I apprehend, of that description which are classed as entrenching tools. The bill-hooks and felling axes which have been provided by this department are those which form part of the camp equipage only. It is very likely, however, that the two sorts may have been confounded, and that the articles in question may have been sent out by this

department. But with respect to the pickaxes, spades, and shovels, none such appear to have been ordered or paid for by my predecessor or myself, and if they have been shipped by Mr. Trotter they must have been received by him from the Ordnance, who have invariably supplied these implements. By a reference to his books it does not, however, appear that any of these tools were shipped by him for Spain or Portugal.

'If your Lordship would allow me to point out a mode of ascertaining whether in this instance the return furnished to you was correct or not, I would venture respectfully to suggest that the officer in charge of the depôt at Lisbon should be called upon to make a particular return of all stores of the description alluded to received and issued there, specifying the dates of the several consignments and the persons by whom they were made. If it appears by his books that entrenching tools were consigned to him by Mr. Trotter, the dates will enable us to trace the error, and ascertain whether it has been on the part of the officers here or at Lisbon.

'With respect to the purchases of shoes which I adverted to, I have to lament exceedingly that the state of the stores should have been so differently represented to your Lordship and in the returns transmitted to this office, as to have made me appear guilty of a very unfounded observation on that subject. I trust I shall be excused for enclosing a statement which will remove any unfavourable impression which the error may have made on your Lordship's mind by showing that, according to such returns as I was in possession of, it

appeared that the stock of shoes in store had been considerable throughout the year and about the period when purchases were made, particularly in the last instance.

'With this view of the subject before me, I considered it to be owing to the neglect of the Commissariat officer, in not apprising the Quartermaster-General of the state of the stores, that the tender for this article was entertained and submitted to your Lordship; and it has always been upon this supposition alone that I have, in my letters to the head of the department abroad, animadverted upon the subject, which appeared to me to be of importance not merely in an economical point of view, but as the comfort and advantage of the soldier were concerned in it, especially when I was informed that a contractor whose offer of shoes had been rejected here was the person who, through the medium of his clerk, a Mr. ——, had in both cases sold the shoes to the commissariat at Lisbon.

'With respect to blankets, I am concerned to observe that the stock has been so low as to have obliged your Lordship to direct purchases to be made. I must, however, observe, in justification of this department, that no requisition appears to have reached it for blankets in the year 1811, except as follows: viz. . . . total blankets, 90,266, which were accordingly provided and shipped at the following periods: viz. . . . And as no general returns of stores in Portugal were received here from that of July 31, 1811, until April 15, 1812, when the returns of December 31, 1811, and March 14, 1812, reached me, the Treasury had no means of being

informed of the wants of the army in that respect. As soon as I was acquainted with them I made application for authority to ship 50,000 blankets for Lisbon, and I trust that they will have arrived before this letter reaches your Lordship.

'I have now had communication with Sir Robert Kennedy[9] on the subject of these supplies in general, and as he thinks that a supply of shoes to the extent of 20,000 pairs per month should be regularly forwarded from hence, I have applied to the Treasury for authority to send that quantity regularly, and will take care that there shall be no omission in the performance of this service, provided your Lordship approves of the arrangement. With regard to blankets, we have a very large quantity now in store, and I can forward immediately any number, in addition to the 50,000 now sent, that your Lordship may think proper to order. . . .

'Mr. Trotter will, I dare say, be glad to avail himself of your Lordship's permission to wait upon you. . . . He will immediately sail for Cadiz with a considerable supply of clothing, necessaries, &c., for the Spanish troops, in order to superintend the formation of the depôt there.

'I have the honour of enclosing a statement of this supply, by which your Lordship will perceive what progress has been made in the execution of the order for the outfit of 100,000 men[1] so far as regards this department. I have every reason to hope that the whole will be completed by the end of June.'

[9] Commissary-General of Lord Wellington's army, then in England on leave of absence.

[1] A considerable proportion of the clothing, &c., was shipped on May 12, the order having been received in March.

(Enclosure.)

'*Shoes.*

'The number of pairs of shoes remaining in store in Portugal at the periods undermentioned, as stated in the returns of those dates, being the only general returns which have been transmitted to the Commissary-in-Chief :—

Date of Return.	Pairs of Shoes in Store.
February 13, 1811	42,326
July 31, 1811	168,644
December 31, 1811	231,753
March 14, 1812	199,256

'Periods of arrival at Lisbon in the year 1811 of the undermentioned consignments of shoes forwarded by the Storekeeper-General. . . . Total pairs of shoes, 250,000.'

Mr. Trotter to Mr. Herries.

'Portsmouth: May 10, 1812.

'I am almost inclined to regret your very liberal defence of me, as I foresee it will only tend to bring you under Lord Wellington's lash ; but for what you have done and are doing I beg you will accept my best thanks, and assurances that, although I cannot but be much hurt at his Lordship's remarks, I feel entire satisfaction in the line I have pursued with regard to the inspection of all stores that have come under my department, and while the *mens conscia recti* is with me I shall never despair of effectually clearing away all prejudice.'

The simple method of investigation suggested by Mr. Herries does not appear to have been adopted. No

steps were taken to substantiate the injurious allegations, distinctly contradicted; neither were they withdrawn. Although refuted, they have been left on record supported by the authority of a great name.

The controversy ended with the following letter (unpublished) from Lord Wellington to Mr. Herries :—

'Fuente Guinaldo: June 9, 1812.

'Dear Sir,—I have received your letters of the 11th and 12th of May, and I conceive that more trouble has been taken and more attention paid to the complaint which I made than the subject deserves.[2] I made that complaint in order that the evil might be remedied, and not to cast any blame on Mr. Trotter or any other Department in England,[3] or to enter by letter into discussions on subjects of this description. We are all much mistaken if we suppose that our conduct or our transactions in the Publick Service are at all times most beneficial to the Publick, notwithstanding our good intentions. My object will upon every occasion be accomplished if, when a complaint is made, measures are adopted to prevent a recurrence of the evil complained of; and I have no desire to injure the feelings of any Individual, or that any Individual who may have erred by mistake should be punished.[4]

'You may depend upon it that I am too well aware of the value of money in this country to authorise the

[2] This is hardly just. The subject was certainly a very important one, and the complaint was very serious and preferred in the strongest language possible.

[3] But blame—and undeserved blame—was cast upon them.

[4] Yes; but the individuals said to have erred in this instance had not erred.

purchase of any article whatever which can be procured from England.

'Mr. Bisset has communicated to me your letter to him in regard to the raising of money by Bills of Exchange at rates settled by Private bargains,[5] and I had already received from the Secretary of State a copy of the minute of the Treasury on that subject. I assure you that I am fully aware of Mr. Perceval's kindness, and I must say partiality, towards me.[6]

'In order to carry on the service in this country I have been obliged to give my sanction to many arrangements of this description, which are quite inconsistent with the rules by which my conduct ought to be guided under other circumstances.

'The only excuse for these irregular arrangements is necessity. If it was not necessary the bargain for raising 500,000 dollars at Gibraltar, of which you disapproved, was, according to all the rules of conduct, quite unjustifiable. Here, I think, we who carry on an important Service in this country, with means avowedly inadequate to their object, ought to have the confidence of Government and of our official superiors that we know what is right, and that we don't depart from what is Right excepting because it is absolutely necessary in order to be able to carry on the service at all. If it

[5] Private bargains meant fancy prices extorted by monopolist money-dealers. The Treasury, perceiving the ruinous tendency of such arrangements, whereby present relief was sought at the cost of augmented future embarrassment, tried to prevent them, but were compelled to yield to Lord Wellington's urgent representations.

[6] Compare this declaration with Lord Wellesley's utterances and Napier's virulent attacks upon Perceval for his imaginary neglect of Lord Wellington.

is thought that we don't understand what is right in a particular branch of the business entrusted to us, or that we depart from the right line without sufficient necessity, persons who possess the confidence of Government should be sent out to perform that particular duty.

'But it increases to a great degree the difficulties and responsibility of our situation for Government and our official superiors to find fault with measures which I admit are quite unjustifiable unless in a case of necessity, without adverting to that necessity.

'Every Individual who means to do his duty for the Public must carry on the service not only according to the orders, but according to what he believes to be the wishes of his official superiors, and you may conceive how much his embarrassments are increased when he finds that his conduct has been disapproved of in a case of necessity, in which he is conscious that nothing could justify him but the existence of that necessity. Therefore it is that I contend for it that we ought to have the confidence of our official superiors, or we ought not to be employed in such transactions.

'You will see that my reasoning on this point applies as strongly to private hints and opinions as it does to official instructions, and I am certain that the Public Service cannot be carried on with advantage by any person who feels differently. Believe me ever, dear Sir, yours most faithfully,

'WELLINGTON.'

A singular comment upon the shoe question is fur-

nished by a correspondence concerning the endeavour of an industrial person to effect a little job by soliciting through a friend the favour of the Commissary-in-Chief to enable him to sell to the army a large quantity of shoes exported for that purpose to Lisbon. The answer was, 'I return you Mr. ——'s letter, and am sorry I can do nothing for Mr. ——. I have interfered in no manner with the purchases of shoes and necessaries by the commissaries abroad, except by recommending most earnestly to them to spend no money in the purchase of articles which can be sent to them from hence by the departments under Government. I have particularly reprobated the buying of shoes sent from hence by individuals, while they were receiving from two to three hundred thousand pairs a year from the Storekeeper-General. This may have led to Mr. ——'s disappointment. The price which he mentions (7*s.* 4*d.*) is full 1*s.* a pair higher than our shoes cost us on the average, delivered at Lisbon.'

The tenor of many letters at this period manifests a strong sense of injustice. In one of them, dated June 12, 1812, Mr. Herries writes to Mr. Trotter, 'I only wish that you and I were in the wrong in these matters. We might then make such apologies as would become us and satisfy others. . . . The last news I have from Portugal is more unsatisfactory than all that has preceded it. *Servire e non gradire*[7] is one of the three things, according to the Italian proverb, *a far*

[7] 'Aspettare e non venire,
Stare in letto e non dormire,
Ben servire e non gradire,
Son tre cose di far morire.'

morire. I hope we shall survive it. . . .' Another letter, however, on July 1, gives better intelligence: 'In the meantime you will be glad to hear that I have received a very satisfactory letter from Lord Wellington. . . .'

The existence of British troops, having wants to be satisfied, elsewhere than in Spain and Portugal at this period is commonly forgotten; but they did exist in many other places, and their wants were sometimes very pressing. While every exertion was being made for the supply of Lord Wellington's army, a cry of distress came across the Atlantic from Barbadoes, requiring speedy relief, which was largely afforded, though not without difficulty on account of the interruption of communications with the United States. This was in 1812. In the following year great embarrassment was caused by demands from Canada, reduced to straits in consequence of transactions directed from Lisbon; and a curious state of entanglement ensued. Mr. Herries, writing to the Victualling Office in March 1813 on the necessity for taking immediate steps to comply with very urgent requisitions, says, 'It is no doubt very vexatious that we should be obliged to send flour from hence at a most inconvenient moment to North America, while the ports of the Peninsula are filled with arrivals of the same article from the United States. Kennedy has very lately purchased 50,000 barrels at Lisbon, and he says there is abundance in the market there. . . . In the autumn of last year Mr. Robinson[8] sent 30,000 barrels of flour from Canada to Lisbon at the request of the Commissary-General in Portugal. . . .' On July 25

[8] Commissary-General in Canada.

a further and still more pressing demand was received from the same quarter; but the last convoy was appointed to sail on August 10 from Cork, and the Victualling Board was unable at so short a notice to ship all the flour required. To meet the emergency Mr. Herries resorted to a strange expedient, ordering the despatch of a large quantity of flour from Barbadoes, where there was then a great store, to Quebec. In the meantime questions had arisen concerning an intricate and speculative business into which Lord Wellington and Sir Charles Stuart, Minister at Lisbon, had been induced to enter, having the twofold object of obtaining large supplies of corn for the army from America at a time when, on account of scarcity at home, restrictions were placed on the exportation of grain from the United Kingdom, and of replenishing the military chest by the sale of the surplus importations. This commercial and financial undertaking, carried on by means of involved bill transactions, and conducted by contractors whose operations could not have been controlled by the General or the Minister, seems not to have been well looked upon in England; and the final examination of accounts at the close of the war showed that the objections entertained had been far from groundless. The necessity which had led to the adoption of the system having ceased, it was determined, upon the recommendations of a report from Mr. Herries to the Treasury (May 18, 1813), that no further measures should be taken for drawing supplies of grain and flour from America, and that the magazines of the army in the Peninsula, which then contained enough to last about twelve months,

according to official returns, should be kept constantly replenished for at least six months' consumption by regular monthly consignments from England. Judicious arrangements were made for this purpose. From the resentful comments, which have been published, on the resolution of the Treasury to put an end to the corn-dealing contract, the subsistence of the army might be supposed to have depended upon its continuance. But no sooner had preparations been carefully completed for sending to the Tagus a periodical supply than it was declared to be no longer wanted;[9] and, that no item of inconvenience or absurdity should be omitted from this strange complication, the tardy discovery of Peninsular abundance was made known in England just too late to enable the Commissary-in-Chief to apply to the relief of real necessities in a British colony the stores he had provided for supposed necessities in Spain.

It is evident that Mr. Herries was heartily supported by the Treasury, which seems to have been in most cases guided by his advice; but his activity was frequently hampered by *vis inertiæ* elsewhere, and especially in the War Office,[1] the dilatoriness and laxity of which in the conduct of business under Lord Palmerston's administration of it are repeatedly noticed.

Here are two out of several instances :—

[9] Mr. Herries to the Victualling Office, August 13, 1813.

[1] Some persons in the present day may require to be told that this, the Office of the Secretary *at* War, was, previous to 1854, not identical with the department of the Secretary of State *for* War and Colonies.

To W. Merry, Esq., War Office.

'July 21, 1812.

'My dear Sir,—I had some time since an application from your office to know if the great coats for Canada, according to a pattern directed in a special warrant for that purpose, had been prepared, and I informed you in reply that the pattern to which the warrant referred had never been exhibited, and that the want of it was the reason why these coats were not provided. Since that time the pattern has not been prepared, and I am still unable to proceed in the execution of the order.

'I am afraid there is some mistake somewhere. Yours very truly,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

To the Storekeeper-General, Lisbon.

'September 10, 1812.

'. . . . But I am surprised by the demand for *great coats*, which should have lasted longer. The contest between the Treasury and the Adjutant-General about the waterproofing, together with the customary slowness and negligence of the War Office, have thrown us cruelly into arrear in the provision of great coats for the army; and I doubt if we shall be able to furnish the 36,000 required for the Portuguese before the end of the year. . . .'

The mention of great coats leads to the notice of a passage in Napier's 'History of the Peninsular War,' in which that necessary article of a soldier's outfit is made the central pivot on which turn a series of highly

coloured pictures, exhibiting with equal truthfulness the miserable abandonment of British soldiers; the meanness, imbecility, and turpitude of all persons connected with Tory Governments; the benefits of despotism; the virtue, the omniscient wisdom, and, above all, the pure disinterestedness, of the Emperor Napoleon.

Sir William Napier, commenting upon a despatch addressed by Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst on December 21, 1813, and, as he was wont to do, improving upon his text, alleges, as proofs of the negligence on the part of the English Cabinet with which the Duke had to struggle, that 'the general clothing of the Spanish troops and the great coats of the British soldiers for 1813 were not ready in January 1814 .... and the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first on the snowy mountains, then in the more chilling damps of the low country about Bayonne. The clothing of the British soldiers for 1814 should have arrived in the end of 1813. . . . It did not, however, arrive until the troops were in progress towards the interior of France. . . .'

To the invective of the eloquent historian we may be permitted to oppose a few dry facts.

In the first place, with regard to the clothing of the Spanish troops, which is said by Sir William Napier not to have been ready in January 1814, we observe that, according to that very despatch which is adduced as evidence in support of his assertion, the deficiency on December 21, 1813, amounted to only 3,000 suits; that more than three months previously, in a despatch

to Sir Henry Wellesley, dated September 16, the Duke of Wellington reported the arrival of a part of the Spanish clothing, and added that 'all the troops with this army, with very trifling exceptions . . . were 'very sufficiently clothed;' that on January 14, 1814, he wrote to the Ambassador, 'The clothing and other stores for the Spanish army are now at Santander;' and that in a despatch addressed to Lord Bathurst in March this passage occurs: 'Some months ago I gave orders that the clothing and equipments for the Spanish army, which were in depôt at Corunna, should be removed to Pasages,' at which port the arrival of the 'Albion' store ship, laden with such articles, was reported to the Commisssry-in-Chief by Sir R. Kennedy on August 23, 1813.

Secondly, as to the great coats of the British soldiers, it is to be remarked that the despatch on the supposed authority of which the assertion above quoted is made does not allude to them at all. It is manifest from the context that the great coats spoken of as being deficient are those for the Spanish troops; and if Sir William Napier had used due diligence in the examination of the Duke's despatches which he cites, he would have perceived in one of them, dated November 1, 1813, the words, 'The great coats of the army [British] . . . . which were ordered round early in August, are in Oporto waiting for convoy;' and in a later despatch, dated St. Jean de Luz, December 19, 1813, 'The soldiers' great coats have also arrived upon this coast.' But this is not all. With still less pardonable negligence the historian overlooked three other documents

which shatter to pieces the whole of his malevolent accusation. The first is a General Order, dated Freneda, April 25, 1813: 'As the English and German infantry of the army will be provided with tents during the coming campaign, the commander of the forces is desirous that the great coats of the soldiers should be left behind, in order to relieve them from a part of the weight which they would otherwise be obliged to carry, and that they should carry only their blankets. . . . Orders will hereafter be issued for the disposal of the great coats of the regiments in store. . . .' The second document is a letter dated May 1 ('Wellington Despatches,' &c.), from the A.-G. to the Earl of Dalhousie, pointing out that there was no reason to apprehend evil consequences to the health of the troops from the measure which had been decided upon. The third is an official report, to be found in the Record Office, from Sir R. Kennedy to the Commissary-in-Chief, dated Vera, November 5, 1813, containing the following passage: 'In consequence of the absolute want of shipping in the ports of Portugal to bring round supplies and stores required from thence, and particularly the great coats of the army, that were left in store at the commencement of the campaign, I lately requested Commodore Sir George Collier to send a number of empty transports to Lisbon without delay. . . .' Thus it appears that what is put forward as a proof of scandalous inattention to the wants of the army on the part of the Government in England was the result of orders deliberately given by Lord Wellington himself, the great coats, the pretended non-arrival of which in the

Peninsula is declared to have been a cause of suffering to the soldiers at the beginning of 1814, having been purposely allowed to remain at Lisbon in the spring of 1813. It seems very strange that Sir William Napier, entering minutely into the particulars of this clothing business in a detailed narrative of military operations, should have been ignorant of circumstances which the civilian writer of the present biography was able, without difficulty, to discover. But it is one thing to search for truth, another to seek opportunities for vilifying political enemies.

Thirdly, respecting the rest of the clothing of the British army, we must note that it was supplied, not by the Government, but by the colonels of regiments —a fact well known to Sir William Napier, who was conversant with all the administrative details of our military system.

In his despatch, above alluded to, of December 21, 1813, Lord Wellington complains (though he says that he does not wish to make complaints) that every branch of the service is 'stinted, particularly the naval branch and those supplies which necessarily come from England.' But the only instance which he mentions of stinted supply, as alleged, is the still outstanding deficiency of part of the Spanish clothing. We have just shown to what very slender proportions this ground of complaint (if indeed it had any real existence) is reducible. As 'the reason of this stinting,' he assumes that 'the inferior departments don't observe that when British exertion is to be made on a new scene the old means are not sufficient. New engines

must be set at work; otherwise the service must be stinted in one or both scenes.'

. . . . . .

How far this censure may have been deserved by other departments we cannot venture to judge, although its justice may fairly be doubted,[2] but that it was in any degree merited by the particular department in England with which we are now concerned we do not hesitate positively to deny. The evidence of daily correspondence with official persons of various grades, with numerous contractors, with manufacturers, with dealers large and small in all sorts of goods, warrants us in affirming that none of the supplies which that department was bound to furnish were stinted; that all available appliances were applied to the service, and all practicable means for its acceleration were employed. All the industrial resources of the country were employed to the utmost. No new ones could have been created by word of command.

There was, however, a nullifying element, the action of which baffled the zeal and activity of the 'inferior departments' of the Government at home, and that was the chaos which prevailed in some of the inferior departments of the army abroad.

'The whole business of the Storekeeper's department in this country is in very great confusion,'[3] writes Lord

[2] The Duke's complaints of inefficient co-operation on the part of the navy are completely answered in a letter from Lord Melville, published in the *Supplementary Despatches*.

[3] It is proper to state that Sir Robert Kennedy, to whom the above remark was officially communicated, positively denied the existence of the alleged confusion.

Wellington to the Secretary of State on May 7, 1813. We have seen in the case of the shoes supposed not to exist, when in reality 200,000 pairs were in store, that the commander of the forces did not know what he had at his disposal. We have seen that pressing demands for fresh accoutrements for the Portuguese troops were sent to England when many thousand sets remained unnoticed and perishing at Lisbon. Let this be added: In a letter to the Foreign Office of April 17, 1813, Mr. Herries says, 'We shipped in the last year nearly 150,000 sets of accoutrements complete for Spain. Where are they?'—a pertinent question, which was probably never answered.

Our Peninsular allies had certainly no reason to complain of lack of readiness to satisfy their not very moderate demands. In the spring of 1812 clothing and equipments complete for 100,000 Spanish infantry were furnished by the Commissary-in-Chief in about ten weeks. Immediately afterwards a cavalry corps was fitted out with like rapidity and in the most expensive style. A further order for the clothing of 50,000 Spaniards at the end of the same year was acted upon without delay, and large supplies of the same description were incessantly forwarded to the Portuguese army. Indications of the burdensome nature of this work, as well as of the extraordinary promptitude and care with which it was executed, are frequent in many letters relating to it. Let one or two suffice.

'Owing to the great haste in which these articles were required, a considerable proportion of the cloth which had been sent up from Yorkshire, only partially dressed, has

been made up notwithstanding that deficiency, which affects the appearance only, the weight and fineness being the same as the rest. . . . A similar circumstance has occurred in providing the duck frocks and trousers. The whole quantity required for 100,000 men was not to be procured either in London or in the country of the same quality. I was therefore constrained to purchase such as could be got, to avoid delay. . . . The shirts are also made of linen of several different qualities (all of them, I hope, sufficiently good), for the same reason. The order being very pressing, I took what could be got immediately, and I believe 270,000 shirts were never made so quickly before. . . . I am sorry to say that we have *just now* received from Spain patterns for the infantry clothing, which is nearly all completed. If our uniforms are not exactly as the Spaniards wished them to be, it is their own fault. . . . I have not yet received any requisition for the renewal of the clothing which you provided last year for the Portuguese troops, but I have been looking forward to it, and shall be pretty well prepared for it when it arrives. . . .'[4]

'The value of our gifts, our loans, our assistance of every description, is underrated by the Spaniards. They seldom reach the expectations, much less the demands, of that Government. In truth, we have supplied their wants so liberally and so readily that we have misled them into exaggerated notions of our powers, and they receive our loans rather as the proofs of inexhaustible means than of generous efforts in the

[4] Mr. Herries to Colonel Gordon, Quartermaster-General of the army in Spain, June 22, 1812.

common cause. Instead of being surprised at our furnishing the equipment for 100,000 men in a few months, they wonder why we do not produce them in a few days. You say they are much in want of cavalry clothing and saddlery. I suppose they think we have only to ship them on receiving the requisition. I hope you will explain to them that saddles take some time to make. When I say that I expect to get about 600 per week made from this period till the 4,000 are completed, you will know that it is as much as can well be done in London.

'Their demand was for 10,000 cavalry. Lord Castlereagh has cut it down to 4,000. Their patterns, which we have received, are very exact, and we shall have no difficulty in conforming to them, except with respect to the saddles, which are such as no workmen here will condescend to make, and which, if we could execute them, would, on account of the quantity of useless leather about them, be enormously expensive. I have therefore had a consultation with the Spanish Ambassador (whose regiment of 600 hussars I am supplying, as I think I told you in a former letter), and he agrees with me in thinking that our light dragoon regulation saddle will be *good enough* for the Spanish cavalry. Care will be taken to make them narrow enough in the tree. The outfit of these dragoons, including arms, will be about 27*l.* per man.

'The cloth is all to be dyed, and part of it to be made before we can set our tailors to work. . . .'[5]

'I am glad we succeeded in satisfying the Portu-

[5] To the Storekeeper-General at Cadiz, July 1, 1812.

guese Government. You and I took trouble enough about it. I am glad too that the Spaniards in the south are satisfied. They ought to be so.'[6]

In the following year, 1813, new allies, lately the friends or subjects of our enemy, called for British aid, and the labour of the Commissary-in-Chief was doubled. His daily enumeration of the supplies of all kinds that were scattered over the Continent conveys, much more clearly than any general description, a notion of the exertions of the Government of this country and of the severe pressure caused by the services so eagerly rendered.[7] There is hardly any conceivable article of military use which is not mentioned. Even medicines and surgical instruments were furnished.

The wide-ranging duties of Mr. Herries's office were quite sufficient for a man possessing uncommon energy, but much more was required of him. He was constantly called upon by the Government to give his attention to matters lying out of the sphere of his proper attributions. On one occasion, in sending to the Treasury an opinion upon the project of a loan which Lord William Bentinck proposed to raise in Sicily, he offered a mild remonstrance :—'I do not exactly see why that paper should have been sent to the Commissary-in-Chief.'

[6] To the same, September 10.

[7] The following is one example :—'The Prussian order will be executed with the least possible delay; but it consists of so many articles which cannot be furnished forthwith that it would be unnecessary, I conceive, to ship accoutrements for it immediately, unless, indeed, you propose to send the arms without waiting for the clothing and necessaries. In that case we will of course proceed with the accoutrements as fast as we can—that is, at the rate of about 2,000 sets a day, which is the utmost we can get made. The enormous quantity shipped within the last five or six months has quite exhausted us.'—*To the Under-Secretary of State for War*, April 7, 1813.

In a letter written in 1814 he says, 'The extraordinary pressure of business which the Treasury have gradually accumulated upon me, a great deal of it only remotely connected with the duties of this office. . . .' What was the principal nature of this business will presently appear.

CHAPTER III.

Dearth of specie—Efforts of the Government to procure it—Unjust accusations—Napier's fables—Money for Allies—Hanoverian coinage—New plan for collecting French money for Wellington—Pecuniary arrangements and negotiations with Allies at Paris—Russian trickery—Faulty treaties of subsidy—Waterloo campaign—French *louis* coined at the London mint—British army abundantly furnished—Management of subsidiary payments—Correspondence with foreign Governments and successful monetary operations—Numerous employments—Office of Commissary-in-Chief abolished—Auditorship of the Civil List—Laudatory Treasury minutes and speeches in Parliament on Herries's conduct—Mr. Spencer Walpole's *suppressio veri*.

IT is well known how greatly the British army in the Peninsula was sometimes distressed by the want of the only thing which the Government at home did not, and could not, supply in abundance—hard cash. A guinea was a rare article of luxury, and the quantity of silver coin in circulation was insufficient for the purpose of small change. Every quarter of the globe was ransacked for specie, but the disturbance of trade, the adverse state of the exchanges, the diminution of the produce of the mines of Spanish America, owing to civil war and anarchy, and the prohibition of commercial intercourse with that part of the world, baffled every effort to procure an adequate supply at a time when it was well known that many millions of hard dollars lay uselessly hoarded at Cadiz and Lisbon.[1] The following

[1] At the beginning of 1811 it was estimated that from seventy to eighty millions of Spanish dollars existed in Cadiz. A few months earlier, among other large sums placed for safety on board the British fleet in the Tagus, the amount of 100,000*l.* was so consigned to the 'Barfleur' by two individuals at

passages in some letters from Mr. Herries exhibit the extreme penury of cash which prevailed in England :—

To Commissary-General Bisset.

'May 25, 1812.

'. . . Your financial difficulties are very distressing, and I shall be heartily glad if the wisdom of any Government which may succeed that of Mr. Perceval shall discover any means of increasing the supply of specie . . . but I fear this cannot be the case. We are now collecting from the ships lately arrived from China and the East Indies a quantity of dollars, which may perhaps in all amount to 500,000. These will be sent to you with as little delay as possible. The same ships brought larger quantities, but the Bank are so much pressed for tokens for our domestic currency and so unable to meet the demand . . . that they have taken the greater part . . . for their own immediate use.[2] . . . The country is not in a state to bear the inconvenience which the disappearance of the tokens, now our only change, would bring upon it ; but they must disappear if the price of silver is raised a little more.'

Lisbon. A good deal of curious information on these and other matters is contained in a series of letters written to Mr. Herries in 1810 and 1811 by Mr. Commissary-General Drummond, who was sent by the Treasury to the Peninsula to enquire into the army expenditure and the best mode of defraying it. His mission proved fruitless, owing to indisposition at head-quarters to promote its objects. He then went to Lima, with full authority to purchase bullion, but the quantity which he was able to procure was comparatively insignificant.

[2] In a despatch dated August 18, 1812, Lord Wellington, commenting upon these circumstances, complained that 'the Bank . . . did not give us even a shilling, and we got the gleanings.' But the 500,000 dollars gleaned represented considerably more than 2,500,000 shillings.

To the Governor of the Bank of England.

'June 10, 1812.

'I made an application some time back to you for bank tokens for Newfoundland. You were then not able to spare me more than 1,000*l*. . . .'

'December 21.

'It appears likely that we may be pinched for the want of a few dollars to carry on the service at Anholt, and I am commissioned to enquire if you can accommodate me with 10,000 dollars. . . .'

Such being the actual state of things, the commissaries in Spain and Sicily were warned that they must not look for supplies of specie from England sufficient for all their wants, but rely chiefly upon the resources of the local money markets. But it has been often and untruly said, on the authority of the philippic delivered by Lord Wellesley in the House of Lords on March 13, 1813, against his recent Cabinet colleagues, and of some hasty expressions of irritation in his brother's despatches, that the commander of the British army in the Peninsula suffered not only from want of care on the part of the Government, but from their unwise interference with his pecuniary negotiations. On these subjects the following fragment of a paper sent by Mr. Herries to Lord Liverpool on March 17, 1813, seems deserving of attention :—

'In the speech of Lord Wellesley respecting the conduct of the war in the Peninsula there are two subjects of accusation which appear to be founded, the one entirely in error, and the other in the perversion of a fact.

'The first is that our exertions in the Peninsula were limited by our expenses for certain miscellaneous services at home; the other, that they were diminished by the mismanagement of the Government in procuring specie abroad. It may seem strange that in urging the last of these Lord Wellesley was not sensible of his error in arguing upon the former. If it be true that our measures were cramped by our want of success in procuring hard money, whether proceeding from mismanagement or not, it must be obvious that the suspension of any services at home not defrayed with hard money could have tended in no degree to extend them.

'It is scarcely necessary, indeed, to point out to any person, however little conversant with this subject, that the services alluded to at home were in no respect in the way of our expenditure abroad, when it is known that our commanders and agents in the Peninsula had no limits whatever imposed upon their purchases of specie. It was never said to them, You shall draw for so much and no more, because we have other expenses to defray, which must consume a part of our funds; but they were authorised to use their utmost endeavours to procure all the specie they could, without restriction of any kind whatsoever. And if it be argued that we might have purchased more dollars in the home market for the purpose of making remittances in aid of Lord Wellington's chest, it will readily occur that we should have gained nothing by such an operation, that the quantity of dollars would not have been increased by it, but that the London market would then have added another rival to those of Lisbon and Malta, and that

we should have had the same dollars either here or there, accordingly as the prices might best meet the speculations of the merchants.

'Upon the second point, Lord Wellesley is represented to have ascribed to the mismanagement of the Government an absurd clashing of several agents employed to procure specie in the same market, and to have asserted that Lord Wellington was directed not to go higher than 5*s.* 8*d.* in the purchase of dollars for his army at Gibraltar, while the agent for the Mediterranean was allowed to outbid him at the same place, and to sweep away all the specie at a much higher price.

'The circumstance which Lord Wellesley must have had in view when he made this charge is one which occurred while he was himself in the Government, when it may be presumed that he was fully acquainted with the nature of it, and when he might have taken some steps to apply a remedy if it was so flagrantly absurd as he seems to have represented it.

'The true statement of the case is this: The commissaries-general attached to British armies abroad (who are the agents supposed to be alluded to by Lord Wellesley in his speech) are instructed, under certain general regulations, to procure such specie as may be necessary for the forces to which they are attached by the negotiation of their Bills upon the Treasury. These regulations necessarily leave a considerable latitude to their judgment and discretion, which must be exercised in a variety of circumstances which cannot possibly be foreseen or regulated by direct instructions

from home. Acting under those regulations, the commissaries-general in the Mediterranean and in the Peninsula, respectively, were each using their utmost endeavours to procure money within their several charges. At the time alluded to by Lord Wellesley Gibraltar was a point of contact between them, and as they had several times come in competition at that spot, the Treasury, foreseeing the evil consequences of that rivalry, and anxious to give every facility and preference to Lord Wellington's army, directed the officer in the Mediterranean to abstain from all interference with that point, and to leave it entirely to the commissary-general in the Peninsula. The difficulty, however, of procuring a sufficiency of money in the Mediterranean for the army there, enhanced by an interested combination of British merchants at Malta, produced so much embarrassment that Mr. Burgmann was driven to measures which, though not approved, and certainly never sanctioned, by the Treasury, were yet excused by the difficulties of his situation. These measures indirectly produced for a short time the effect described by Lord Wellesley at Gibraltar. For Mr. Burgmann entered into special contracts for dollars at such an extravagant rate that the parties contracting with him were enabled to go into every other market in the neighbourhood to obtain them at prices much higher than those existing at the time. And there is no doubt but that in this instance the agents of those contractors withdrew sums from Gibraltar which might otherwise have been purchased for the army of Lord Wellington at that place. . . .

'Strong, severe, and repeated disapprovals of these transactions by the Government at home (which has long since taken measures effectually to prevent the recurrence of such disorders) were conveyed to the Mediterranean while Lord Wellesley was in administration, and he may therefore have the means of knowing that if any evil of material importance has arisen out of them such evil is not chargeable upon the Government itself, but upon the mismanagement of agents acting erroneously and in opposition to cautious and proper instructions. In point of fact, however, it was an evil of additional expense only, and not an impediment to our general operations. For the whole quantity of dollars procured for the two armies was not diminished by this concurrence, although the price was unfortunately increased; nor is there any probability that a single dollar less has been secured for our use than could by any exertions have been obtained for it.

'Upon the statement that Lord Wellington was limited in his purchases to the price of 5*s.* 8*d.* the dollar, while others were allowed to purchase at a higher rate, it is necessary to observe that there is no foundation for the assertion, and that all the communications of the Treasury do, on the contrary, proceed upon the principle that to attempt to impose any maximum of price was contrary to the wishes of the Government and likely to embarrass the negotiations more than any other measure that could be adopted. It is possible, however, that Lord Wellesley may allude to a correspondence which took place in the latter end of

1811 and early part of 1812 respecting a purchase of dollars at 5*s.* 8*d.* by Mr. Bisset at Gibraltar, which was strongly disapproved of by the Treasury; but that correspondence will clearly show that the disapproval was founded not upon the ground of its being too high a rate, but upon the objection which arose out of this circumstance that the commissary was giving this price of 5*s.* 8*d.* by a private bargain, while he kept his . . . .'

The rest of the paper is lost. It may be supplemented by corroborative extracts from correspondence of the previous year which distinctly refute Lord Wellesley's allegations concerning bill negotiations, and show that the action of the Treasury and the Commissary-in-Chief in this matter afforded no just ground for the complaints recorded in some of the Wellington despatches.

Mr. Herries to Commissary-General Bisset.

'April 29, 1812.

'. . . I am well convinced that their Lordships are fully sensible of the difficulties with which you have to contend in raising the supplies of money requisite for the current service of the army, and by no means disposed to impute blame to you for any steps which, under circumstances of such difficulty, you may in the best exercise of your judgment think it expedient to adopt or to recommend to the commander of the forces; and although they may on some occasions differ from you in opinion, and think it right to state the difference and the grounds of it, yet from the communications which I have had with them I am persuaded that they feel the impossibility of laying down any fixed rules here which

should be binding upon you under all the various circumstances of the service in the Peninsula, which they must be unable exactly to appreciate at this distance. . . .'

The Assistant-Secretary of the Treasury to Mr. Herries.

'May 11, 1812.

'. . . But although their Lordships are anxious that these impressions should not be overlooked, and that the inconveniences which they think it possible may result from these private bargains should be brought under the notice of the Commissary and by him be submitted to the Earl of Wellington, yet they nevertheless wish it to be distinctly understood that they feel themselves utterly incompetent to form a judgment at this distance which should be opposed to the deliberate judgment of the Earl of Wellington on the spot, and you are distinctly to acquaint Mr. Bisset that if his Lordship should continue to think it advantageous to obtain money by such contracts Mr. Bisset will follow the Earl of Wellington's directions; and their Lordships will be fully prepared to sanction whatever he directs and be satisfied that it is determined by the best judgment which can be applied to the subject. . . .'[3]

From these letters it is clear that, so far from harassing Lord Wellington (as has been pretended) with vexatious opposition, the Treasury showed him the utmost deference, even when they had good reasons for thinking his monetary arrangements injudicious; that his operations were not restricted by any 'hard and

[3] A communication to the same effect was made by Mr. Herries to Mr. Bisset on May 14.

fast line,' but that, on the contrary, the greatest possible latitude was conceded to them; and that an unfair representation of the conduct of the Government towards him is conveyed by his letter of April 22, 1812, stating that 'the Commissary-in-Chief and the Treasury have disapproved of my sanctioning bargains for importing specie from Gibraltar, for which bills were to be granted by the Commissary-General at a more disadvantageous rate of exchange than the market rate of Lisbon. I have therefore been obliged within the last three days to refuse to give my sanction to an offer of 500,000 dollars upon a similar bargain. I can scarcely believe that the Treasury are aware of the distresses of this army. . . .'

The objections of the Treasury—which they allowed Lord Wellington to overrule—to private bargains were neither frivolous nor merely theoretical, and it appears from subsequent correspondence that Mr. Bisset also, a very able and experienced officer, agreed with them in condemning the system to which on one occasion he was compelled to have recourse.

There existed a sort of monetary *camorra* known by the familiar name of 'the Cab,' having its principal seat at Malta, and agents in Sicily and Spain, the design of which was, by subtle combinations and bold manœuvres, to drive out all other dealers, and secure to itself the monopoly of the money market. The British commissariat would then have been absolutely at the mercy of the association, which had already succeeded in extorting extravagant prices from two commissaries-general; and it was to be ex-

pected that if the demands of the '*Cab*' could not be resisted they would soon become ruinous. It was only by encouraging healthy competition in opposition to the multiplied forces of the monopolist league that the danger could be averted. The destruction of the pernicious power of the *Cab* was the aim of the Commissary-in-Chief; and the measures which he took for that purpose proved at last completely successful. They need not be particularly described. To all sorts of plans for raising the wind by ingenious, but hazardous, contrivances he was decidedly opposed. 'We must discourage,' he wrote to a mercantile correspondent, 'our commissaries and agents from dabbling in financial projects. They have not information enough to judge soundly of them.' He agreed with the Treasury in thinking some of the monetary devices resorted to, or proposed, probably at the suggestion of interested speculators or schemers, by the commander of the forces, unsound and impracticable. But in various instances besides those already mentioned a disposition was shown to give way to Lord Wellington's representations. An example is exhibited in a passage of a letter (May 14, 1812) to Commissary-General Bisset:—

'With respect to the observations in your letter . . . on the certificates bearing interest, I think it right to apprise you that in the adoption of that plan the Government here have yielded entirely to the judgment of Lord Wellington, having themselves been more disposed to apprehend some harm (by disturbing the present system of raising money in Portugal) than to expect much good from it. Their objections did not, however, appear to

Lord Wellington to counterbalance the probable advantages of this species of paper, and it only remained in adopting it to make such a difference in point of immediate pecuniary advantage between these notes and the bills of exchange on the Treasury as to render them applicable to different classes of money-holders only. This you have perceived, and your observations generally agree with what occurred to others who considered the proposal here. Theoretically speaking, I should not expect these certificates to produce much money, but Lord Wellington's better judgment, founded upon practical information, will, I doubt not, prove more correct.'[4]

Although it was never intended that the pecuniary wants of the army should be supplied principally by direct remittances from England, it is certain, whatever may be said to the contrary by partisan, or careless writers, that considerable sums in specie were periodically forwarded to the Peninsula during the last two years of the war.

Sir William Napier makes on this subject a distinct assertion which must be refuted. He alleges, as an instance of the negligence and opposition which, according to him, Lord Wellington met with on the part of the English Government, that 'at the moment of greatest pressure' (at the end of 1813) 'Colonel Bunbury, Under-Secretary of State, was sent out to protest against his expenses. 100,000*l.* a month

[4] The certificates in question seem, after all, never to have been issued by Lord Wellington, because he objected to some of their terms, which, for cogent reasons, were deemed by the Treasury necessary for the security of British credit.

was the maximum in specie which the Government would consent to supply, a sum quite inadequate to his wants.'[5] And in support of this statement, every part of which is untrue, the writer quotes incorrectly from one of Lord Wellington's despatches (January 8, 1814) a passage into which he interpolates words not to be found in the authorized version. Quite different from Sir William Napier's account of the nature and objects of Colonel Bunbury's mission is that given by Lord Bathurst, who informed Lord Wellington on January 12, 1814 (see 'Wellington Supplementary Despatches,' vol. viii.), that its purpose was to give explanations on the following points:—

'1. The extent of the reinforcements. . . .

'2. The amount of money which we shall be able to furnish you, particularly in the course of the two ensuing months.

'3. The provisions which may be sent from hence. . . .

'4. The state of the transport service. . . .

'5. The nature and extent of co-operation which you may expect from the King (*sic*).[6] . . .'

Lord Bathurst wrote further on January 20: 'Your Lordship will have been apprised that as soon as the British Government had reason to know that you intended to push on beyond the Adour, and that an increased supply of money would become necessary, every exertion was made for that purpose. Colonel

[5] *History of the Peninsular War*, book xxiii. chap. v.

[6] This is a manifest error. The word 'Navy,' instead of 'King,' appears in Lord Wellington's Memorandum of February 1, 1814, on the above points. (See *Despatches, &c.*, 1st edition.)

Bunbury will inform your Lordship of the success of these exertions. 400,000*l.* has been embarked, and is now under sailing orders for Pasages, thereby anticipating your Lordship's desire that a large supply should come at once to your relief. . . .'

Lord Wellington, who, according to Napier's story, had protested against the inadequacy of the maximum supposed to have been announced by Colonel Bunbury, made the following remark in a memorandum given to that officer on February 1: '*The amount of the money, &c.* This is very satisfactory.'[7]

At no time was any maximum fixed by the Government, who in practice supplied more than was asked for. On August 18, 1812, Lord Wellington expressed to the Secretary of State his desire that a sum of 100,000*l.* should be forwarded to him every month. This request was acceded to. As a sufficient quantity of foreign coin could not be procured, the Government, by a somewhat arbitrary interpretation of the Bank Restriction Act, drew the amount in guineas from the Bank, against the wishes of the directors, under a special Order in Council.[8] What was actually done in the way of remittance both before and after the adoption of this plan appears with perfect exactness from an account drawn up in the Commissary-in-Chief's office, and showing the most minute particulars of every shipment of money made by him.[9]

[7] It may be added that the despatch cited as containing an animadversion upon Colonel Bunbury's alleged intimation is dated several days before Colonel Bunbury's departure from England.

[8] See Lord Bathurst's letters to Lord Wellington on this subject in the *Supplementary Despatches*.

[9] See note at the end of the Chapter.

In the last six months of 1812 (Lord Wellington's despatch above alluded to could not have been received before the middle of September) the amount sent to Lisbon in gold bars, doubloons, Portugal gold coin, guineas, napoleons, and dollars was not 600,000*l.*, but 775,213*l.*, besides 384,695 dollars, the equivalent of which is not stated (because they were not purchased by the Commissary-in-Chief). During the twelve months of 1813 the value of the specie shipped was 1,723,936*l.*, with the addition of 339,432 dollars not reckoned in sterling. The monthly average for the three months March, April, and May was (in a round sum) 286,000*l.*, for the five months March–July about 213,000*l.*, and for October, November, and December 132,331*l.* In January 1814 the large consignment of 400,000*l.* left Portsmouth by the 'Désirée' frigate. It was followed within a fortnight by another of 200,000*l.*, and a few days afterwards the equivalent of 100,000*l.* in French coin sailed from Holland, making up a total sum of 1,096,994*l.* 0*s.* 8*d.* for the four months ending February 25, 1814. So much for the fiction of the 100,000*l.* *maximum*. But we cannot avoid noticing in connection with it an instance of very singular want of candour, to say the least, on the part of the historian. His comments upon the imaginary instructions of Colonel Bunbury in January 1814 are followed, after an interval of some pages, by a statement that in the same month Lord Wellington's 'situation was suddenly ameliorated . . . by the acquisition of a very large sum in gold. . . .' This was no other than the 400,000*l.*, the coming of which was announced by Colonel Bun-

bury ; but the writer does not say how or whence the sum was acquired, and his readers, misled by his previous assertions, are left to draw the natural conclusion that Lord Wellington, compensating the laches of the Ministry by his own care, procured the money without their intervention.

As an instance of his 'provident sagacity' a marvellous tale is then told, which has been accepted by admiring multitudes, on Napier's authority, as an undoubted historical truth, although a little criticism ought to convince any rational enquirer that it is an absurd fable, undeserving of the least credit.

Lord Wellington, we read, 'foreseeing that the money he might receive would, being in foreign coin, create embarrassment, adopted an expedient which he had before practised in India to obviate this. Knowing that in a British army a wonderful variety of knowledge and vocations, good and bad, may be found, he secretly caused the coiners and die-sinkers amongst the soldiers to be sought out. . . . With these men he established a secret mint, at which he coined gold Napoleons, marking them with a private stamp and carefully preserving their just fineness and weight with a view of enabling the French Government when peace should be established to call them in again. He thus avoided all the difficulties of exchange. . . .'

The limited period within which this operation must have been accomplished can be determined with tolerable accuracy. It may safely be assumed that Lord Wellington could not have made any preparations for coining before the latter part of January, because until

then he not only had no gold to devote to that purpose, but was not aware of the approaching arrival of the large quantity which actually reached him at the beginning of February. In the second week of that month began the advance of the army into the south of France, in view of which the coinage is said to have been undertaken, and which it is declared to have facilitated. Early in March a large consignment of authentic French money, which would have rendered further coining superfluous, reached head-quarters. The whole time, therefore, employed in this business could not have exceeded a few weeks. Within this brief space we are called upon to believe that a picked detachment of convicted coiners (it is obvious that no others would have criminated themselves), secretly selected through the indispensable agency of many captains, subalterns, and non-commissioned officers, established a secret mint with all requisite machinery and appliances, from the melting furnace to the coining press, at St. Jean de Luz, the seat of head-quarters—a miserable fishing town of some 2,000 inhabitants at the foot of the Pyrenees. Napier's readers are not informed whether the 'just fineness' of Lord Wellington's napoleons was ascertained by competent assayers, like the coiners 'sought out among the soldiers,' or whether, by the simple transmutation of English guineas (the whole of the gold sent to him in January was in that form) into French twenty-franc pieces, more than their just fineness was secured to the latter (their legal standard being worse than that of the English coin), with a gain to the enemy, and a heavy loss to the British public.

Nor is it explained how the usual delay caused by the preparation of dies was avoided in this remarkable coinage. Experts affirm that it is not easy to obtain the steel of special quality which is alone suitable for the purpose.[1] Are we to suppose that an abundant supply of it was at hand in the St. Jean de Luz market? But if the soldier-engravers had possessed the requisite material, which their bayonets would not have furnished, as well as the proper tools, and if, with fingers hardened by the constant manipulation of Brown Bess, they had been able delicately to reproduce a perfect Napoleon's head, some months must still have elapsed before all the dies could have been completed:[2] so that, of the coinage contrived for the purpose of the invasion, not a single piece would have been struck by the time when the British army was on the point of evacuating the French territory.

For this 'wild and wondrous tale' no authority is given, or can be discovered. Nothing that could be imagined to have been its foundation appears either in the 'Wellington Despatches' or in the correspondence of the Commissary-in-Chief. The entire responsibility for the creation and circulation of the story rests upon Sir William Napier. He did not perceive that he was throwing out a grave imputation against one of the most sincere of men and most conscientious of public servants,

[1] See Professor Brande's evidence before the Royal Mint Commission in 1849.

[2] In his evidence before the Mint Commission Mr. William Wyon spoke of an interval ranging from one to seven months between the order for the die and its execution; and Mr. Ansdell, in his *History of the Mint*, says, 'The engraver employs many months in producing a finished matrix after it has been duly prepared for his work.'

who would have been guilty of unpardonable deceit if, by representations of immediate necessity, he had induced his Government to procure for him by extraordinary exertions an immense quantity of guineas (most of them were coined for the express purpose of transmission[3]), destined, without their knowledge, for the melting-pot. This consideration alone ought to be sufficient to destroy the credibility of the narrative.

Forty-nine private letters from Mr. Herries to various persons on the subject of the collection of specie in England for the Peninsular service in 1812 and 1813 afford abundant proofs of the difficulties of the times (of which the great Duke took no heed), of earnest solicitude (which he rarely acknowledged) on the part of the Ministry, and of ceaseless activity (which he never recognized) on that of the Commissary-in-Chief. It should not be forgotten that a long time always elapsed before the treasure laboriously amassed in London could reach the army in Spain. Even its carriage to Portsmouth was in those days neither rapid nor secure, and serious consequences resulted from delays. 'The want of some prompt military conveyance on this road,' wrote Mr. Herries to the Horse Guards, asking for relays of the waggon train, 'is continually felt when we are so driven to use all methods for accelerating our remittances to the Peninsula. A difference of two days on the road may sometimes, by saving a wind, make a difference of six weeks on the whole.' The money once shipped, the official departments in England could do no

[3] In 1813 Mr. Herries proposed such coinage, and caused 519,000 guineas to be struck at the Mint for the Peninsular service.

more. It seems unreasonable to hold them responsible for the foul winds which frequently detained frigates at Spithead for many days (on one occasion H.M.S. 'Stag,' with 100,000*l.* on board, could not sail for nearly three weeks), for the proverbial perversity of the Bay of Biscay, or for defective means of transport in Portugal and Spain, mentioned by Lord Wellington (August 1812) as one of the causes of his distress, 'certainly occasioned in some degree by our distance from Lisbon and the difficulty of carrying the money to the army.'[4] All these inevitable causes of delay ought not to be lost sight of. At the same time the fact should be borne in mind that, besides money, money's worth in the shape of articles of daily consumption to an enormous amount was supplied by the home authorities.

The pecuniary embarrassments of the British Government were greatly increased by the demands of our allies, as well as of our own troops, in the North of Europe. The effect of the war in that quarter was to raise the prices of gold and silver enormously,[5] while, at the same time, considerable difficulty was experienced in finding in England any convenient currency for

[4] He was then at Madrid. Could he not prevail upon patriots in the Capital to help him to raise cash for their national cause? Money must have existed. It is impossible not to feel that throughout the war sufficient pressure was not put upon our Peninsular allies to induce them to contribute a portion of their hoards to their own defence.

[5] The average market price in London of gold in bars per ounce was, in 1810, 4*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.*; in 1811, 4*l.* 15*s.* 6½*d.*; in 1812, 5*l.* 1*s.* 3*d.*; in 1813, 5*l.* 6*s.* 6*d.* The actual prices at which gold doubloons and silver dollars were purchased from the Bank for remittance to Spain were, respectively, in June 1812, 4*l.* 17*s.* 6*d.* and 6*s.* 3*d.* per ounce; in April and May 1813, 5*l.* 6*s.* and 6*s.* 8*d.*; and in December, 5*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.* to 5*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.* for the former and 7*s.* for the latter coin.

circulation in Germany. On this account it was thought expedient to coin at the Royal Mint Hanoverian money—gold pieces, called pistoles, of five thalers and silver pieces of $\frac{2}{3}$ thaler each. The whole operation was conducted under the direction of the Commissary-in-Chief,[6] having been concerted in the first instance between him and the Hanoverian minister, Count Münster.

Towards the end of the year 1813, the Bank of England being unable to furnish an adequate supply of specie applicable to the expenditure of the army in France, a new plan, devised by Mr. Herries after consultation with Mr. Nathan Meyer Rothschild—at that time hardly known as a capitalist to the official world[7]—was submitted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 'as affording the best chance of giving that prompt assistance to Lord Wellington which may at this moment be productive of the most important consequences.' The object in view was fully attained. The proposed measure having received the instant approval of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart ('It is felt,' they said in a secret letter, 'that the details of this service may be safely confided to your experience and discretion'), it was put in execution without loss of time. Mr. Rothschild, with detailed instructions and the strictest injunction of secrecy from Mr. Herries, went over to Holland and Germany to superintend

[6] In pursuance of a Treasury minute drafted by himself, after all the preliminary arrangements had been made, he gave orders to the Mint fixing the weight and fineness of the coins to be struck. The amount issued in 1813 was 342,397*l.*; in 1814, 356,208*l.*; in 1815, 434,723*l.*

[7] In letters from the Treasury at this date his name is invariably misspelt.

the collection from various places—even from Paris itself—of French coin, not to be procured in the London market. The large sums obtained were from time to time quietly put on board men-of-war stationed at Helvoetsluys for the purpose of conveying them to the nearest available port to Lord Wellington's head-quarters. By this means an abundant stream of genuine French gold and silver currency (of greater practical utility than mythical minting in the Pyrenees) was made to flow steadily into the military chest; and the British general was thus enabled to display—to the satisfaction, if not the admiration, of the inhabitants of the South of France—the unusual spectacle of a victorious invader paying his way with ready cash, in remarkable contrast to the less expensive methods pursued by the allied armies penetrating from the east. Although many agents must have been employed in these complicated operations, their secret was so well kept that more than twenty years later the historian of the Peninsular war was absolutely ignorant of the real source of the supply, to which he assigned a fabulous—almost miraculous—origin.

An official (secret) report from Mr. Herries and a private letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer bear testimony to the ability with which this business, together with another transaction under his direction, was managed by his agent. 'It is due to Mr. Rothschild that I should not omit this opportunity to be a witness to the skilfulness and zeal with which he has executed this service, while he has at the same time conducted it so quietly that no impression appears to have

been made by it upon the Exchange. . . . The business has been very quickly and successfully executed as far as the operations here are concerned, and I believe it has been equally well done upon the other side. . . . I have already disbursed 700,000*l.* in the purchase of bills on Holland and Frankfort, without its having produced the smallest effect in the market. . . . I am convinced that 100,000*l.* negotiated by a foreign minister or an officer of the Commissariat would have produced ten times the effect of Rothschild's operations, which must now amount to nearly a million sterling.' . . . . The arduous nature of the work imposed upon the writer himself is also noticed. 'These affairs have necessarily, thrown a great deal of anxious responsibility and labour upon me, for I do not permit Rothschild to take a step without my immediate sanction, and he is therefore almost continually in my room. The labour has principally fallen upon my secretary, because no other clerk has been admitted to a knowledge of the transaction. . . .'

A curious illustration of the monetary history of the period is afforded by the minute accounts which remain of the daily purchases made. The number of small lots (such as 90 French crowns, 30 louis, 34 napoleons, and the like) of coins of the same description, bought on the same day at different prices, shows how painfully they had to be extracted almost piecemeal from nooks and corners.

It may seem strange that the Commissary-in-Chief of the British army should have been called upon by the

Secretary of State for War[8] to provide funds for the journey of the restored King of France to Paris, and for the first expenses of his installation in his capital; but such was the case. A sum equivalent to 100,000*l.*, in bills, cash, and circular notes, was furnished to Louis XVIII.; and to this first advance an equal sum was added soon after the King's arrival at Paris,[9] by Lord Castlereagh's desire, through the hands of Mr. Herries, who at this time was expected to act as a general purveyor of everything to everybody for every purpose. He was employed on a special and most important service, which requires particular notice.

He represented (April 24, 1814) to Lord Liverpool and the Chancellor of the Exchequer the great advantage that would be derived under then existing circumstances from making Paris the centre of transactions for raising through a single agency the funds needed for the supply of the British army in France and for all other Continental purposes. At the same time he pointed out the serious inconveniences resulting from injudicious arrangements, by which the subsidies due from Great Britain to Austria, Prussia, and Russia under the treaties of 1813 and 1814 had all been made payable in London in pounds sterling, without any

[8] Without the intervention of the Treasury. The matter appears to have been brought for the first time to the notice of the Chancellor of the Exchequer by a secret letter from Mr. Herries, dated April 13, 1814, in which he said, 'By the direction of Lord Bathurst I have procured from Mr. N. M. Rothschild, and have the honour to transmit to you, for a secret special service, which his Lordship will explain, the several bills of exchange on Paris. . . .'

[9] A receipt, signed by the King himself, was given for the whole amount —200,000*l.*—which was repaid, with interest, some time after the Second Restoration.

stipulation respecting their reduction into foreign currencies. The Allied Powers drew at their own discretion for the sums they were to receive, and the selling of paper upon London without caution or concert by their respective agents, not always solicitous for the interests or the credit of England, in different parts of the Continent at once, affected the exchanges in a manner very detrimental to the extensive monetary operations of the British Government. It was suggested by Mr. Herries that a confidential agent should be sent to Paris, empowered to come to an understanding with the Allies for the adoption of a less injurious system, and to make all the other pecuniary arrangements shown to be advisable. He was directed by the Treasury immediately to undertake these duties, and his instructions, based on his own recommendations, were very wide, concluding with the expression, 'In the latitude which their Lordships give to your discretion in this commission they show the confidence which they repose in you. . . .'[1]

He left England for Paris at the beginning of May, and returned by way of Amsterdam, where he found an opportunity of doing a good stroke of business for the public towards the end of June. His mission was attended with very beneficial results,[2] and the manner in which he accomplished his task earned for him much applause both at home and abroad. By adroit combinations, with the assistance of the Messrs. Rothschild,

[1] Letter from the Treasury, April 26, 1814.

[2] See, in the Appendix, his Report to the Treasury on the termination of his mission.

of whose ability, and zeal for the interests of the British Government, he repeatedly expressed his admiration, he was able to provide funds at a moment's notice for every service required; while the source whence he derived the sums always at his disposal remained concealed, and the exchange, depressed by incautious operations in other quarters, steadily improved. His negotiations with the Allies, which required very delicate handling, were in great measure successful. The Prussian and Austrian representatives, who dealt frankly and in a liberal spirit, acceded to his proposal, the fairness of which they recognised—that, instead of drawing bills upon London, their Governments should receive their subsidies, with every reasonable accommodation, in convenient foreign money, at favourable rates of exchange, through the hands of agents of the British Treasury at Paris or elsewhere on the Continent. But the Russian agents showed a different disposition, at every moment shifting their ground, departing from their promises, haggling and shuffling in a manner unworthy even of a small money-changer. Mr. Herries's letters are full of animadversions on the duplicity and dishonesty displayed by them throughout, and especially in a matter concerning an offer made to them of a certain sum of 200,000*l.* on good terms, in which business the English Treasury was put to considerable inconvenience by their tergiversation. Thus he writes in different places, 'The bargains they have made here are proofs that there is either treachery or ignorance in the extreme in their pecuniary arrangements. . . . I really believe their solemn assurance only to be

worth nothing. . . . It is not to be believed that they would have acted as they have done . . . from ignorance and folly alone. . . . I was prepared to find them *indécrottables* in money matters, and my expectation is more than fulfilled. . . . There is something rotten in this, depend upon it . . . .' and much more to the same effect.

All these discussions were rendered more complicated by the introduction of a troublesome question not contemplated by the instructions given to the representative of the Treasury. From its connection with the history of the war, this matter, concerning which extraordinary mistakes have been made, deserves some explanation. The Conventions of Reichenbach concluded in 1813 between Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, besides stipulations for monthly subsidies, contained others for the creation of a so-called 'Federative Paper' (Baron Stein's invention) to the extent of 5,000,000*l.*, Great Britain of course assuming the obligation of the reimbursement of one-half. In execution of this agreement it was provided by supplementary conventions, signed on September 30 of the same year, that, with the authority of Parliament, Great Britain should issue Bills of Credit for the benefit of Russia and Prussia for the sum of two millions and a half sterling, or of fifteen millions of Prussian thalers, such issue to be computed from June 15, 1813. The necessary sanction was given by an Act of Parliament, but, although large advances were made from time to time on account of them, the Bills of Credit 'were never issued,

owing to the circumstances of the times.'[3] In May 1814 the two Allied Courts, eager for a settlement, presented some new propositions, which, with certain essential conditions and modifications recommended by Mr. Herries, were accepted by the British Government, and it was agreed that, in lieu of the phantom Bills of Credit, real debentures bearing 6 per cent. interest, to be paid off by regular instalments, should be delivered. But even these instruments, with the exception of a few handed over to Russia, seem to have had no actual existence. In the case of Prussia the whole amount due was liquidated more conveniently by simple monthly payments at Berlin. Our obligations to Russia, to whom the larger share (two-thirds of the whole) accrued, were cleared off expeditiously by two remarkable operations, from which the British public, absolutely ignorant of their nature or objects, derived great benefit. In the first instance a considerable saving was realised by the prompt decision of Mr. Herries, who, without time for consulting the Treasury, agreed to take over from

[3] Statement of liquidation by Mr. Herries. In a letter enclosing papers on this subject for Lord Castlereagh's information he speaks of the expediency of 'some measure to give effect to our engagements under the treaty of September 1813, which has hitherto been a dead letter to the Allies, and which is not likely to be carried into execution upon its present footing.' According, however, to Alison's *History of Europe*, the provisions of the Act 'were immediately carried into effect; the issue took place and had the effect of instantly providing the requisite supply of circulating medium in Germany and Russia, which passed at par with specie through all the North of Europe. To the supply of money obtained and the extension of credit effected by this bold, and withal wise and necessary, step, at the critical moment when it was most required, and when all human efforts but for it must have been unavailing, the successful issue of the war and overthrow of Napoleon are mainly to be ascribed. . . .' The British Treasury and our two Allies knew better.

Messrs. Rothschild a transaction between them and the Russian Commissioner at Amsterdam for the anticipation, on certain conditions, of the first six monthly instalments receivable from England. Subsequently a still more advantageous arrangement was concluded by his advice on a proposal to him from the same house for the accelerated payment of the eight last instalments—a somewhat complicated operation, involving very intricate calculations. From a statement laid before him by Mr. N. M. Rothschild in May 1815 it appears that the difference in favour of the public between what was actually paid under this agreement (888,888*l.* 17*s.*) and what would, without it, have been payable in the ordinary course (1,117,332*l.* 14*s.*) amounted to no less than 228,443*l.*[4]

In the conduct of the mission which has been described, Mr. Herries was left entirely to his own resources. He dealt directly with Ministers of Foreign Powers, unguided by the head of the Foreign Office then at Paris, who allowed him complete freedom of action; and his correspondence shows no trace of any intervention on the part of the British Embassy, which is alluded to only in mentioning a serious inconvenience to the public service caused by delay in the transmission of letters of great consequence. In the despatch of his very laborious business he had the help of only

[4] The letter which shows these results mentions some others produced by good management, and concludes with the remark, 'From these statements you will, I doubt not, do me the justice to say that the business I have had the honour of transacting for the Government has been executed most advantageously.' Such was certainly the fact. According to a later statement by Mr. Herries the gain was smaller than that shown above, being 120,000*l.*

one, but an invaluable assistant, Mr. Spearman,[5] who subsequently became known as one of the best public servants of his day. At a very early period of his life the singular merits of this distinguished gentleman—his power of intense application, his clearness of judgment, his promptitude and firmness of decision, his unflagging zeal, and his unswerving rectitude of purpose—were recognized by Mr. Herries, much his senior, who lost no opportunity of bringing them prominently to notice. Between these two men there subsisted the strongest friendship, which was never diminished.

On the basis of the general concert established at Paris a plan was settled between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Ministers of the Allies in London for future subsidy payments on the Continent, in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of loss to anyone, and to cause the least inconvenience to the British Treasury. For its execution detailed instructions were given by Mr. Herries to his agents. But it was soon announced that the Russian Government would persist in drawing directly upon London—a course which they well knew to be injurious to us. The vexatious nature of their proceedings appears from Mr. Herries's correspondence with the Minister of Finance at Berlin, who thoroughly entered into his views, and from the following significant passage in one of his letters to Mr. Harrison, the Assistant-Secretary to the Treasury:—'The Russians are treating us scandalously.[6] They have opened

[5] Then Deputy Assistant Commissary-General, afterwards the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Spearman, Bart., Assistant-Secretary of the Treasury, Controller of the National Debt, &c. &c.

[6] A good illustration of the utter disregard not only of courtesy, but of

bureaux at Königsberg and Berlin to take up their depreciated roubles by payments partly in money and partly in bills upon England. The rouble having been much depreciated, the bills are readily taken in exchange for them even at a very unfavourable exchange, and the profit still left makes [something is here omitted in the copy] the holder (and induces him) to sell them again at anything by which he can secure a percentage. *Ergo* the exchange, notwithstanding all our pains, goes to the Devil while this goes on. . . . Let us pray that no future subsidies may be granted to them in *sterling money and payable in London.* Let us rather agree, if we are to give them anything, to give them *so many roubles*, and trust to our own management to keep our engagements as economically as possible.'

The prayer here recorded was not heard by the Foreign Office, and the grievous disappointment of the Commissary-in-Chief was bitterly expressed in a letter to Mr. Rosenhagen, Comptroller of Army Accounts at the Duke of Wellington's head-quarters, in the following year, when new treaties of subsidy were concluded, full of all the proved defects of the old ones.

the simplest rules of international comity, which marked Russian dealings with Great Britain, is afforded by a letter dated April 20, 1813, from Mr. Herries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, enclosing a communication from a considerable cloth manufacturer in Yorkshire relative to the proceedings of an agent 'instructed by the Court of Russia to send over from England 400 woollen manufacturers.' By statutes then existing, and by no means obsolete, however opposed to economical principles, this was a criminal offence. The secret violation of the law of England by a 'glorious ally' whom we were straining every nerve to support must be considered as dishonourable conduct.

'May 22, 1815.

. . . . . .

'You will be a little surprised when I inform you that, notwithstanding all my remonstrances and the apparent concurrence of all those to whom they were made in the justness of the view upon which they were founded, not the smallest step has been taken by our negotiators to obviate the inconvenience of our being bound to pay the subsidies in London.

'The new treaties[7] are in the very words of the old ones, and we are again this year to beg of our allies as a special favour to allow us to depart from the letter of our agreement. . . . I am sick at heart when I consider the prospect of all the wrangling I shall have on this point unless I resolve to withdraw myself from such an ungrateful occupation and let the exchanges go to the Devil.'

His views were embodied in a memorandum given on April 4 to Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart, who appear to have approved what the Foreign Office—avoiding the trouble of a new arrangement—paid no attention to.

'It is proposed,' the paper says, 'that the subsidies to be given to the three great Powers be fixed in a foreign currency, with an option to Great Britain to pay them in certain coins, the value of which in such foreign currency may be at once agreed upon. . . .'

. . . . . .

Nearly six months previously Mr. Herries, writing

[7] With Austria, Russia, and Prussia, signed at Vienna on April 30, 1815.

to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (October 17, 1814) 'with respect to the Russian demand for the maintenance of their fleet,' strongly urged the expediency of stating to Count Lieven at once that the British Government would pay any balance due on the Continent and not in sterling in London, because, he said, 'it will otherwise cost us a great deal more than its own amount by the influence which, in the hands of the Russian agents, it will have upon the exchange in the payment of our other foreign expenditure.' But his rational advice does not seem to have been acted upon.[8]

In the memorable campaign of 1815 the facility of communication between England and the seat of war, and the superior resources of the Low Countries compared with those of Spain and Portugal, rendered the supply of the army a much easier task than in former years; while the improvements, already alluded to, which had been effected by Mr. Herries in the organization and administration of the Commissariat service ensured greater regularity and despatch. The Duke of Wellington could not have complained of inadequate

[8] The balance above alluded to—114,508*l.* 16*s.* 1*d.*—was paid in London in January 1815. This not very reasonable item of British expenditure arose out of the loosely drawn stipulations of the Treaties of Reichenbach and Chaumont for the maintenance of the Russian fleet in British ports, at an estimated yearly expense of 500,000*l.* This apparently useless naval force, consigned to the care of Great Britain by the Emperor Alexander, arrived in British waters in December 1812, and left them, on its return to Russia, in June 1814. According to an Admiralty return it consisted, on October 7, 1813, of twelve line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and a brig, carrying 1,102 guns and 8,680 men. Of these ships, one of eighty guns, four of seventy-four, and a forty-four gun frigate were employed with the British squadron off the coast of Holland, the remainder lying snugly moored in the Medway and at the Nore, with what advantage to this country or to the cause of the Allies generally is not perceptible.

efforts to furnish his hastily collected forces with all that they could require. That they were well provisioned at an early period appears from a letter to the Prussian Chargé d'affaires in London, in which Mr. Herries informs him on May 11 that 'the magazines which have been established for the British army in Flanders have been so fully completed, and all the arrangements for the supply of the troops are so far advanced, that it is not now necessary to have recourse to the ports of the Baltic for any supplies of grain. . . .'

The superfluity of our stores was very serviceable to our allies. A few facts prove incontestably the immense superiority of British commissariat management at this time to that of the great military Powers of the Continent. Rum and rice to a considerable amount were sent from England for the use of the Prussian army, at the disposal of which also the Duke of Wellington was able to place large quantities of wheat. About the same time the Austrian army in Italy drew corn and spirits from the British magazines at Malta and in Sicily.

The continued dearth of specie presented a formidable obstacle, to be surmounted, as it was, only by timely and extraordinary exertions. An estimate of the monthly expenditure of 75,000 men upon the British establishment in Flanders, which was drawn up by Mr. Herries in answer to a confidential letter from Lord Liverpool, dated March 25—the day of the signature of the Treaty of Alliance at Vienna—exhibits a gloomy pecuniary prospect. The difficulty of procuring the minimum sum required—half a million in

specie—costing 625,000*l.*, in addition to the monthly charge of 400,000*l.* for the Peninsula and the Mediterranean, is declared to be 'greater, under the present circumstances of Europe, than what any man could undertake with much confidence to overcome. . . . The London market affords no resource at this moment. . . . The chest in Flanders is at this time very ill provided, having been lately supplied from month to month only. . . . But the campaign which is now contemplated ought to be opened with at least a three months' supply of specie. . . . It seems, however, literally impossible to procure immediately 150,000*l.* in hard money for the purpose. In the meantime every effort is making to secure what can be got, and there is strong reason to hope that 500,000*l.* will very speedily be poured into the chest in various French and German coins, in consequence of the directions given upon the receipt of the first intelligence of Bonaparte's landing in the south of France. If Paris had remained open a few days longer the order would have been completed before this time. . . .'

On the day after the delivery of this paper the writer of it took a bold step, which sufficiently indicates his real authority, the confidence placed in him, and the fertility of his resources. Without previously consulting the head of the Government or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he directed Mr. T. Wyon, of the Mint (letter marked 'Secret, March 29, 1815'), immediately to prepare a die for striking French louis, of which he forwarded specimens. He reported what he

had done to Mr. Vansittart, with the observation, 'not doubting but that you will readily obtain the King's [i.e. Louis XVIII.'s] permission to strike this coin, and conceiving that it may be very useful to avail ourselves of it in the course of the campaign;' and adding, 'If Lord Liverpool and yourself should not approve of this, there will be no harm done by the mere preparation of the die. . . .' It was not till June 1 that, the consent of the French King having been duly notified and all things being in readiness for the work (Napier's select die-sinkers at St. Jean de Luz were quicker), orders to begin the coining of the money were issued by the Master of the Mint. In the course of the month twenty-franc pieces to the value of 485,973*l.* were delivered to the Commissary-in-Chief for the use of the army, and the total amount received by him up to the end of October was equivalent to 690,699*l.* 10*s.* 4*d.* This foreign coinage appears to have been executed in a manner very creditable to the English Mint. The chief assayer at Paris repeatedly expressed his approval of its perfect correctness;[9] but some unworthy doubts having subsequently been expressed on the part of the French Government, a special trial of the pyx, pursuant to an Order in Council,

[9] He wrote to the Assayer of the Mint in London, in July 1815, 'Nous venons d'essayer les premières pièces . . . . nous les avons toutes trouvées à 900 millièmes fort, ce qui indique une fabrication parfaite. . . .' again in September, 'Vos monnaies à l'effigie de Louis XVIII. continuent à être bonnes et bien fabriquées;' and in November, 'Nous essayons tous les jours des pièces de 20 fr. frappées à Londres (soit dit en passant un peu contre les droits régaliens). Nous les trouvons toutes à 899 ou à 900 millièmes et nous applaudissons à votre exactitude.' For these and other details we are indebted to the courtesy of the Deputy Master of the Mint, who has kindly allowed us to inspect the records of the department.

was held at Goldsmiths' Hall in the presence of the French Ambassador on January 25, 1816, when a number of louis taken at random from those struck in London, being duly compared with others coined in the Paris Mint, were found to agree with them exactly, both in fineness and in weight.

By means of the aid above described and large purchases of specie in all quarters, the Duke of Wellington was well furnished with cash, as a letter written by Mr. Herries ten days after the battle of Waterloo shows. 'I have had some considerable sums of money remaining in great jeopardy at Paris, which will of course become immediately available. We have also a superabundant military chest, and have been sending to the Duke so much French money coined in London that I am really in hopes that it will not be necessary to take any measures through the Exchange for supplying him for some time to come.' The plethoric state of the chest was maintained, owing to the adoption of the Continental system of requisitions in the enemy's country. 'We of the army,' wrote Mr. Rosenhagen to Mr. Herries from Paris on July 12, 'are growing indifferent about money, being, as I understand, fully determined not to pay for a single article supplied on our requisitions;' and again in August, 'The Duke will not even pay for eggs and milk to make hospital puddings.'

In the middle of April the Commissary-in-Chief was sent by the Government in the greatest haste to confer with the Duke of Wellington at Brussels on the subsidiary arrangements to be made with the smaller Powers,

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and on other matters. One of the consequences of this mission[1]—useful in other respects—was that the new treaties negotiated by the Duke were free from the inconvenience complained of in those concluded at Vienna with the great Powers, a proviso being inserted in all of them to ensure concert with British authorities as to modes of payment.

Upon Mr. Herries was imposed the duty, quite extraneous to his ordinary functions, of finding the means of fulfilling in the most economical manner the pecuniary engagements taken by Great Britain. This was a very onerous charge, requiring constant vigilance, and involving extensive combinations attended with no little risk, anxiety, and responsibility. These transactions were spread over a very long period, and the correspondence concerning them with representatives of all the subsidized States except Russia,[2] and with other persons, is very voluminous. Many of these papers, the bulk of which precludes their reproduction here, have great public interest, and, especially, numerous letters from Baron von Bülow, the Prussian Finance Minister, who, departing from official routine, held direct communication with Mr. Herries on the subject of frequent anticipations urgently needed. These papers place in a very striking light, together with the immense exertions of the Prussian Government, deserving of the highest praise, its absolute inability to carry on the war

[1] See the Duke of Wellington's despatch to Lord Castlereagh of May 24, 1815.

[2] From a paper written in 1816 it appears that the Russian subsidy paid in London was, for the most part, left unremitted, and invested in military clothing, &c.

without British assistance, as freely given as it is warmly acknowledged; while at the same time they are full of cordial recognitions of the prudent skill displayed by Mr. Herries in his financial measures, and of the value of the services earnestly rendered by him to the great cause. Mr. Greuhm, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires in London, expresses himself repeatedly in the same sense. Thus on May 22 he writes, 'The readiness of his Britannic Majesty's Ministers, so often experienced, to meet the wishes and necessities of the Prussian Government upon all similar occasions, and Mr. Herries's particular zeal in seconding the measures of his Government, will relieve Mr. Greuhm from the necessity of an apology for addressing Mr. Herries upon this subject;' three days afterwards, 'Mr. Greuhm presents his compliments to Mr. Herries, and begs him to accept his grateful acknowledgments for the readiness with which Mr. Herries has met the subject of the note;' and at a later date, 'Mr. Greuhm, in requesting, with his usual confidence, Mr. Herries to lay before the Lords, &c., of the Treasury the contents of this note . . . . entertains the hope of once more receiving his ready and effectual support, experienced upon every occasion by the subsidized Powers. . . .' &c. &c. From a great number of passages, too long for repetition, it is evident that the person addressed was held in high estimation on the Continent, and that he was believed to be what in the jargon of the present day would be called a Prussophil, or, more correctly perhaps, a Germanophil. In truth he had, from early associations probably, very strong German sympathies. He was deeply convinced not

only of the wisdom and power, but of the moral worth of that great people.

In connection with the business of the subsidies, much advantage to the public resulted from a monetary operation, or series of operations, on the Continent, proposed by Mr. Herries and executed under his directions with brilliant success. Its object was to obtain speedily and cheaply a large quantity of foreign money, not to be procured without great cost and delay in any other way.[3] The reply of the Treasury to his suggestion states that 'their Lordships attach the utmost importance to the proper commencement of an arrangement of this description and magnitude, and that their confidence (which their experience has so fully justified) in your zeal in the public service, and in your ability and intimate knowledge of these subjects, induces them without hesitation to accept your offer of proceeding immediately to Frankfort with these bills. . . .'

Among the multitudinous items of expenditure for which he was called upon to provide, one of the most insignificant in amount seems to deserve a passing notice, because it effected an object of universal interest, and redounds to the honour of the Government who gave the order for it.

To Mr. Rothschild.

'December 20, 1815.

'I have to request that you will take measures for paying at Rome into the hands of Signor Domenico Lavaggi the value of 150,000 francs . . . . on account

[3] See letter to the Treasury dated June 30, 1815, in the Appendix.

of the Chevalier Antonio Canova. You will present your accounts for this transaction to Mr. Drummond at Paris, who will refer you to the cashier of the military chest. . . .'

The most 'Philistine' of Britons would hardly grudge this outlay[4] for the transport, which could not without it have been accomplished, of recovered works of art to Rome. Let those who study the masterpieces of the Vatican and the Capitol remember that the restitution of these spoils of revolutionary war was due to the action of the Tory Ministers of the Prince Regent of England, who not only backed the Pope's just claim with all their influence, but furnished his illustrious agent at Paris with the means he did not possess of bringing back the plunder of his galleries.[5] And it should not be forgotten that in their unjust resistance the Government of Louis XVIII. were supported by

[4] An additional sum made the total amount expended 202,180 francs. It was paid out of the indemnity received from France under the Treaty of Paris.

[5] The work of restitution was brought about chiefly through the energetic efforts of the late Mr. William Hamilton, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (afterwards British Minister at Naples). Canova's biographer, Missirini, says of him, 'Quel degno uomo gli avea porto ajuto efficacissimo a Parigi per la ricupera degli antichi monumenti, onde il Canova solea dire che se avesse per quello dato il sangue, ancora non avrebbe creduto compiutamente rimunerarlo.' Pius VII. never failed to express his gratitude for the service rendered to him by the Government of this Protestant country. 'L'Inghilterra,' wrote Cardinal Consalvi to Canova from Rome on October 20, 1815, 'è troppo grande per aver bisogno di accrescere la sua gloria, ma quello che ha fatto in questo incontro il Governo Brittannico con una generosità senza esempio scolpirà nel cuore di Sua Santità, nel mio, e in quello di tutto il popolo Romano, un sentimento perenne d' infinita riconoscenza' (Missirini *Vita di Antonio Canova*). An Italian historian of the present day has also borne tribute to the conduct of Great Britain on this occasion (Nicomede Bianchi, *Storia della Diplomazia Italiana*, &c.).

the 'magnanimous' Alexander, who was even so ungracious as to refuse an audience to Canova for the advocacy of his master's cause. Very different was the reception the great artist met with in London, where the Prince Regent treated him in a manner worthy of both.

Mr. Herries seems at this time to have led a most laborious life, all sorts of new occupations being continually thrust upon him, in consequence of a dangerous habit he had acquired of showing readiness for any kind of work. Thus we find him suddenly plunged into a tedious negotiation, properly belonging to the Foreign Office, for the settlement of certain pecuniary questions between Great Britain and Hanover. In the same way the management of details relating to the execution of the unreasonable engagement entered into by the Government, and too readily sanctioned by Parliament, to make good in part the dishonest default of Russia towards her creditors in Holland was put into his hands by the Treasury. It may indeed be inferred from his correspondence that he was looked upon as a general referee for various branches of administration. For instance, the Master of the Mint wanted information concerning the famous recoinage operations at the end of the seventeenth century. It was not from his own department, but from Mr. Herries, that he sought and obtained the historico-numismatical particulars he required.

From motives of economy, not very well calculated, the office of Commissary-in-Chief was abolished on October 24, 1816, against the advice of the Comp-

trollers of Army Accounts, by a Treasury Minute dated August 16.[6] This document bears ample testimony to 'the advantages which have resulted to the public service for some years past from the mode in which the supplies have been furnished . . . .' and to 'the improvements which have been introduced into the management of this branch of the public expenditure. . . . .' It concludes with the following words :—'In making these arrangements, by which the future services of John Charles Herries, Esq., will no longer be requisite in the situation of Commissary-in-Chief, the arduous duties of which he has discharged in a manner not only reflecting the greatest credit on himself, but productive of the most essential benefits to the public service, their Lordships feel that they should not discharge an important though gratifying part of their public duties—the acknowledgment of meritorious services—if they omitted to accompany this Minute with the expression of the high sense which they entertain of the services which Mr. Herries has rendered to the public, and with every testimonial of their entire approbation of his able, zealous, and meritorious conduct at the head of the Commissariat Department during a period and under circumstances which have occasioned a pressure of business and an extent of expenditure unprecedented in the extraordinary services of the army both at home and abroad. . . .'

It was not, however, until some six years after the abolition of the office that all labour and responsibility attendant upon it ceased, so much time having been

[6] Laid before Parliament February 11, 1817.

required for the completion and auditing of accounts, the minute interrogatories[7] upon which, in a mountain of papers before us, afford proof sufficient to convince the most suspicious Radical that in the days of old Tory rule transactions relating to public money were subjected to a very jealous scrutiny.[8] In the appendix to this work two documents will be found, which relate to the final winding-up of a great national concern, and therefore have historical value. One of them—a very instructive paper—is a statement by Mr. Herries, dated February 28, 1822, of the mode of liquidation of all the subsidies to foreign Powers under the treaties of 1814 and 1815; the other is a reply from the Treasury, expressing in the strongest terms the high sense entertained of the signal ability with which the special duties confided to him had been discharged.

A private letter on this matter from the Assistant-Secretary of the Treasury may find a fit place here :—

'I not only entirely concur in the propriety of the course you propose, but also in the manner of doing it. It is due to yourself in the first instance, and to your zealous and meritorious assistant, Spearman, in the

[7] 616 queries were put by the Board of Audit, some of them respecting the most trifling sums.

[8] The total amount of the sums which passed through the hands of Mr. Herries, and for which he was a public accountant, from October 1, 1811, to October 24, 1816, was 42,393,640*l.* 4*s.* 1*d.*, thus distributed:—

	£	*s.*	*d.*
To December 31, 1811 . .	536,586	16	5
In the year 1812 . . .	3,481,127	8	8
„ 1813 . . .	7,140,049	1	1
„ 1814 . . .	10,173,702	7	6
„ 1815 . . .	15,873,341	6	1
„ 1816 . . .	5,188,833	4	4

second, to put upon record the nature, magnitude, and importance of the great work entrusted to you; and the present moment, when all the accounts of this vast expenditure are just brought to so satisfactory a close, is most appropriate for that purpose. You have taken the high ground of disclaiming any pecuniary remuneration for these important services. But that disclaimer strengthens your claims a hundredfold upon the higher powers for their attention to your other objects, official or political. I shall be most happy to promote to the utmost extent of my influence your kind and just views in favour of Spearman.'

On the cessation of his former functions in 1816, the new office of Auditor of the Civil List, which in the preceding session had been created by Act of Parliament in pursuance of a recommendation of a committee of the House of Commons, was conferred upon Mr. Herries. This appointment was made the occasion of a party attack (May 8, 1817) upon the Government, by a motion of censure from Mr. Bennet, one of the most active members of the Opposition. It was negatived by a majority of 93 to 42. In the course of the debate, in which the Opposition speakers did not deny the merits of the individual concerned, on the Ministerial side the extraordinary value of his services was strongly dwelt upon.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, 'Towards the close of the year 1812 and in the year 1813 . . . . it was felt to be the duty of this country to make a great and gigantic effort. . . . It became necessary to provide not only military but also pecuniary means for

an almost unlimited exertion. . . . All these boundless resources, however, would have been useless, unless they had been judiciously extended and applied to the different points of action; and here he would ask any honourable members who recollected the discussions which took place five years ago whether it was then thought possible that this country could furnish in one year 20,000,000*l.* of metallic currency for the uses of the war, and this too at a time when the exchanges were greatly against us, under circumstances unparalleled in history—when it was the object of England to unite the armies of all Europe against France. Mr. Herries succeeded in contriving the machine by which this great object was triumphantly accomplished. He sent proper persons to the several parts of Europe to make the necessary arrangements, and these were so well adjusted that in no instance had any of the military operations then in progress been retarded by a want of specie. With what success he performed his important and arduous commission might appear from this, that the demands of the allies were answered as soon as made; the wants of the army were supplied as soon as declared, and, in one word, there was a continual succession of means to meet each difficulty as fast as it arose. Wherever the armies of our allies advanced there the resources of England were to be found; and wherever our own army or navy was directed to proceed abundant supplies were provided. . . . If the exertions that were made, and the success that followed, were fairly to be ascribed to the ability and enterprise of Mr. Herries (and that they

were so no man could dispute), then he would ask, should there not be a reward proportionate to such meritorious services? Millions upon millions of the country's money had been trusted to Mr. Herries, and he had applied them with integrity and honour. A future Minister, however, would hesitate to trust such millions to any man, if it could be seen, by the case of Mr. Herries, that penury and neglect were the reward of such distinguished and confidential service. . . . .'

Mr. Charles Grant[9] spoke warmly in the same sense. He said, 'At the close of the war he [Mr. Herries] proved himself a very able person, and sustained a burden of the highest importance: he had provided our armies with everything necessary, though in different and remote places; he had, in addition, procured specie in abundance to meet the necessities of the army and the demands of foreign Powers. No man could have been expected to perform all that he had done. The expenses of this country would have been very much greater than what they had been but for his exertions. Several millions had been saved to the country by him. . . .'

It is now necessary to animadvert upon a distortion of history by the suppression of facts. On the occasion of the appointment of Mr. Herries to the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1827, Mr. Spencer Walpole describes, at quite disproportionate length, and with entire inaccuracy, the antecedents of the new minister, whom he labours to represent as a person of no account,

[9] Afterwards Lord Glenelg.

known for no services of a public nature. The manifest object of the writer is to lead his readers to the conclusion—a natural one, if the premisses were true—that the selection, for a high financial station, of this obscure individual who had never shown any qualifications for it, could only have been due to Court favour and Court intrigue. For this purpose it has been deemed convenient to leave wholly unnoticed—or, let us rather say, to expunge—all that portion of his public life just reviewed, in which he rendered exceptional services to the State, and in which, as we are justified by evidence in saying, he established a well-earned reputation for the possession of financial skill and administrative ability of a very high order. This is not ignorance. It is not negligence. It is bad faith, such as even in a party pamphlet would be intolerable. We cannot suppose that Mr. Walpole, writing the history of the year 1817, did not take the trouble to make himself acquainted with the Parliamentary proceedings of the period. He must certainly have seen the report of the debate above alluded to; and the Treasury Minute laid before the House of Commons at the beginning of the session, on the abolition of an office intimately connected with all the operations of the Great War cannot have escaped his notice.

Note on Page 81.

In two instances Lord Wellington, replying to advices of shipments from the Secretary of State, refuses to admit the correctness of the official accounts. In his despatch (misquoted by Napier) of January 8, 1814, he says, 'The sum of 121,535*l.*, not 147,000*l.*, arrived.' But the figures rejected by him represent the actual cost of the specie forwarded (47,000*l.* in guineas and the rest in doubloons). On January 16 he writes to Lord Bathurst that 'the sum of 482,000 dollars arrived in the "Medina," making about

106,000*l.* or 107,000*l.*' But the price paid for the treasure forwarded by the 'Medina,' and of which only a portion was in dollars, was 149,994*l.*, which sum was therefore the exact equivalent of the specie shipped. In each case Lord Wellington simply throws aside the statement of real payments in London (to the Bank of England) and substitutes a computation on a theoretical rate of exchange, at which not a single dollar was ever obtained in the whole course of the Peninsular War. What makes this method of calculation the more curious is the fact that on April 21, 1813, when the market price of the dollar was lower than in January 1814, he reckoned, in a despatch to Lord Bathurst, the value of 200 dollars as not less than 60*l.* at the rate of exchange of the day. Consequently, even supposing that no rise had taken place, we should get this extraordinary Rule of Three sum:

Dollars	£	Dollars	£
200	: 60 ::	482,000	: 106,000.

The indication of this arbitrary arithmetical process may serve as a warning to hasty and uncritical readers, that in matters relating to pecuniary supplies the great Duke's despatches are not to be implicitly relied upon as evidence against official authorities in England.

CHAPTER IV.

Herries a financial adviser of the Prime Minister—His desire for retrenchment—Economical views of Liverpool and Vansittart thwarted by departments—Palmerston's obstruction—Revenue Enquiry Commission—Herries appointed Secretary to the Treasury and enters the House of Commons—Work at the Treasury—Liverpool and Robinson—Canning's administration—Anecdotes and correspondence—Injurious statement by Lord Palmerston criticised—Herries wishes to leave the Treasury—The 'Times' on effect of his reported resignation—Paper on finance, 1827—Proposed abandonment of Sierra Leone, &c.—Windsor Castle Commission—Canning's death—Nomination of Herries as Chancellor of the Exchequer generally expected.

FROM various passages in letters extant it appears that the head of the Government was accustomed to take Mr. Herries into council on financial questions, and attached great importance to his opinion.[1]

What was the nature of the advice given in other respects we are not able to state, but on the point of economy it is certain that Mr. Herries was always opposed to unnecessary expenditure. He was not one of

[1] For example, Lord Liverpool, in asking for the estimates, already alluded to, for the campaign of 1815, begs that it may be considered 'before we have our meeting on the subject of finance on Tuesday.' Mr. Arbuthnot, in an undated letter, which seems to have been written at some time during the war, says, 'We had some talk this morning at Fife House about the taxes, and Lord Liverpool was exceedingly anxious that you should be present at a meeting with Vansittart, for the purpose of considering whether the idea of 10 per cent. on excise and customs was practicable. . . . Lord Liverpool, upon hearing from me that you were out of town, wished that I would beg you to come up. Long [Paymaster-General] is very anxious to raise the money by the 10 per cent. duties, . . . but Huskisson says that the money could not be raised. . . .'

those men of whom Cicero complained that they could not understand — '*Quam magnum vectigal sit parsimonia.*' Two instructive letters from him—the first to Mr. Rosenhagen, who had been Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the second to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury—show how earnestly he advocated large retrenchments after the peace.

February 13, 1816. . . . 'I have been prevented from writing to you lately by a fit of business considerably beyond the ordinary course of things, in which certain meetings, calculations, and conferences, resolutions and waverings of and about the Budget, have a considerable part. The crisis (behind the curtain) is now past, and I am just in that state in which you and I found ourselves upon the same occasion last year. A good, wise, and economical Budget has crumbled in our grasp, the higher powers have yielded to the subordinate departments, and we have a supply of thirty millions to bring forward without having any arrears to provide for; therefore a fair prospect of thirty millions for a permanent peace establishment! (England and Ireland of course). The army alone amounts to thirteen millions!! . . .'

'April 20, 1816.

'I transmit to you an official letter to-day on the subject of the expenditure in Canada. It is really quite necessary that you should take some steps through the Secretary of State to check the profuse and lavish expense which is now going forward there. The enclosed copy of a private letter from —— will show you that even the Commissary General, who is not generally

an economical personage, is astonished at the length to which it is carried. We had much better be at war than allow so great an expenditure to continue during peace, and all our efforts here will be useless unless we check extravagance abroad. . . .'.

Such were the sentiments expressed, not by a factious assailant of the Government, not by a radical demagogue, not by a stump orator addressing an ignorant mob, but by a very friendly Tory, a skilful calculator, an experienced administrator, a man as little disposed as anyone in England to diminish the efficiency of the army and the power of the nation. If his views had prevailed—if the 'higher powers,' instead of yielding against their own better judgment to the pressure of 'the departments,' had persevered in their first resolution to bring forward the 'good, wise, and economical Budget' recommended by their prudent counsellor, they might have gained much deserved popularity. And what were those departments whose stubborn resistance prevented a wholesome reduction of estimates? The one chiefly concerned was undoubtedly the War Office, at the head of which was, and had been for several years, Lord Palmerston, whose speeches in that year, 1816, breathe the most determined spirit of opposition to real retrenchment. He it is who must be held mainly responsible for the refusal of the then Tory Government to satisfy the reasonable demand of the nation for an immediate and sufficient relief from the immense burdens laid upon the people, and submitted to, for the prosecution of a just, necessary, and glorious war.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his first financial statement on February 12, 1816, estimated the probable expense of the army at about 12,238,000*l.*, and the aggregate amount of the supply services at 29,398,000*l.*, somewhat less than the figures in Mr. Herries's letter above cited (13,000,000*l.* and 30,000,000*l.* respectively); but, although several reductions were made in the estimates in the course of the Session, the actual expenditure properly belonging to the army was 13,047,582*l.*, and the total amount under the head of supply was 30,457,550*l.*[2] In order rightly to appreciate the magnitude of this outlay, which was looked upon with amazement by the Tory Commissary-in-Chief, it is necessary to consider that since 1816 the wealth of the kingdom has been more than quadrupled, and that consequently the real burden of a given charge upon the taxpayers in that year was probably four times as heavy as it would be now. Very large diminutions of expenditure were subsequently effected; but eleven years later the same person, in a different position, will be found again urging upon the Government the necessity of considerable retrenchment, and deploring the impediments thrown in the way of it by 'the departments.'

In 1821 Mr. Herries was included in a Commission

[2] See Finance Accounts for 1816, and the Fourth Report of the Finance Committee in 1817. The system of public accounts at that period renders them very perplexing. It is difficult for anyone but a Treasury expert to pass through them without error. Statements laid before the Finance Committee of 1828 give, with a different arrangement, different results. The payments on grants of Parliament for the army in the year ended January 5, 1817, are shown to have been 15,027,898*l.*, and the total supply payments 31,975,411*l.* The former of these two sums probably includes remittances to foreign countries, amounting, in 1816, to 1,731,139*l.* for subsidies &c.

nominated by Act of Parliament, for an enquiry into the collection and management of the revenue in Ireland, with a view to their assimilation to the system established in England. The powers of this body, of which the Vice-President of the Board of Trade, Mr. (afterwards Lord) Wallace, was the Chairman, were by an Act of the following year extended to Scotland, and partially to England. Its labours led to an entire change in the constitution and practice of the great revenue departments, and especially to alterations in the laws which regulated the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland. Duties were assimilated, drawbacks and bounties abolished, regulations of practice, applicable alike to all the three kingdoms, were gradually introduced, and the separate and independent Boards of superintendence and direction in London, Dublin, and Edinburgh were discontinued, the whole of their several powers being centralized in London, so as to secure uniformity and economy of administration. In drawing up the reports of this Commission, previous to the beginning of 1823, when he ceased to be a member of it, Mr. Herries had a considerable share. The Second Report[3] in particular (one of the most important), which was devoted chiefly to 'the Incorporation of the British and Irish Establishments for the Collection of the Public Income in such a manner as to place each description of the revenue throughout the United Kingdom under one practical management,' was entirely his.

A good deal of confidential correspondence between

[3] Dated June 28, 1822.

Mr. Herries and the Chairman, Mr. Wallace, during this period is preserved. It is not without interest even now, and shows that they worked together with the greatest cordiality, as appears also from the following extract from a letter addressed to Mr. Herries, then in Scotland, on November 29, 1822, by Mr. Arbuthnot, one of the Secretaries of the Treasury.

'Dear H.—I saw Wallace's letter. It spoke highly of the Commission, and it expressed a strong wish that you should be in Parliament to aid him. . . . .'

At the beginning of 1823, the place of Financial Secretary of the Treasury having become vacant in consequence of other ministerial changes, Lord Liverpool offered it to Mr. Herries, together with the influence of the Government to bring him into Parliament for the borough of Harwich, where he was elected in February as a colleague of Mr. Canning. The significance of this unusual—it may perhaps be said unprecedented—political arrangement, can hardly be denied. The Prime Minister could have had little difficulty in finding among his supporters in the House of Commons several persons of weight and ability who would have been eager to accept the important, and at that time lucrative, post bestowed upon an outsider unable to command a seat or a vote, and quite inexperienced in public speaking. It is obvious, therefore, that in the opinion of Lord Liverpool, a man of very sound judgment, the individual so selected must have had peculiar qualifications, making his assistance most desirable.[4]

[4] The arrangement effected in 1823 was looked upon as a probable one

The Prime Minister had no reason to repent of his choice of the new Secretary to the Treasury, whose activity and ability in the despatch of important business were declared by his contemporaries to be unsurpassed. The reliance placed upon his judgment and resources by Lord Liverpool, who paid great attention not only to general financial management, but to the departmental business of the Treasury, and the carelessness of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,[5] who paid little attention to either the one or the other, enabled Mr. Herries to exercise in reality an authority, we will venture to say, much greater in extent and in degree than that which belonged to many a Cabinet Minister. The power which he had, in fact, was never abused by him. His endeavour always was to ensure the efficiency of the public service; but without rigidity. He was not a pedantic red-tapist. He was never willing to cause real injury by inflexible adherence to an administrative dogma. By nature averse from harshness, he was considerate in his dealings with individuals, while carefully guarding the public interests. He was ever disposed to render official assistance for the advancement of science and art, and his zeal for the promotion

ten years earlier, as may be gathered from a letter written to Mr. Herries by an official friend in 1813.

[5] The Right Honourable Frederick Robinson, afterwards Viscount Goderich and Earl of Ripon. His letters, which invariably contain excuses for not attending to some business, to Mr. Herries during this period, would be instructive to those who study 'the way not to do it.' Lord Liverpool's letters, on the contrary, are those of a man who did his work conscientiously and thoroughly. They are always clear and to the point, showing perfect acquaintance with the subjects to which they relate. Almost every one of them conveys entire approval of something done or suggested by the Secretary and carefully considered by the First Lord.

of public improvements was conspicuous. At the time in question, and during the whole of his subsequent career, he did more, perhaps, for this latter object than any other political person of his age. The laying out (by Nash) of the enclosure in St. James's Park—one of the most pleasant spots in the metropolis; the transformation of the Charing Cross neighbourhood; and the construction of the Carlton quarter,—belong to the period when he was Secretary of the Treasury. These and other works were pushed on by him vigorously.

A very important legislative measure of reform, the consolidation of the Customs Laws—the intricacy and confusion of which had become a very serious inconvenience to commerce—was effected under the auspices of Mr. Herries while Secretary of the Treasury. What share he had in it is shown by the following passage in the Introduction to the Collection of New Acts, by Mr. Deacon Hume, whose valuable services in framing them were warmly acknowledged in an official letter from Mr. Herries.

'After this intended work of "Digest" had been some time in hand, and when considerable progress had been made in it, the more effectual measure of "*consolidation*" was recommended in the fourteenth Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry; and, happily, when the period arrived for the determination of Government upon that suggestion, Mr. Herries, who had been a member of that Board, was in a situation to give effect to his own project. So much, indeed, was the difficulty of the work overrated by many persons in high stations, that the

question was for a while suspended between the palliative remedy of a "Digest," or abstract, and the effectual cure of a "consolidation;" and but for the exertions of Mr. Herries, by whom, as Secretary of the Treasury, all the Bills were introduced into the House of Commons and carried through their stages, and who had satisfied his own mind of the practicability of the design, it is probable that the public would have been left to apply and adapt, as it best could, a few hundred more quarto pages of Digest to the 1,375 already in its possession.'

The unfortunate and not well-justified secession of the Duke of Wellington, Mr. Peel, and many of their followers, from the Government, when Mr. Canning became its head, placed the subject of this memoir in a difficult and painful position. On the one hand, a political separation from the most considerable portion of the Tory party, to which he had always been devoted, was distressing to him; but, on the other hand, he could not approve the conduct of the seceders, who appeared to him to have acted unwisely for the interests of their party, and unfairly towards the new Prime Minister chosen from among them. Although his political inclinations were rather towards the Duke and Mr. Peel, his personal sentiments drew him more to Mr. Canning, whose genius commanded his admiration, and of whose winning manner in social intercourse he felt the charm. The shades of difference between his own opinions and those expressed by Mr. Canning on some points of domestic and foreign policy seemed to him insufficient to warrant a withdrawal from the Government when its most prominent member in the

House of Commons was placed at its head. He was left as free as before to vote against Catholic Emancipation; while on the subjects of Parliamentary Reform, to which Mr. Canning was as hostile as the Duke of Wellington, and the removal of commercial restrictions within certain limits, to which Mr. Herries was as favourable as Canning or Huskisson, there was perfect agreement. At the same time, there could be no doubt that the ability of the then Secretary of the Treasury was very highly valued by Mr. Canning, who never failed to express the esteem in which he held him, and his desire to retain his services. Mr. Canning's sentiments, however, had not always been the same towards Mr. Herries, against whom he had been for a long time prejudiced by misrepresentations leading him to believe in a personal hostility which had no real existence.

We have heard a pleasant anecdote told of an election journey made by them together for the first time to Harwich, Canning being then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 1823. It seemed likely to be anything but an agreeable journey. Each of them imagining that the other was ill-disposed towards him, the two travelling companions sat moodily, each in his corner of their chariot, after the manner of Dr. Johnson's typical Stage-coach passengers who 'corrode away in gloomy malignity'—until at last Canning broke silence with a funny story. His fellow-traveller showed that he too had a sense of humour, and the rest of the route, which had threatened to be dreary in the extreme, was passed in genial conversation. The greatest cordiality

always prevailed between the electoral colleagues afterwards.

The following draft of a letter to Mr. Planta, one of the Secretaries of the Treasury, at a time when the first ministerial arrangements of Mr. Canning were still incomplete, shows that Mr. Herries, though willing to continue his connection with the Government, wished to leave the Treasury on account of his health :—

'My dear P.,—In my ruminations on the subject of the difficulty which has arisen in the filling up of the Office of Woods, &c., I have been led back to a notion suggested by Lord Goderich when conversing with me on that matter yesterday.

'He said, why should not *you* (meaning me) be put into that office? It would be agreeable to the King, and it would obviate all the objections to the introduction of a stranger on the score of our complicated money arrangements.

'He added that he thought Courtenay [6] or F. Lewis,[7] might fill my station, and that I might do a great deal of the important business of it in Parliament this session, although holding the other office; so as to be really as useful in finance as if Secretary of the Treasury.

'I was not prepared to offer any opinion on the suggestion at the time.

'Upon reflection, however, it appears to me to present a solution of the difficulty which has occurred, and that it might be convenient to Mr. Canning and

[6] The Right Honourable Thomas Peregrine Courtenay.
[7] Afterwards Sir T. Frankland Lewis.

satisfactory to me. I should lose a good deal of income[8] by the change, but I should gain advancement, and, what I very much want just now, some comparative ease. I am not in my usual state of strength and health.

'Courtenay would be of invaluable service to Mr. Canning. He knows the details of finance better than any man I am acquainted with. He knows the rules, and forms of the House, and, what is of all things the most important, he knows the habits of Mr. Canning in business, and, from much experience, how to serve and assist him most effectually. He is already in the enjoyment of his confidence. . . .

'Such is my scheme. I send it to you instead of writing to Mr. Canning, because it may be wholly useless even to bestow a thought upon it, supposing the arrangements to which it relates to have been finally made since I saw you, in which case you must throw it into the fire.

'On the other hand, should it still be worth while to present it as a suggestion to Mr. C., you can do so. You have some interest in it, as it would promote you to the house in D. St.'

Mr. Planta replied thus :—

'Downing Street: Monday Morning, April 30.

'My dear Herries,—I have received your confidential letter, and, as I thought the question still open enough, I immediately sent it on to Mr. Canning, with my cordial

[8] 1,500*l.* a year; the then salaries of the Secretary of the Treasury and First Commissioner of Woods and Forests being, respectively, 3,500*l.* and 2,000*l.*

support, such as it is, however *much I lose* (for house and pecuniary advantage are nothing to me in comparison with the loss of *you* as a colleague). I have seen Mr. Canning since; he received the suggestion very kindly, but still his mind seemed turned on other arrangements. Ever yours faithfully,

'J. PLANTA, JUN.'

However well disposed towards Mr. Canning (he might perhaps have been properly described as a personal, though hardly a political, Canningite), Mr. Herries was determined not to continue to adhere to his Administration if the principles on which he believed it to be founded were departed from. When, therefore, the junction of a portion of the Whig party (thanks to the ill-advised hostility of those who might under Canning have kept together a purely Tory Government) seemed to indicate an impending change of policy, he felt called upon to intimate to Mr. Canning that, if such were to be the case, he must leave him. In particular, he asked for explanations as to the line to be taken on the Parliamentary Reform Question by the Cabinet, after the Whig infusion. Mr. Canning's reply was most decided. He declared it to be his intention to maintain the attitude of resistance which he had always assumed, and he added that he had insisted on receiving from the Whigs who had joined his Government a positive pledge that they would not only abstain from advocating Reform, but would join with him in opposing it if the question were brought forward in Parliament.

Mr. Herries having observed that there might perhaps be some misunderstanding on this point, the Premier answered with great warmth, vehemently striking the table before him with his clenched hand: 'I say they *are* pledged—every one of them—except Abercromby.'[9] 'But how,' exclaimed his interlocutor, 'can they reconcile such a promise with all their former professions?' Canning rejoined, with a smile, 'That's their affair—neither mine nor yours.'

Mr. Tierney, one of the Whig members of Canning's Cabinet, declared in the House of Commons, on February 18, 1828, that, with Canning's consent, he had reserved to himself the right of voting in favour of Reform. But this assertion cannot be reconciled with the known terms insisted upon by the Prime Minister and his remaining Tory colleagues, and accepted by the Whigs who joined him, as the conditions of the alliance. They were published in 1831 by Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private Secretary, in the second edition[1] of his 'Political Life of the Right Honourable George Canning;' and in his later work, 'George Canning and his Times,' he says: 'Mr. Canning's opinions never varied, nor did he relax in his strenuous opposition to all proposals for Reform,[2] on the principle of general improve-

[9] The Right Honourable James Abercromby, Judge-Advocate General, afterwards Speaker of the House of Commons and first Lord Dunfermline.

[1] In the first edition they did not appear. The details of the negotiations for the formation of the Ministry were 'omitted,' as a note informed the reader, 'in consequence of representations having been made to the author that their publication at the present moment' (in 1831) 'might be productive of very serious mischief to the country.'

[2] On May 4, 1827—only three months before his death—he said, in the House of Commons, 'I am asked what I mean to do on the subject of Parliamentary Reform? Why, I say, to oppose it—to oppose it to the end of

ment. Such progress had he made in bringing over the public to his views, that when, in 1827, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Tierney, and Lord Carlisle joined his Government, and when Mr. Brougham and other Whigs gave it their support, it was on the express condition that Reform was to be not an open question, but one which the *united* Cabinet were to oppose.' It is evident that Tierney's alleged reservation, which would have been wholly inconsistent with this agreement, was unknown to Canning's confidential secretary and biographer. That it should have been admitted seems in the highest degree improbable. Such an exception to the general rule, however, may have been allowed in the case of the Judge-Advocate General, who was not a Cabinet Minister.

Lord Palmerston's 'Autobiography,' published somewhat recklessly by Lord Dalling, contains the following passage on the subject of the formation of Canning's Cabinet, in which the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer appears to have been offered to Lord Palmerston :—

'In the meantime intrigues were set on foot. George IV., who personally hated me, did not fancy me as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He wanted to have Herries in that office. There were questions coming on about palaces and Crown lands which the King was very anxious about, and he wished to have a creature of his own at the Exchequer, or to have the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer held by the First Lord,

my life in this House, as hitherto I have done. I am asked what I intend to do respecting the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts? My answer is, to oppose it too.'

whose numerous occupations would compel him to leave details very much to George Harrison, the Secretary, and to Herries, Auditor of the Civil List.'

In no part of Mr. Herries's private correspondence with various persons in and out of office, and among others with the King's private Secretary, Sir William Knighton, is there the slightest allusion to the supposed wish of the King that Mr. Herries should be placed at the Exchequer. He never mentioned to any member of his family a matter of so much interest to him and to them. It is to be presumed, from the total silence of his official friends, that none of them ever heard of it. The reasonable conclusion, therefore, is, that the King's desire, if it had any existence save in Lord Palmerston's imagination, was never expressed.

From some observations in the 'Times' and other newspapers at a later date, a notion appears to have been prevalent that the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer had been offered to Mr. Herries by Mr. Canning. This, we believe, was a mistake. What, however, is certain is that, as we have often heard from Mr. Herries himself, at the time when the question of Lord Palmerston's appointment to that office was pending, Mr. Canning asked the then Secretary to the Treasury whether he would consent to serve in that capacity under Lord Palmerston, and that the enquiry was answered with a decided negative. Whereupon the Prime Minister observed: 'Then let us say no more about it.'

The last part of Lord Palmerston's statement quoted above furnishes one of the many internal proofs with

which the 'Autobiography' abounds of the utter untrustworthiness of that historical record. It was very well known to Lord Palmerston that at the time when Mr. Canning held together the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, and during several previous years, Mr. Herries was not Auditor of the Civil List, but Financial Secretary to the Treasury. As such he was in constant official correspondence with Lord Palmerston, the Secretary-at-War, on matters with which the Auditor of the Civil List could have no concern, and throughout nearly five sessions sat by his lordship's side in the House of Commons, where the Auditor of the Civil List was, by an Act of Parliament, expressly precluded from sitting. Moreover, Lord Palmerston, who from long experience was thoroughly conversant with the mode of distribution of departmental business, certainly knew that 'questions about palaces and Crown lands' did not come under the cognizance of the Auditor of the Civil List, whose functions were confined to the control of the expenses of the Royal Household; and consequently that even if Mr. Herries had, as asserted, occupied that post at the time referred to, the First Lord of the Treasury would have been unable to 'leave details' concerning such matters 'very much,' or at all, to him. We have not here to deal with a mere mistake. The *animus* with which Lord Palmerston tries to connect an imaginary Auditor of the Civil List with imaginary palace jobs is too patent to need indication.[3]

[3] Lord Dalling in a note to the words, 'Herries, Auditor of the Civil List,' adds the remark, 'And also Joint Secretary of the Treasury.' With

The assurances obtained from Mr. Canning convinced Mr. Herries that he could without sacrifice of principle maintain his connection with the Government; but bodily indisposition made him seek relief from the hard labour he had for some years incessantly undergone at the Treasury. Accordingly, he addressed to his chief on July 3 the following letter, which speaks for itself:—

'I have for some time past experienced a gradual failure of health and strength which has interfered materially with the discharge of the heavy duties of my office. I have got through them as well as I could, but certainly not by any means to my own satisfaction.

'I now find that without some considerable relaxation I cannot hope to recover the general tone of my constitution, and I know too well what are the business and responsibilities of the Financial Secretary of the Treasury not to be aware that I could not, without great injustice to you, endeavour to obtain such a relaxation except by requesting you to confer upon some other person an office which I am physically unable to discharge satisfactorily.

'I might perhaps be able to render you more assistance in your financial arrangements in and out of Parliament—and more particularly in preparing the materials for the Finance Committee, and attending to its proceedings—if I were relieved of the weight of my

very little care this negligent editor might have ascertained that the two offices could not have been held simultaneously by the same person.

present duties, either by being out of office altogether or placed in any office requiring less constant labour and attention than that which I now hold.

'In either way you may depend upon the utmost support that such an humble individual can afford to uphold the principles on which your Government is founded.

'If in the changes which you may have to make, any of the easier offices of Vice-President of the Board of Trade, or First Commissioner of Woods &c., should be at your disposal, I think I should be able to combine with the discharge of the duties of either of them some service not wholly useless in the line in which I have the most experience. In the latter of these offices more particularly I think I might be able to conduct the business to your satisfaction. But knowing how you have destined it I am bound to say that the arrangement which you desire to make (if you can prevail upon S. Bourne to accept it) is in my own opinion preferable to any other.

'You will, I am sure, have no difficulty in finding a fit successor to my office. I know that T. P. Courtenay is a candidate for it, and has long been so; and I also know that in respect of his knowledge of the business and his habits of application he is well qualified to fill it. Of his qualifications by reason of his general talents and acquirements you know, I believe, more by the experience which you have had of them during his service under you than anything I could say would inform you of.

'I have been unwilling to make this communication

until I felt that I could not with propriety defer it any longer. It is not merely for my own sake that I now seek the relief which I have pointed out. I feel that if I were to struggle on with the difficulty I experience I might be the occasion of embarrassment to you by failing at the opening or in the midst of the ensuing session, when you will have much business of considerable magnitude and difficulty to contend with.

'Having thus fully explained my situation, I leave myself entirely in your hands, as to the time and mode of disposing of me, and beg you to believe me always most faithfully yours,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

This letter appears to have been sent through Mr. Planta, who noticed its receipt thus :—

'Treasury: July 3, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—Your letter was given to me just as I got on horseback to-day, and it spoiled my ride entirely.

'You did me but justice in supposing that if you had told me yesterday, even languid and knocked up as I was, I should have contended with all my might against your determination. But as it is taken, and the thing done, contention is of no use. Every man is the best judge of what is the most eligible course for himself; and I can only say I sincerely hope you have done that which will make you most happy. I must further express unqualified sorrow at ceasing to have your assistance here. I have not seen Mr. Canning since he has received your letter. I will come over to you in the course of the day, as I suppose you

are hardly well enough to venture here. Yours ever truly,

'J. PLANTA.'

In consequence of some verbal communications through the writer of the above note, a second and explanatory letter was addressed to Mr. Canning to the following effect:—[4]

'Allow me to return to you my sincere thanks for the message brought to me by Planta.

'I trust he has conveyed to you my sentiments on learning your favourable opinion of my services and your desire to retain them. And more particularly I hope that he has removed entirely any impression which you may have received from my letter of a solicitude on my part to obtain any new appointment at present. When I intimated my readiness to serve you either out of office entirely, or in any of the offices of half-labour such as those I mentioned, I most sincerely wished you to understand my preference of those alternatives according to the order in which I placed them; and I mentioned those offices rather with a view to guard you against supposing that I entertained any wish to hold an honorary sinecure such as the Paymastership, &c., &c. (which would not be at all suitable to me), than on account of any particular wish to occupy either of the situations which I named.

'In truth, I am too well aware of the difficulties and embarrassments by which you are surrounded in completing your ministerial arrangements to entertain

[4] From a rough draft in pencil.

a thought of increasing them by pressing any additional claims upon you.

'I do not think the arrangement with C. Grant would be suitable. The state of Huskisson's health will require, I fear, that he should go immediately and for some time abroad. That office[5] could not with any propriety be left without the president or vice-president to attend to it, and as I am similarly circumstanced with Huskisson, we should be ill adapted to relieve each other.

'With respect to the Treasury, give me leave to express as my decided opinion that you ought not to throw away the means it affords of increasing your political connection with families of influence. It is, besides, an office in which I should be wholly lost and out of my natural place, which is in the working class of politicians. Upon the whole, I venture to submit, as the best course under the circumstances which compel me to seek such a considerable interval of relaxation from hard labour, that my intention to withdraw from the Treasury should remain secret until your other general arrangements have been completed (which I presume will be done very soon), and permit me to hand over my office to my successor about the end of this month, or the beginning of August, leaving the whole question of future employment to time and circumstances hereafter.

'It will be my earnest wish that it should be clearly understood in all quarters that the motives for my retirement are wholly unmixed with any feeling of discontent or estrangement with respect to yourself.

[5] The Board of Trade.

The kindness, frankness, and confidence with which you have conducted yourself towards me affords me every inducement to believe that no such sentiment exists on your part, and I should ill indeed requite that confidence and kindness if I allowed any place for its existence on mine.

'It was chiefly as a means of preventing any misconception on this point that the taking office suggested itself to me.

'In the communication which Planta made to me he mentioned your disposition to join the Privy Council with the Lordship of the Treasury. If the former alone were to be bestowed upon me upon my quitting office, it would help most distinctly to mark the character of that retirement, and I should accept the honour with the double satisfaction of receiving it as an approbation of my humble services in my present office, and a proof that in quitting it I carried your continued goodwill as the head of the Government along with me.

'I grieve to have occupied you so long with such an insignificant subject, when you have others of so much magnitude on your hands.'

It must be allowed that the whole of this correspondence shows a loyal and unselfish spirit on the part of Mr. Herries. His proceedings seem to have been watched with interest by the opposition Tories, from which quarter hints and suggestions were conveyed to him, showing a desire that he should detach himself from Mr. Canning's Government, or, at any rate, abstain from any open manifestation of cordial adherence to it. One of the secessionists wrote thus,

on July 5: 'I called on you yesterday, but you were engaged. I would have called this morning. . . . I do not know what steps you mean to adopt. It had been told to *my friends* that you had sent in your resignation. This was false. . . . You had first intended to throw up office if the Whigs came in. This was no secret, for it was, I found, generally talked of at the Treasury. There were, however, valid grounds for your remaining in office rather than be the cause of embarrassment in your particular department to the King's Government. . . . We, it is true, may never return to office again. We may, however, have this happen to us; and I am most anxious that, should such an event occur, you may stand with my friends as you yourself could most desire. Were you to remain where you are, no umbrage would be given; but were you to change your office, and thus make your stand by such a declaration of your principles, I think the case would be felt to be different.' . . . This was precisely the course which Mr. Herries had proposed to take.

On July 16 the same correspondent wrote to him, 'I had a long talk with Knighton. . . . He is most anxious to have the Duke back, and he entreated me to point out the mode. . . . He was most cordial to me. He was not unbounded in his praises of Canning, but he palliated his conduct. He abused the rest of the crew—as he called them—most unmercifully. He spoke with great dislike of the appointment of the Lord High Admiral, and of the suggestor of it. This, I see, is not popular at Windsor. They are evidently alarmed, and they want the Duke as a safeguard. This is the

substance of all that passed. . . . Peel said to me on Saturday that Hobhouse was quitting them, and that he wished you would also. . . .'

A confidential communication from the same person was reported as follows by Mr. Spearman :—'He added, "The Duke of Wellington and Mr. Peel are the only persons for whose opinions Mr. Herries need care, and I am quite sure he is well with them; and although I think it might be considered as inexpedient that he should take any advancement upon leaving the Treasury, yet, from a conversation I had last night with the Duke, I am sure he will never misunderstand such a step, although he thinks, placed as Mr. Herries is, and with his standing before the public, he had better not."' . . . What that standing really was may be seen from the following remarkable passages in the city article of the 'Times' of July 23, 1827, when rumours of Mr. Herries's intended retirement began to circulate :—

'There has been little activity to-day in the Consol Market. . . . Some of the more cautious stockholders are beginning to be less sanguine for a rapid advance than they were a few days ago. Two or three causes for this distrust exist. The first we may mention is the aspect of affairs in Lisbon. . . . In the next place the minds of many are unsettled by the whispers which daily get abroad of the intrigues set on foot by the enemies of Mr. Canning. . . . To this it may be added, though to superficial observers it may appear a descent in the climax, that the confidence of another class, and that not a small one, is shaken by the reported retirement of Mr. Herries from office. Stock-

holders instinctively dread any change in the system of financial affairs, or in the management of the public debt; and they are aware that the present system, such as it is, owes its form chiefly to the laborious exertions of Mr. Herries, who has fulfilled all the duties of Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the exception of the delivery of the Budget. It is difficult, too, to fix on any public man who could at this moment adequately supply his place. This is the analysis, as near as may be, of the shades of discontent which hang over the market for Government securities.'

That the position which he held, according to the 'Times,' in public estimation was occupied by him in fact, may be inferred from the following paper, of which the draft is in his handwriting, on the state of the finances in 1827. It enunciates, in the tone of a person whose authority is recognized, the opinions of the writer on three important points in particular: the Sinking Fund, to the maintenance of which in its then existing form he was opposed; the retrenchment of expenditure, which he insisted upon; and the appointment of a Finance Committee, which he proposed for the purpose of effecting the desired reductions. This memorandum, endorsed 'Finance, 1827,' was probably drawn up about the time of the formation of Mr. Canning's Government:—

'Without entering into a minute detail of figures, the following may be taken as a fair general view of our financial condition at the present period.

'The year which has closed (1826) exhibits a surplus of income over the *actual* expenditure, exclusive of

the Sinking Fund, of about 1,009,448*l.*, which falls short of the amount appropriated by law to the Sinking Fund by 4,581,783*l.* In this actual expenditure are included items which are some of them not properly a part of it; and some of them only casual excesses of the *payments* within the year.

. . . . . .

'These two sums being deducted from the actual payments, will show that the surplus of the income over the *corrected* yearly expenditure was 3,548,089*l.*; being only 2,043,132*l.* short of the sum required for the Sinking Fund.

'But as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, upon the reformation of the Sinking Fund in 1823, adopted his financial measures upon a view of the probable income and expenditure of the then ensuing four years, it will be fair to see how far in those four years his estimate of a surplus adequate to the Sinking Fund of 5,000,000*l.* (with the growing interest upon it) has been realized. The annexed paper A will show that in those four years, taken together, after rejecting from the expenditure the advances by way of loans &c. (the repayment of which is amply secured), the income has exceeded the expenditure, taking the actual payments as such without allowance for accelerated issues, together with the Sinking Fund, by about 1,000,000*l.*

'The true deficiency of the income in 1826 to supply the whole Sinking Fund being, as already shown, not more than 2,043,000*l.*, it is only necessary to observe that this deficiency is fairly and obviously attributable principally to the depression occasioned by the extra-

ordinary circumstances which affected the Revenue in the last year, the temporary consequences of which have been greater than could well have been anticipated. When, however, it is considered that the variation produced by these causes has, upon the whole, not been more than at the rate of 4 per cent. upon the amount of the Revenue, it can hardly be a subject of much surprise, and still less of despondency.

'After this view of the financial results of the four last years, we have to examine our prospects for the present year and for the future. . . .

'After making these allowances on either side, the probable expenditure in the year may be assumed at 52,000,000*l.* (exclusive of any advances or loans out of the Consolidated Fund).

'To cover this charge the Revenue, together with the repayments of all kinds, and the annuity from the Trustees of Pensions &c., may be estimated at 55,000,000*l.*, which would therefore afford a surplus of 3,000,000*l.* only for the Sinking Fund, being about 2,700,000*l.* short of its proper amount according to the law now in force.

'In what manner is this difference to be supplied? Are we to impose taxes? to borrow money by loan or exchequer bills? or to abandon the present plan of the Sinking Fund, which imposes the obligation of applying a fixed sum to the purchase of Stock, whether the surplus of the Revenue can furnish it or not?

'To impose taxes appears to be impracticable, and even if practicable highly impolitic in the present state of the country.

'To borrow money for the purpose of redeeming debt would be in opposition to the principles now universally received, and, in truth, to sound economy.

'The remaining alternative is the alteration of the principle of the Sinking Fund, by removing the present obligation to purchase Stock to a fixed amount, whether the Revenue afford the means or not.

'There would probably not be much difficulty in adopting this simple and natural course, if we were not embarrassed by the pledges and discussions of former occasions, when measures relating to the Sinking Fund were under consideration: but, whatever be the difficulties arising out of those circumstances, I nevertheless conceive that we have no choice but between a temporary and a total abrogation of that part of the present law which compels us to employ for the redemption of debt money which we have not got, and which we cannot raise (or ought not to raise) except by borrowing it.

'. . . The effect upon the public credit of such an alteration would probably not be at all material. The money actually applicable in the market to the purchase of Stock would indeed be quite as great in the year 1827 under such a regulation as it was in 1826, for the Sinking Fund was then chiefly applied to the discharge of Exchequer Bills in the hands of the bank for the payment of the holders of 4 per cent. Stock, who did not accept the terms of reduction in 1825.

'This arrangement might still be grafted upon a recognition of the policy of maintaining a Sinking Fund as nearly as possible at the rate of 5,000,000*l.* a

year, with accumulation; and it might upon very good grounds be shown that with a complete return to an ordinary state of commerce and consumption, there would be a reasonable foundation for expecting that we should be able, on an average of years, to maintain that rate of surplus without the addition of any new taxes.

'But such an expectation could not well be held out without the prospect also of some diminution of our expenditure. Upon that point I am still of opinion, notwithstanding the disappointment which our hopes experienced last year (even before the events in Portugal had quite destroyed them) that a good deal might be effected by a vigorous and determined effort; and that reductions to an extent materially useful and highly satisfactory to the country might be made in the Military, Naval, and Civil Departments respectively, without any considerable (perhaps not any) diminution of the Establishments. My belief is that upon a very close examination they will be found in some respects more *expensive* than they need be.

'But the difficulties standing in the way of a *Government* disposed to make these reductions would be very great; and even if it should succeed in overcoming all the details opposed to it, and in making such retrenchments as might satisfy itself, the Public would still remain unsatisfied, and unwilling to believe that every possible saving had been accomplished.

'To do the work most effectually and most satisfactorily, both for the Government and the Public, a Committee of the House of Commons would perhaps be the fittest instrument. If a Committee were ap-

pointed to enquire into and report upon the whole of our public expenditure (including the charges of managing the revenue, and all other outgoings between the gross and the net receipt of it), they might, if well constituted and well managed, be made the means of effecting some reformation and some savings, which are not only desirable, but now almost indispensable; and they would at the same time raise up a barrier against the unreasonable attacks and the absurd clamour which are now directed against every branch and degree of expenditure, however legitimate and indispensable.

'Such a Committee is no new expedient. Financial enquiries by the House of Commons so conducted have been instituted from time to time, and the interval which has elapsed since the last of this kind (1817 and 1818) would seem to justify the renewal of the measure at present.

'There would, moreover, be a peculiar fitness in resorting to it again in the first Session of a new Parliament. And on the present occasion it would be still further advantageous to establish it without much delay, because, the estimates for the great branches of the expenditure having been voted, it would occasion no disturbance or suspension of their arrangements for the present year, and would afford a prospect of some reports upon which measures might be adopted during the recess, with a view to the estimates for the year 1828.'

The Finance Committee, of which the writer of this paper was evidently the originator, was not appointed as he wished in 1827, but was in that year announced

by Mr. Canning (it had been already suggested by Mr. Herries to Lord Liverpool and Mr. Robinson in 1826) as one of the measures for the ensuing session of 1828. Its composition had afterwards a serious effect upon the Cabinet of Lord Goderich.

In connection with the recommendation of retrenchment (not a Whig invention) contained in the paper given above, the following correspondence relating to the proposed abandonment of the settlements on the coast of Africa, and to the pressure of Colonial expenditure generally—a sore trouble to the Secretary of the Treasury—may be introduced here, although it properly belongs to a somewhat earlier period :—

'Eastham : January 5, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—Arbuthnot's letter to me (which I enclose) will render any explanation on my part unnecessary in sending you the memorandum, or, rather, the letter to which he refers on the subject of the African forts. I hope you will be able to make out the Duke of Wellington's draft, as I have done, though once or twice not without some little difficulty.

'I quite agree with the Duke of Wellington that the whole of the coast of Guinea ought to be abandoned ; and I am prepared to say the same of Sierra Leone. They involve a great deal of expense without answering the purposes for which we now profess to retain these possessions. Some time may be requisite, and some precautions necessary, before we withdraw ourselves altogether from these insalubrious possessions, but the decision to withdraw from them will, I hope, be taken without delay. I should further hope that Portugal, in

return for the *substantial* services which we are now rendering to her, will not hesitate to transfer to us her merely *nominal* sovereignty over the island of Fernando Po. That island, I believe, will be more useful in forwarding the objects of legitimate trade with Africa, and as a station for watching the illicit trade in slaves, than all the possessions which we now hold on the coast of Africa. Yours very faithfully,

'W. HUSKISSON.'[6]

'January 7, 1827.

'My dear Huskisson,—I rejoice greatly at the determination which appears now to be taken by the Cabinet, upon the Duke's suggestion, to put an end to the unjustifiable waste of life and money which we have of late years been incurring, against our own conviction, in mere complaisance towards a party of zealots. . . . .

'. . . The abandonment of the establishments on the coast of Africa will relieve our Miscellaneous Estimates in some degree this year, but not our Extraordinaries. . . .

'But it surely is not the less desirable that we should lose no time in setting about this most useful work of economy and humanity.

. . . . .

'I believe you know the nature of these exceedings of our Colonial expenditure, and how they have been shuffled out of immediate observation by the indirect way in which they have hitherto been defrayed. But I doubt if you are aware of the extent of them. I am preparing a letter now to the Colonial Department upon a review of the accounts for the last 10 or 12 years of

[6] Then President of the Board of Trade.

each Colony, which will show the real state of the case, and which I will communicate to you. In the meantime, I may state that . . . . they are (collectively) accumulating debt to us at the rate of nearly 200,000*l.* a year. We are certainly not in the right course, as to the management of this considerable branch of our general expenditure. But there is a good disposition on all sides, I believe, and particularly on that of W. Horton, to get into it. . . .

'J. C. HERRIES.'

In the last month of Mr. Canning's administration Mr. Herries was placed on the Royal Commission for the direction of the restorations of Windsor Castle, which were commenced in 1824. This Commission, to which other persons were subsequently appointed, was originally composed of the Duke of Wellington, the Earl of Aberdeen, Sir Charles Long (Lord Farnborough), Sir M. W. Ridley, and Mr. Alexander Baring (Lord Ashburton), besides the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the First Commissioner of Woods and Forests, *ex officio* members of it. The duties of the Commission consisted principally in examining plans and estimates, all of which required their sanction before they were submitted to the Treasury, or the works could be proceeded with. Lord Farnborough seems to have been the most active Commissioner. His correspondence, a few extracts from which are given below, with Mr. Herries', shows that both of them were very anxious to check unnecessary expense, especially in the matter of furniture. But who has ever been able

to restrain builders, decorators, and upholsterers, even in the most unpretending houses of private individuals ?

On July 22, 1827, Lord Farnborough writes—

'I am sorry Tuesday is inconvenient. But we should really do nothing without you. I rather think it would be best to adopt your proposal of throwing the business of furnishing into the hands of the Lord Chamberlain. Lord Goderich thinks we have gained something in economy by our Committee, but I fear not a great deal. I am ready to co-operate if it is wished, and I will do my utmost to spare expense.' And on the 25th, '. . . Both building and furnishing committees are in such state of abeyance, that unless some immediate measures are taken we shall be in difficulty. . . . All this partakes of the derangement consequent upon the change of administration ; but the worst of all is not to know whereabouts we are ; and nobody can put this *en train* but yourself. In the meantime the K. presses to get into the Castle. This period will be retarded unless we can establish some system that will work. I shall be forthcoming for some time whenever any meeting may be required, and I shall be most anxious to do all in my power to keep down expense, to which we must set ourselves heartily at work or we shall have a bad account to render. As I am more impressed with the importance of all this than others appear to be, I am sure you will excuse my calling your attention to it. I hope Canning will take it in hand.'

Mr. Herries replies on the 26th to Lord Farnborough :—

'I quite agree with you that some final settlement as to the management and responsibility of the furnishing of Windsor ought now to be made.'

To Sir William Knighton—the King's private secretary—he writes, apparently on the same day :—

'My dear Sir William,—It is necessary that we should have a meeting with you on the subject of furnishing Windsor Palace, and also on some other matters connected with Civil List expenditure, as soon as you return to London. When I say *we*, I mean Lord Goderich, Lord Farnborough, and myself.

'We shall get into confusion and do the King ill service if we do not, with your assistance, come to a clear understanding of what we may, and what we may not, or cannot do. Shall you be in town the end of next week, or when?

'My determination to go for two months to the Continent at the beginning of August remains fixed. But before I go I am most anxious to have some full conversation with you, and above all to leave every matter in which we are jointly engaged on such a footing that no confusion or trouble may arise out of my absence.'

On August 8, 1827, the day of Mr. Canning's death, Mr. Herries, who had been preparing for a journey on the Continent in search of health, received the two following letters, dated the previous day—one from Mr. Planta, and the other from Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst.

'My dear Herries,—I have nothing to say this morning that is in the least favourable. The account

is not yet come into town, but I fear its delay is only because the *event* is near at hand. When I left Chiswick at nine last night there was not the least hope. I am glad you have put off your departure for some days, and I entreat you to take care of yourself and to do all you can during them to restore your health, which I find has been again severely attacked during my absence. So far from having long *holidays*, I think you will be called upon to be Chancellor of the Exchequer. Be assured that I shall always rejoice at your elevation, and retain a sincerely satisfactory recollection of the time, however short, that we have been together: if indeed we are not together still. But all this is premature. I shall see you to-morrow if you are in town. Ever yours faithfully,

'J. P.'

Now it must be remarked that a gentleman in Mr. Planta's position was necessarily in constant and confidential intercourse both with political personages and with permanent civil servants in the highest branches of the administration. The expression, therefore, of his belief that Mr. Herries was destined to be the future Chancellor of the Exchequer may fairly be taken as the reflex of the prevalent opinion in the official world. If it had been merely his own fancy, Mr. Planta would hardly have hazarded such a prediction.

Lord Lyndhurst wrote:—

'My dear Herries,—Circumstances are such that you must not leave England at present. Let me see you to-morrow. Mr. C. is in a very sad state. Ever yours,

'LYNDHURST.'

The significance of this pressing letter addressed at a moment of the gravest anxiety by the Lord Chancellor to an individual described by the latest historian of that time as a 'Tory clerk,' cannot escape the penetration of a judicious reader. Why, he will ask, was Lord Lyndhurst so solicitous to prevent the departure of a Secretary of the Treasury on account of the then impending crisis? Surely he could not have been moved by a consideration of any prospective inconvenience to the business of a department with the management of which the Lord Chancellor was not in the least concerned, and in which he probably took little interest. No. The only rationally possible explanation of Lord Lyndhurst's action is that, looking forward to a ministerial re-arrangement, he desired the participation of Mr. Herries in the composition of the new Cabinet as a means of strengthening the anti-Whig element in it to which he himself belonged. On no other supposition would Lord Lyndhurst's urgent communication have been worth the minute or two required for the writing, folding, sealing, and addressing of his note. And it may reasonably be assumed that the particular place in the Cabinet which he had in view for his correspondent could have been no other than that of Chancellor of the Exchequer—Mr. Herries, who was known to have special aptitude for the post, being already spoken of in political circles as the person likely to be chosen to fill it.

This fact is proved by the evidence of a letter from Lord Westmoreland to the Duke of Wellington, dated

August 8,[7] in which he says, 'The news of last night, which I rather credit, was that Lord Goderich was appointed Minister. There were talks of Herries being Chancellor of the Exchequer.'

[7] *Wellington Correspondence*, second series, vol. iv.

Note to page 133.

From family correspondence lately found it appears that Mr. Herries, having resigned the office of Secretary to the Treasury, 'at Mr. Canning's earnest entreaty consented to give him a little time to look for a proper successor.' There was reason to believe that Mr. Canning had resolved not to appoint any successor before the 10th of October.

CHAPTER V.

Goderich Cabinet—Lord Palmerston's and Mr. S. Walpole's inaccurate accounts of its formation—True contemporary narrative by Mr. Herries—Corroborative correspondence—Historical comments upon the facts.

THE account given in Lord Palmerston's Autobiography of the circumstances attending the construction of the Cabinet of which Lord Goderich was called the head is in every particular untrue. Mr. Spencer Walpole, taking the Autobiography for the foundation of his description of the same events, has drawn upon his own imagination for additional inaccuracies.

The real facts, never until now made known, of this curious episode in English political and constitutional history, are stated in the following narrative, written at the time by Mr. Herries, and supported by contemporary correspondence. The annotations on these documents are the work of the present editors.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS FROM AUGUST 8 TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1827, BY MR. HERRIES.

'August 8.

'I received the account of Mr. Canning's death at Montreal[1] at about eleven o'clock.

'I came afterwards to town, and saw Planta in the

[1] Montreal, near Sevenoaks, the seat of Earl Amherst, was rented by Mr. Herries during his lordship's absence in India as Governor-General.

evening at his own house. He informed me that Lord Goderich had been sent for, and Mr. Sturges Bourne, to the King.'

'August 9.

'On Thursday I had a conversation with Mr. Planta, who had seen Lord Goderich on the subject of his probable arrangements generally. I then understood that it was intended to propose to Mr. Sturges Bourne to undertake the Chancellorship of the Exchequer.

'On this day there was a Cabinet, at which, as I was afterwards informed by Lord Goderich, a letter from the King was received, containing his general views of the reconstruction of the Ministry in consequence of the death of Mr. Canning.

'Mr. Planta informed me that Lord Goderich wished me not to depart for the Continent until I had seen him.'

'August 10.

'On Friday Lord Goderich called on me with Mr. Planta. He told me what is stated above, and that the King had proposed to Mr. Sturges Bourne to be Chancellor of the Exchequer when he was at Windsor; but he added that in the King's note, addressed to the Cabinet, that suggestion was not contained.

'He was anxious to ascertain that I would continue with him. I assured him he might consider me as remaining attached to his administration, and I begged him to consider my letter addressed to Mr. Canning as being now addressed to himself.

'He said nothing to authorize me to suppose he would offer me the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer; but

by the way in which he adverted to that situation it appeared to me that I was in some way associated with it in his mind. I suggested to him, and pressed strongly upon him, that he should make Mr. Huskisson Chancellor of the Exchequer.[2]

'He said there were some difficulties in the way of that; but he avoided saying what were to be his arrangements. He ended by expressions of great cordiality in consequence of my firm adherence to him, and he begged that I would remain in England until Tuesday, because he hoped on Monday to let me know what part he should propose to me in his new arrangements.'

'August 11.

'On Saturday, being at Montreal, I received a note from Mr. Planta, merely communicating to me the information that Lord Goderich was proceeding in good heart in his arrangements.

'In the meantime my name had been brought forward by most of the newspapers as the person likely to be called to the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer (a circumstance strongly remarked upon by Lord Goderich afterwards, when he offered me the situation, as a confirmation of his own opinion of my fitness for it).'

[2] Mr. Herries's sentiments towards Huskisson at this time are indicated by a passage in a letter, dated August 9, from Sir Henry Hardinge to the Duke of Wellington (*Wellington Correspondence*, second series, vol. iv.):—'I saw Herries at his house in Great George Street. He is looking very ill. In any case, he says, he must for the present resign, as he is completely done up, and must go abroad. . . . Huskisson, he observed, ought to be retained, as most important.'

'August 12.

'On Saturday another letter came to me from Mr. Planta. In this he informed me that Lord Goderich was thinking of me for Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he added so many things having reference to his own situation and to mine, as the consequence of that destination, and he spoke of these so confidently, that it was evident to me that he (Mr. Planta) had good reason to know that such was Lord Goderich's intention.

'He conveyed to me, at the same time, Lord Goderich's particular desire that I should come to town the next day and see him on his return from Windsor, whither he was going.'

'August 13.

'This day I came to town, as was desired by Lord Goderich. I saw the Lord Chancellor first at Lincoln's Inn, in my way to Downing Street. He told me that the King desired him to convey to me his own particular wish that I should accept the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, which Lord Goderich would offer me.

'I afterwards saw Lord Goderich on his return from Windsor in the evening, and he told me that the King desired I would undertake the office and come to him to-morrow morning to kiss hands, after which I might go abroad and take care of my health for a time.

'Lord Goderich expressed himself to be much gratified by this result, which he communicated to me with much cordiality.

'I felt myself placed in a very embarrassing situation by this sudden call to an office which had been at no time an object of my thoughts or wishes, and which, in

the present condition of my health and strength, I could not contemplate without dismay. It was unquestionably a very high gratification to me to find that I had acquired, however undeservedly, so favourable a place in the opinion of the public and also of the higher powers. I could not but feel flattered in the strongest degree by the elevation proposed to me; but, on the other hand, I could not be insensible to the great difficulties which surround the office to which I was called, nor to the inadequacy of my own strength to grapple with them. More deeply, even, than any of these, did I feel the embarrassments which were likely to arise out of the present misarrangement of political parties. I felt, upon the whole, that I could not, with satisfaction to myself, in my present condition and with my present feelings, embark in the cares and responsibilities belonging to a member of the Government at the head of one of its most important branches.'

'August 14.

'Such were my feelings on the night of the 13th. The discomforts of a very bad night, affording ample time and opportunity for reflection, confirmed me in my opinion.

'After much and anxious deliberation I wrote to Windsor, instead of going, and put my reasons for declining to undertake the office (entirely grounded on the condition of my health) into the hands of Lord Goderich.

'There was much difficulty, on the whole, in my coming to this final determination; but having made it honestly and conscientiously, and having thus declined

the great advancement offered, in the most gratifying manner, to me, I felt that I had done right, and was prepared to abide the result, be it what it might, with a quiet and contented mind, which may, perhaps, contribute more than anything else to restore my physical strength.

'I was given to understand this day that the King expected the Duke of Wellington to come back to the command of the army with the present administration.'

'August 14.

'On this day a message from Windsor forced me to reconsider my refusal.

'Lord Goderich had been with me before I received it; but although he expressed much anxiety and distress on the apprehension of my abandoning him, yet he did not in this interview appear to be particularly anxious on the subject of my accepting the particular office which he had offered to me. My conference with him, however, did not change my determination.'

'August 15.

'When I had taken some hours to consider the message from the King, I felt myself compelled to declare that I would do my best to meet his Majesty's wishes; but I stated to Lord Goderich that I must in that case have some rest and absence from business immediately, and that it must be distinctly understood that if I did not thereby gather strength, I might lay down the office again without being subject to the charge of versatility.

'I was assured that the King would be perfectly satis-

fied with that arrangement, which was forthwith made known to Lord Goderich by Sir William Knighton.

'Lord Goderich came to me very soon afterwards. He was again apparently in much embarrassment[3] and distress, but seemed to have great difficulty in disclosing the cause of it. I asked him if he had seen Sir William Knighton and had received my message; and when I found that he had received it, I began to surmise what the object of his visit proved really to be. I saw that he must be embarrassed by my having agreed to accept the office, and I led him to open himself by putting the question directly to him.

'He repeated all his assurances that "I was the only person he could wish to have in the office," and the "fittest, in his opinion, to fill it, &c., &c.;" but he said there was so much possible inconvenience in the precariousness of my duration in it, and so much positive embarrassment and trouble to himself in the necessity of my being immediately and for some time away, that he did not know what to say about it. He also adverted in obscure terms to certain peculiar embarrassments arising out of the composition of his Government. I told him at once to relieve his mind of any disquietude with respect to me. He held in his hand my formal refusal of the office. That refusal had not yet been cancelled by my subsequent communication, except the private one through Sir William Knighton;

[3] The cause of it was his having in the meantime offered the Exchequer to Lord Palmerston. (See Planta's letter to Huskisson, *post.*) Mr. Herries knew nothing of this negotiation.

and I begged him, therefore, to consider himself at perfect liberty to make use of it as he pleased.

'I added (and with great sincerity) that I should be most happy if he appointed some other person to the office, and that he might be assured it should create no estrangement between him and me.

'He seemed delighted with this declaration and as if relieved from some great trouble, and he was again most profuse in his assurances of regard and friendship, &c., &c.

'For my own part, I was greatly relieved too. I felt that I should probably be freed from the necessity of taking a step which appeared to me to be fraught with objection and danger; while, on the other hand, I should stand well with the King, to whose wishes I had acceded. The refusal now would not be on my part.

'I took care, however, that the real state of the case should be made known at Windsor, and, having done so, I left London, informing Lord Goderich that I should leave England on Saturday next, and that his messenger would find me at Montreal, if he had anything to say to me in the meantime.

'I had good reason to know that all Lord Goderich's difficulties and embarrassments in this matter arose out of an intrigue of the Whigs which had for its chief object the bringing of Lord Holland into the Cabinet.[4]

'This information came to me from a very sure quarter.'

[4] This is corroborated by a letter of August 24, 1827, from Lord Palmerston to the Hon. W. Temple (*Bulwer's Life, &c.*), and by Planta's letter to Huskisson, *post*. See also the account of the King's conversation with Mr. Herries on August 31, in this narrative.

'August 16.

'I came to London on the evening of this day by appointment from Lord Goderich, but without any intimation of the particular purpose.

'I found him again in perplexity. He informed me that the King desired I would attend, the next day, at Windsor, when he would give me an audience, and offer me the Seals himself.

'I begged of Lord Goderich to inform me whether I was to understand that as being his own advice to the King, and whether I was to consider that he himself offered me the Seals. In other words, whether I was going to the King in conformity with the wishes of the present Government or independently of them.

'He was obliged to own that the appointment which the King was now pressing upon me had, since he, Lord Goderich, had first proposed it to the King, become liable to some objections on account of the conflicting feelings and pretensions of the several parts of the Cabinet, and that he was overwhelmed by the difficulties which surrounded him. He was again profuse in his declarations that to him personally my appointment would be most satisfactory; but he gave me plainly to understand that he should be glad if I would relieve him of his difficulties by resisting the King's wishes.

'I told him distinctly that I could not now do that. I pointed out to him that it was his business, as the head of the Government, to assert his right and advise the King exclusively on the subject of appointments of so high a nature; that he could, indeed, no longer con-

sider himself with justice as being entrusted with the formation of the Government if the King took any other course in spite of his advice; and that I should therefore recommend to him to request the King to desist from his present intentions, and to think no more of me. I assured him (and again with perfect sincerity) that such a termination of this strange affair would be to me the most welcome.'

'August 17.

'I waited this morning, on Lord Goderich, at ten o'clock, according to his desire, that I might receive his final directions as to my journey to Windsor. He now produced a letter from the King, which he had in his possession at our interview last night and had not then shown me.

'To such a letter it appeared to me impossible to oppose any further resistance. I told Lord Goderich that I took it for granted, receiving such a communication through him, I could have no choice but to go to Windsor to accept the Seals. He said he thought so, but he again talked of difficulties and perplexities. He, however, concluded by saying positively, "There is no alternative; you must accept the office."

'I went to Windsor accordingly, and returned as I went, with the single exception of having been sworn in of the Privy Council.

'The scenes that occurred at Windsor would fill a volume.[5]

[5] This account is confirmed by Mr. Planta's statement to Mr. Huskisson, of August 21, and Mr. Herries's letter to Lord Goderich, of August 17, *post*. All this evidence is opposed to the assertions on this subject in Lord Palmerston's autobiography, which, after giving a wrong date for the Council, says: 'When he (Herries) arrived he told Goderich he still declined.' This is not

'The King made us wait so long that he gave time to the Whigs, Tierney and Lansdowne, to direct a new battery against Lord Goderich. The effect of it was that he came to me, and, with the strongest demonstrations of distress, entreated that I would avoid the positive acceptance of the Seals. He said that his Government depended upon it.

'I told him that he must in that case advise the King not to offer them to me, for that I would not myself refuse (although glad to be without them) after having come thither, however reluctantly, to accept them. . . .

'He said he would do what he could with the King; but if he persisted, he hoped I should assist him at least to postpone the arrangement.

'After his interview I went in. The King kept me an hour. He told me that Lord Goderich had suggested some objections which he knew came from the Whigs; that he would not be dictated to; and that he desired I would take the Seals (putting them at the same time into my hands).

only untrue, but manifestly absurd. Mr. Herries went to Windsor at Lord Goderich's desire, for the sole purpose of receiving the seals. He had no other business there. 'He entered the Closet, remained half an hour, and came out Chancellor of the Exchequer, but the King's Chancellor of the Exchequer, and not Goderich's.' This is contrary to the fact, which was well known to Lord Palmerston, who was present at the Council, and upon whose mind there could not have been any doubt as to the result of the interviews of Lord Goderich and Mr. Herries with the King. Lord Palmerston, being a member of the Cabinet, knew with absolute certainty that until the beginning of September Mr. Herries did not enter it, and he was necessarily acquainted with the fact of the prolonged vacancy of the office in question, if for no other reason, because his own pretensions to fill it were discussed in the newspapers of the day. It is very singular that his editor should not have noticed this strange circumstance.

'I told him I would take them willingly if the head of the Government had not desired me to beg of him at least to suspend the determination until he could have another interview with his Majesty. He was a good deal ruffled by this request, and still insisted; but when I observed that I had come into the closet under the recommendation of his First Minister, and that I thought it would prejudice the power and influence of that minister in the formation of the Government if he were not at least listened to, he yielded and sent for him, promising me that he would tell him his mind roundly.

'So I believe he did. But when, after a long conference with Lord Goderich, I returned to the King, he told me that he had very reluctantly consented to put off the matter until Mr. Huskisson's return. "But, remember," he said (Sir William Knighton was present), "the Seals are for you—they are yours."

'When I returned to Lord Goderich I found him satisfied with having, as he said, "gained a day." On my arrival from Windsor I wrote to him the accompanying letter, No. .

'The King's conversation about his Government and the Whigs was very curious, and, upon the whole, very satisfactory.

'I must add that I do not owe my nomination to the Privy Council to Lord Goderich.

'The King himself proposed it to me.'

'August 22.

'Lord Goderich came to me.

'I had previously seen Mr. Planta, and had pointed out to him a paragraph in the "Evening Herald," which

was evidently the echo of what had been circulated at Brookes' some days before. He was so indignant that he went forthwith to Lord Goderich to state to him that he really could not now remain silent any longer on the questions put to him in my letter.

'Lord Goderich treated the paragraph with a very proper feeling of indignation, but would not believe that it could come from the Whigs. I told him that I had previously heard of the manœuvre from Sir Alexander Grant.

'After some conversation which threw no new light on the probable issue of the depending question, he wrote and copied the letter dated August 22 hereunto annexed.

'Mr. Planta this day gave me a copy of Lord Goderich's letter (or rather of his own under Lord Goderich's immediate dictation) to Mr. Huskisson on the subject of the difficulty which has arisen about my appointment. This letter contained, on the whole, a clear and very fair statement of the facts of the case.

'I went to Montreal this day.'

'August 24.

'A messenger brought me (with the newspapers) several letters concerning the shameful paragraph in the "Morning Chronicle" about me. Among others, one from Lord Goderich, very creditable to his honourable and good feelings.

'Holmes arrived soon after, and informed me of what was passing in London on the subject.

'I immediately wrote a short paragraph to accompany the insertion of the letter from Lord Goderich in

the "New Times" of the next day, and sent it up by a special messenger to London. I was greatly distressed and vexed by the blackguard proceedings of the party opposed to me.'

[The letter, with an introductory paragraph, appears in a prominent place in the 'Times' of August 27, 1827.

'The "Morning Chronicle" of Friday stated that strong objections existed to the nomination of Mr. Herries to the Exchequer upon the grounds of his intimate connection with the principal speculator in the money markets of Europe. Lord Goderich has since put forth the following letter :—

'"Downing Street: August 24.

"My dear Herries,—In consequence of what appears in the 'Morning Chronicle' of this day, I owe it to you to state explicitly that the grounds assumed in that paragraph for the delay in the appointment of Chancellor of the Exchequer are totally destitute of foundation, and that they involve an imputation upon you which I shall be prepared at all times to deny in the most peremptory manner, be they asserted by whom they may. Ever, my dear Herries, most sincerely yours,

"GODERICH."'

It is quite impossible that any person searching the newspapers of the day, as Mr. Spencer Walpole has done, for historical materials, should fail to observe this letter in the 'Times.' Mr. Walpole must therefore be supposed to have read it. But he has not alluded to its existence, while carefully reproducing the calumnious statement which it indignantly contradicts. To have

given the refutation together with the slander—the antidote along with the poison—would not have been in accordance with his method of writing history.]

'August 25.

'I went to London, saw Lord Goderich, and communicated with many persons on the subject of the paragraph. The Chancellor read it, and said he thought I could not maintain successfully an action upon it against the editor of the paper. The incalculable mischief to me of a fruitless prosecution of the offender was so evident that I resolved not to attempt that course except upon the clearest and strongest legal grounds. I found, moreover, that a very strong and general feeling of indignation had been excited against the contrivers of this attack, and that the tide of public opinion was against them.

'I returned to Montreal.'

'August 27.

'Courtenay and Maberly[6] came to me in the morning. The latter to offer his services to detect the author of the paragraph in the "Morning Chronicle." While he was with me the paper of Monday was received, in which the libellous matter was repeated and aggravated under the pretext of a sort of apology for it.'

'August 28.

'I came to town. I met Maberly, and received from him intelligence which left no doubt of the articles in the "Morning Chronicle" having proceeded from the Whig party. But he could not then discover the name of the individual who had instructed the editor: although

[6] A Liberal M.P. interested in the *Morning Chronicle*.

the latter fairly admitted that he had been instructed. He said, moreover, that he believed he had mistaken one part of his instructions.

'In the meantime the attack had been warmly taken up and vigorously repelled by all the anti-Whig and moderate papers, and the general impression seemed decidedly against the Whigs. Mr. Huskisson arrived this evening. I understood that he had seen Lord Goderich, and Lord Carlisle, and Lord Lansdowne. I avoided calling on him or having any communication with him.

'In the course of the day I received much information of the conversation and proceedings of the Whigs. The prevalent opinion, founded upon the explicit declarations of Tierney, was that they would resign if I were appointed. It appeared from all the accounts which reached me that Tierney was the most vehement opposer of my appointment.[7] He was said to have declared publicly that he would not sit in the same Cabinet with me. On the other hand, many of the minor Whigs disclaimed his violence and conduct, and were endeavouring to prevail on Lord Lansdowne to be more reasonable.'

'August 29.

'Mr. Huskisson went to the King. I waited anxiously for his return, expecting that some communication would forthwith be made to me.

[7] There can can be no doubt that Tierney was, and had been for a long time, bitterly hostile. His animosity, which may presumably be traced to Mr. Herries's attachment to Mr. Perceval, the *bête noire* of the Whigs of his day, showed itself so far back as the year 1811. For a notice and a refutation of malignant insinuations made by Tierney to Greville see Appendix F.

'I waited in vain until ten o'clock at night, when I received a note appointing me to go to Lord Goderich the next morning at ten.

'The prevalent intelligence of the feeling and determination of the Whigs this day was that they were prepared to resign rather than to yield.'

'August 30.

'I went, according to appointment, to Downing Street at ten o'clock.

'After waiting some time I was admitted to Lord Goderich, with whom were the Chancellor and Mr. Huskisson. Mr. Sturges Bourne afterwards joined us.

[8] 'Mr. Huskisson, in a discourse of some length, stated all that had passed at Windsor. He described the King as being much displeased with the articles in the Whig papers, some of which he made Mr. Huskisson read. He said that the King explained his views of the public service in my appointment, and the motives which induced him to approve of it when proposed to him (and to insist upon it afterwards), at much length. It appeared that he was determined not to give way.

'But before Mr. Huskisson left him, an expedient was suggested to which he so far gave his consent that he said he would adopt it if it could be made quite consistent with his own dignity and honour, and with my character, according to my own satisfaction. Upon the latter condition he insisted most emphatically.

[8] A more detailed account of this interview and subsequent transactions will be found in a letter from Mr. Herries to his sister, dated the same day.

'This expedient was that Mr. Sturges Bourne should be appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer as the King's first nomination, to which he still adhered, if Mr. Bourne should be willing to accept it; and that I should be appointed to some other high office with the avowed intention of making me more available for the management of the Committee of Finance in the next session, and with the understanding and consent of the Whig party that I should, within a certain period, succeed to Mr. Sturges Bourne as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

'Before I could well express my own objection to this proposal, Mr. Sturges Bourne put an end to the necessity for my doing so by positively refusing to accede to that part of it which concerned him.

'It was thereupon determined that Mr. Huskisson and the Chancellor should go to Lord Lansdowne, and apprise him of this fruitless endeavour to accommodate matters, whereby it was hoped that he would be led to feel the earnest desire of the King and the friends of Lord Goderich to pay all proper and practical attention to the wishes of his Lordship's party, and the consequent expediency of yielding on their side. I now hoped the struggle would be at an end, either by the concession of the Whigs, or by their expulsion if they should continue obstinate.

'In about an hour, however, the Chancellor, Mr. Huskisson, and Mr. Sturges Bourne came to my house. They had been engaged in a fruitless altercation with Lord Lansdowne, who would not yield any point to them; while, on the other hand, Mr. S. Bourne had

been prevailed upon to say that he would undertake the Chancellorship of the Exchequer if I would consent to the arrangement as proposed to me.

'I explained to them the reasons which made it impossible for me to do so. I stated that, setting aside all consideration of the blackguard imputations in the newspapers, which were disclaimed by Lord Lansdowne and his immediate friends, I could not do any act by which I should appear to admit the justice of any grounds of exception which the Whigs chose to assume against my appointment. I said that the acceptance of any other office by me after the exception had been made would be tantamount to such an admission; and would therefore be, in me, an act of self-condemnation and degradation. I must therefore peremptorily refuse it.

'In consequence of their earnest desire I accompanied them all to Lord Goderich's house, in order to give that answer to him myself.

'We there had another long altercation. He (Lord Goderich) complained of an unwillingness in me to yield any point: observing that in all such matters no Government could ever be arranged if no party would concede anything of their wishes or views. I observed to him that his reproach would be very just, and his argument very good, if the question of concession regarded only objects of convenience or ambition; but that where the question was a point of honour it was wholly inapplicable, because in such a case the smallest concession was a surrender of the whole object, and would be such a sacrifice as no man could be called

upon to make for the convenience of others, or even for the existence of a whole Administration.

'Such being my final determination, we adjourned to Mr. Huskisson's office (he had left us in the early part of this last conference) to tell him the result.

'When we arrived, Lord Lansdowne was with him upon some other business. As soon as he was gone, I asked why he might not be present at what we were going to say? and I added, that I should have no objection to communicate freely with him on the matters in question. I had nothing to conceal or to disguise, and I supposed that he must be equally disposed to open his mind to me.

'Huskisson readily adopted the hint and sent for him.

'Our conversation was, I believe, satisfactory to both parties. He gave me the most solemn assurance that he not only was no party to the rascally attacks of the "Morning Chronicle," but that he entertained the strongest feelings of disdain for them. He said the same feelings were entertained by his friends in the Cabinet.

'I repeated to him what I had already said to the others, on the subject of my *now* accepting any other office than that of Chancellor of the Exchequer; after having, however, very distinctly represented to him how gladly I should, at an earlier stage of the formation of the Government, have taken any office of a much lower rank. I also clearly explained to him that I had never sought the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer; on the contrary, I had long strenuously refused it.

'He professed not to understand my feelings on the point of honour, and to think that all my difficulty on that score ought to be removed by the understanding which he was ready for himself, and on behalf of his friends, to subscribe to, that I should be admitted into the Cabinet as Chancellor of the Exchequer after a short period of service in some other office.

'This conference was therefore as fruitless as the others on the same subject had been. Sir William Knighton had long been waiting for the result of Mr. Huskisson's proposal in order to convey the final determination of myself and Sturges Bourne to the King. We therefore went to Hanover Square to communicate it to him.

'Here, after a conversation, in which some further attempts were made to induce me to yield, Sturges Bourne declared, that upon a more mature consideration he must positively and finally retract his conditional consent to undertake the duties of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

'This broke up the conference, and Sir W. Knighton set off immediately to Windsor with the information.'

''August 31.

'In the course of this night I had reflected much on the perplexing situation in which the Government, as well as myself, was placed; and I sought anxiously for some expedient by which to avert the catastrophe—the dissolution of the Administration—which appeared to be at hand.

'I resolved, at length, to write to Lord Goderich, to propose that if Huskisson would (according to my

original suggestion) undertake the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, I would continue to serve under *him* as Secretary of the Treasury for a certain time, and until other arrangements could be made.[9]

'I conveyed a copy of this letter to Windsor in one to Sir William Knighton for the information of the King.

'I had scarcely despatched these letters when I received from Lord Goderich a summons to attend the King at the Royal Lodge this day at one o'clock.

'I repaired thither accordingly. I met the Lord Chancellor, Lord Goderich, Mr. Huskisson, and Mr. Sturges Bourne.

'My first object was to ascertain whether Mr. Huskisson would acquiesce in my proposal. He declared most positively and peremptorily that nothing should ever induce him to accept the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. The door was therefore closed against my expedient. I had the consolation, however, of knowing that I had given satisfaction to all parties by the proposal. The King expressed himself in the most

[9] No copy of this letter to Lord Goderich has been found. Mr. Walpole says that 'George IV. suggested that Huskisson should take the Exchequer.' No mention of such a suggestion was made by Huskisson himself in his long report of his conversation with the King, nor was it alluded to in any of the discussions thereupon. No one seems to have made the proposal except Mr. Herries, who for the second time urged it ineffectually. As for Mr. Walpole's other story of the Exchequer having at this time been offered (he does not say by whom) to Tierney, its improbability is manifest. For the condition insisted upon by the King, as reported by Huskisson, for any new arrangement, was that it should be satisfactory to Mr. Herries, to whom a proposal that he should be set aside to give place to the leader of the Opposition to him would have been simply offensive. Such a settlement of the question was not spoken of, and could not have been deemed possible by any of the negotiators.

gracious terms concerning it, and assured me that he should never forget my readiness on this occasion to make so great a sacrifice for the accommodation of his Government and service.

'Before the Ministers went in to the King, I had much conversation with them. I found them quite determined to support the King and to maintain Lord Goderich's recommendation, and not less prepared for the course which they would pursue if the Whigs should resign.

'The King kept them (all four together) in conference a considerable time. On their return, I was informed by Lord Goderich that he was commissioned by the King, in consequence of his own recommendation and that of the other Ministers present, again to offer me the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. I was at the same time summoned to attend the King.

'He received me most kindly; thanked me for offering to serve under Huskisson; assured me that Huskisson had proved himself a warm friend to me in all his interviews with the King on the subject of my appointment,[10] and then entered fully into his views and feelings with respect to the party who were pressing Lord Holland upon him, and thwarting his choice of

[10] This assurance, which agrees with Huskisson's language in addressing his colleagues, is totally at variance with Mr. Walpole's unsupported assertion that 'Huskisson required very little encouragement to induce him to oppose the appointment [of Herries], and his language was so firm that the King was persuaded to reconsider the contemplated arrangement.' This statement, moreover, is inconsistent with the fact that Mr. Huskisson went to Windsor with the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, and Mr. Sturges Bourne, expressly for the purpose of advising the King to abide by Mr. Herries's nomination, in spite of the resistance of the Whigs.

me, with no other view but to carry their point with respect to that nobleman. He concluded a long conversation by desiring me to kiss his hand for the appointment.

'During this interview he received a suggestion from the Ministers, who were in another room, that he should send for Lord Lansdowne and explain fully to him what he had been advised by them to do. He appeared reluctant to take that step, and asked my advice upon it. I strongly recommended the adoption of it, and he wrote to Lord Lansdowne in my presence.

'I returned to London, and went from thence late at night and very unwell, to Montreal.

'Soon after my arrival, I was followed by a messenger from Pemberton,[1] bringing me information of the feelings and intentions of the Whigs which was not calculated to give a more favourable view of their conduct or their case. It now appeared that they avowed themselves ready to commute all their opposition to me for some assurance of the future introduction of Lord Holland into office.

[1] C..R. Pemberton, of Newton, Cambridgeshire, at that time Private Secretary to Mr. Herries, and always his attached friend. The information sent by him was as follows:—

'—— has earnestly requested me to write to you this night, to say that he has just left Tierney, after an hour's cool and deliberate reasoning on the business under discussion. The result of which was that —— is of opinion that if Lord G. would pledge himself at any reasonable period to urge the King to admit Lord Holland into the Cabinet, the Whigs would remain in office; but only on some such condition. They are to meet at Lord Carlisle's at ten to-night. Lord Lansdowne will not return to town to-morrow, but goes elsewhere from Windsor; and, therefore, unless he receives some satisfactory intimation from Lord Goderich, he will resign to-morrow. I am to see —— at Ten, who will furnish the particulars of the meeting at Lord Carlisle's.'

'I sent the intelligence to Lord Goderich, and I also despatched a letter to Windsor, that the King might be apprised that a little graciousness towards Lord Lansdowne would probably suffice to keep his Administration, for some time at least, on its present footing.'

'September 1.

'I remained all day in anxious expectation of the result of the interview at Windsor. I learned nothing until eleven at night, when I received a note from Maberly, inclosing one from Sir J. Macdonald, which, although not quite conclusive, afforded strong presumption that the Whigs had made up their minds to remain in office.'

'September 2.

'Early this morning a messenger from Sir W. Knighton, brought me the intelligence that all was settled; the Whigs having consented to retain their office, *I being Chancellor of the Exchequer.*

'At noon, Lord Goderich's letter to the same effect, reached me together with an intimation that a Council was appointed for two o'clock on the 3rd, at Windsor, where I was ordered to attend to receive the Seals.'

'September 3.

'I received the Seals at Windsor, none of the Whig members of the Cabinet being present.' [2]

[2] 'Lord Lansdowne resigned,' says Mr. Spencer Walpole, 'but withdrew his resignation.' When did he resign? Not on August 31, as Mr. Herries's conversation with the King, and his subsequent communications with Lord Goderich, clearly show. On September 1, Lord Goderich made the announcement (see *post*), 'All is settled; they remain in.' Lord Lansdowne's resignation must therefore have been tendered—if at all—in the course of the 1st. But, at 11 P.M. on that day, Mr. Herries received, from a good

The subjoined correspondence illustrates and corroborates the foregoing narrative.

Mr. Planta to Mr. Herries.

'(Private and Confidential.)

'August 12, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—Goderich is proceeding on with a good heart, and in an excellent frame of mind, in making his arrangements. I see that he looks to you, and to your help, in all financial matters; and, there-

Whig source, information leading to the conclusion that the Whigs had determined not to go out, and, early the next morning, their final resolution to remain was made known to him without (apparently) any mention of the step alleged to have been taken by Lord Lansdowne.

Among other irrelevant references in foot-notes, Mr. Walpole makes one to Mr. McCullagh Torrens's *Life of Lord Melbourne.* At the place indicated (vol. i. p. 236) there is the following curious passage:—

'Lord Lansdowne did not consent to form part of the reorganised Administration without making terms for his friends; these are best told in his own words.

'"I have arranged—I will not say insisted—that an arrangement should be immediately made for bringing Mackintosh and young Stanley [the late Lord Derby] into office, so that there is respect for the past and hope for the future. Lord Darlington is to be a Marquis, likewise my friend Lord Camden. The Chancellorship of the Exchequer has been pressed again upon Sturges Bourne and also upon Huskisson [by Mr. Herries]. It is essential that all this should be known to justify an acquiescence, which I think requires a little propping-up in the public eye."'

Now, it was impossible that the elevation of 'my friend Lord Camden' to a Marquisate should have been one of the stipulations which secured and 'justified' Lord Lansdowne's 'acquiescence,' for the simple reason that Lord Camden had been raised to that rank in the peerage fifteen years before the ministerial crisis of August 1827. Lord Lansdowne certainly knew that his noble friend had, since 1812, been a Marquis like himself. There is no room here for a conjecture that by a slip of the pen the name of one Peer was substituted for that of another, or that it was misread by the transcriber, because, in fact, during the Goderich administration no one was created a Marquis except the Earl of Darlington, made Marquis of Cleveland. And it does not appear, from the records of the time, that any office or dignity was conferred upon Lord Camden in the year 1827. Besides which, it is to be observed that this patriotic nobleman was not in any way connected politi-

fore, I feel little doubt but that the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, with (of course) a seat in the Cabinet, will be offered to you, at which, hoping you will accept it, and that your health will allow you to do so, I shall *greatly rejoice.* The country looks to you to fill this situation; and I know from undoubted authority that the King wishes it also.

'Thus you have every means of being comfortable in accepting it.

'The Secretaryship of State for the Colonies will then be, no doubt, offered to Huskisson, with the lead

cally with Lord Lansdowne's party, being, on the contrary, a consistent, and very decided, Tory. It is vain to seek for an explanation of Lord Lansdowne's bewildering statement.

Another authority to which Mr. Walpole refers his readers for what he calls 'the story of this intrigue,' is *Lord Colchester's Diary, &c.* Without verification (never attempted by ninety-nine readers in a hundred) they would not suspect—what is the exact truth—that the sense of all those passages in the work cited, which relate to the formation of the Goderich Ministry, is directly opposed to that of Mr. Walpole's text. At every moment there occurs the reference, 'See *Colchester Diary*;' but the work, when seen, is found to contain, not corroboration, but contradiction. One page in particular which is pointed to (vol. iii. p. 524) is filled with a letter from Mr. Wilbraham to Lord Colchester, making the following, among other, remarks: 'I believe that there is a hitch in the arrangements in consequence of a struggle for power on the part of the Whig section of the Administration, who have been made very sore by the absolute refusal of the King to admit Lord Holland into the Cabinet, and are trying their strength in endeavouring to exclude Herries from a seat in the Cabinet *which he had been urged to accept by Lord Goderich.*' (The italics are ours.) Either Mr. Walpole had not read this passage when he cited it, or he was not able to perceive, what is clearly perceptible, that it tells against his account of the transactions in question. Every one of the letters to Lord Colchester, from his different correspondents, relating to the difficulties of Lord Goderich's ministry, from first to last, is in favour of Mr. Herries, strongly in condemnation of his adversaries, and therefore in a spirit quite contrary to that of Mr. Walpole's narrative.

So much for historical references.

of the House of Commons; and Charles Grant, will, I hope, succeed Huskisson at the Board of Trade. Frankland Lewis will probably succeed you as Secretary of the Treasury. We shall want a strong man to stand up in the House of Commons in debate; and he will be that man.[3]

'Goderich goes to the King about twelve to-morrow, and he desires me to tell you that he begs to see you on his return: so pray make your arrangements to stay in town till you have had your interview with him. Then you are free as air for your start on Tuesday morning.

'I must ask you, in the case above supposed, to think again as to me and the house. The house will be yours in virtue of your new office. Pray then in that case only let me have yours in Great George Street, if it be but for one year, to move into in October; and that I may have time to look about me, and decide where I shall definitively settle myself. Ever yours faithfully,

'J. PLANTA.'

[3] The *Times* of August 15 said, in its leading article:—'In the arrangement of places after the will of the real Sovereign, and under his direction, not many changes or much infusion of new matter is necessary. Mr. Huskisson may accept the Seals of the Colonial Office . . . Mr. C. Grant would then step into the office of President of the Board of Trade . . . Mr. Herries, we believe, has been before offered the situation of Chancellor of the Exchequer; his own health and that of the late First Lord of the Treasury has probably suspended the decision. The former cause may be removed by a temporary relaxation which the season allows; and the painful certainty which prevails on the latter subject will make him better acquainted with the precise bounds of the duties which he has to perform.' In the last part of this sentence there seems to be some allusion which is not now comprehensible. The tenor of the preceding remarks shows that Mr. Herries's appointment was looked upon almost as a matter of course.

The Lord Chancellor to Mr. Herries.

'Wimbledon: Sunday (August 12).

'My dear Herries,—I am very sorry to learn you are so unwell. You must rally as speedily as possible, as we cannot go on without you.

'I shall be happy to see you, and still more happy to see you well and in good spirits to-morrow at Lincoln's Inn. Ever yours,

'LYNDHURST.'

Mr. Herries to Lord Goderich.

'(Confidential.)

'Great George Street: August 14, 1827.

'My dear Goderich,—I could neither go to Windsor nor anywhere else this morning. I have been ill in the night, and have been obliged to get relief by remedies which will not allow me to stir at present.

'I have sent a messenger to Sir William Knighton to apprise him of the reason of my not coming, and I have also informed him that I should write to you on the general subject, and request you to communicate to the King my helpless and comfortless condition, disqualifying me for the task which the King by your advice (judging far too favourably of my abilities) has proposed that I should undertake.

'I hope to be of some assistance to your Government, though I am not capable of serving you in the arduous office which you would have placed me in. There can be no doubt fortunately, in the public opinion, as to the grounds on which I am induced to decline it. My intention has been generally known for some time,

and it would perhaps have excited more surprise that I should suddenly have become capable of occupying a difficult office, than that I should still be unable to accept so flattering an offer as that which you have made me.

'I am doubtful whether the inclosed is a proper form of answer to the proposal which you have made to me by the King's desire. Pray let me know confidentially if it is not so, in order that I may be correct in the mode of my communication.

'I could call on you at any time after one or two o'clock. Most truly yours,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

Mr. Herries to Lord Goderich.

'Great George Street: August 14, 1827.

'My dear Lord Goderich,—Your communication of the King's most gracious condescension in desiring you to propose to me to fill the important situation of Chancellor of the Exchequer was gratifying to me in a degree which I cannot attempt to express.

'It is no less mortifying and painful to me to be compelled to request that, in laying at his Majesty's feet my most humble and dutiful acknowledgment of his gracious kindness, you will submit to him that in the present weakened and precarious state of my health, I am so entirely inadequate to the efficient discharge of the duties of such an arduous office (so as to render any useful service to his Majesty) that I am compelled with the deepest feelings of regret to solicit his Majesty's permission to decline it.

'Allow me to add my warmest acknowledgments to yourself for the kind and cordial manner in which you made the communication to me. Believe me, my dear Lord Goderich, ever truly yours,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

Mr. Herries to Sir William Knighton.

'(Most Confidential.)

'Great George Street: August 15, 1827.

'My dear Sir William,—This is in the strictest confidence. Our good friend Goderich called on me so soon after you left me, that I had not had time to write to him.

'He was in much perplexity. After a good deal of hesitation and embarrassment he owned to me that my holding the Chancellorship of the Exchequer under the uncertainty of being able to go on with it, and with the certainty of being obliged to have the whole business of the Treasury on his hands for a certain time, was so full of objection and inconvenience that it quite distressed him.

'I could not do otherwise than assent to all that he said; and I begged, therefore, that he would consider me as being entirely in his hands. I said that I could only accept the office such as *I am* in point of health, and subject to the condition of immediate temporary absence. I *now* had agreed to do so, notwithstanding my letter of yesterday to him, but as that letter was not recalled, I entreated that he would use it, or cancel it, as best might suit his views of the interests of the King's Government, and also of his own convenience.

'Our interview was of the most friendly and cordial character. He appeared to be satisfied with my perfect disposition to accommodate myself to the utmost of my power to the interests of the King's Government, and he left me apparently decided to make another arrangement for the situation of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

'I have seen him since, by his desire, and he has added some fresh arguments in support of his present view of the subject. I acquiesced in them; and I left myself again in his hands—only desiring that I might not be put into any office of great labour and attendance, or of inferior dignity to that which I now occupy.

'I hope that in all these proceedings I have so conducted myself as to show that I have never suffered my personal views or interests or pretensions to stand for a moment in the way of the interests of the King's Government. You know all that had passed previously to what I have now stated, and I send you these memoranda of what has since occurred in order that you may be enabled to do me justice in the highest quarter if, by any mischance, my conduct should not be clearly stated by others, or not be rightly understood. Above all, I am anxious that it should be felt that *I* have not vacillated.

'I am leaving London for some fresh air. I shall return late to-morrow night, in order to be prepared for whatever may befall me on Friday. A messenger from Downing Street will bring me tidings in the meantime of Goderich's decision. Ever truly yours,

'J. C. HERRIES.

'You will of course understand that these conferences with Goderich have prevented me from writing the letter I had intended to send to him. But he knew what it would have contained before I saw him, from his conversation with you.'

The King to Mr. Herries.

'(Private.)

'The King sends his regards to Mr. Herries, and desires to see him at Windsor Castle on Friday next, the 17th, at half-past one P.M.

'The King regrets to find that Mr. Herries's health is at present embarrassed, but the King feels confident that a few weeks' relaxation from business will set everything right. Under these circumstances, the King cannot consent to dispense with Mr. Herries's services as his Chancellor of the Exchequer. The King is quite aware of the pressure at this moment of the affairs of finance upon the country, and hence it is that the King, with this knowledge, so highly and so justly values Mr. Herries's services.

'G. R.

'Royal Lodge:
'Wednesday night, August 15, 1827.

'P.S.—The King sends this to Mr. Herries *open* through Lord Goderich.'[4]

'G. R.'

[4] But Lord Goderich did not deliver the letter to Mr. Herries when he saw him on the 16th.

Mr. Planta to Mr. Herries.

'Treasury: August 16, 1827,
'Half-past 2 P.M.

'I am just returned from this most melancholy ceremony,[5] and more real mourning I never did behold.

'Goderich has nothing definitive for me to tell you yet. He is gone to Windsor at this moment, and will no doubt be anxious to see you this evening on his return; so pray come up without fail.

'I hope you continue better.'

Lord Goderich to Mr. Herries.

'Great George Street: August 16, 1827,
'9.30 P.M.

'It is most essential that I should see you; if you come to town to-night in any reasonable time, pray come to me. At all events, let me see you *early* to-morrow morning, as soon after nine as you can. You must be at Windsor to-morrow, let things turn out what they may.

'If you are not well enough to come to me either to-night or to-morrow morning let me know, and I will come to you.'

Mr. Herries to Lord Goderich.

'Great George Street: August 17, 1827.

'My dear Lord Goderich,—I trust that you will not think it unreasonable that I should now beg the favour of you to let me know what course you propose to adopt with respect to my situation in connection with

[5] Canning's funeral in Westminster Abbey, which Mr. Herries was unable to attend.

your Administration, after the extraordinary occurrences of this day.

'I was commanded by the King (through you) to undertake the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. After having endeavoured strenuously, but in vain, to decline that arduous undertaking, I attended, in obedience to a positive order from his Majesty, at Windsor, to receive the Seals. They were placed in my hands by the King himself, after a full explanation of his reasons for doing so, and with the most gracious expression of his desire that I should accept them.

'But before I had entered the King's closet I had engaged myself to you—in consequence of circumstances which had arisen since our arrival at Windsor—not finally to take those Seals until you should have had another opportunity of speaking with his Majesty on the subject. The King permitted me, with much reluctance, and upon my earnest solicitation, to suspend the acceptance of them for that purpose.

'You had then your interview with his Majesty, and when I saw him again his Majesty informed me that he had yielded to your representation so far as to consent to the postponement of the arrangement until the return of Mr. Huskisson. His Majesty then added, "But remember the Seals are for you; they are yours."

'I am now anxious to learn from you what your intentions are upon this subject. Is the postponement which you have recommended a mere matter of time, or has it reference to any intended or probable change of purpose?

'The manner in which I originally refused these Seals, and the difficulty with which I was induced to withdraw that refusal, must, I think, be sufficient to protect me against every possible suspicion of being now actuated by any eager desire to obtain the office.

'It is not the office, but my public character that is now an object of solicitude with me.

'You must have observed how scrupulous I have been throughout this transaction as to the availing myself of the King's favour in any other manner than through your hands. It would not be consistent with my principles to accept any appointment or distinction from the Crown in opposition to your wishes so long as I am acting confidentially with you and in support of your Government.

'When, therefore, I am told by the King that the Exchequer Seals are to be placed in my hands when Huskisson returns, I am necessarily desirous of knowing whether that is also the understanding of the chief adviser of the King. Unless I am distinctly informed of your determination on this point, I may be building upon a very fallacious ground; and we may both of us be hereafter again involved in some such proceedings as those which occurred this day, and which must, I am sure, be equally painful to all the persons who had any share in them.

'I must entreat you to understand that I am not now soliciting the office at your hands; I am asking only for that distinct explanation of your intentions which will enable me to determine what I am to do with respect to the offer and declaration of the King.

'Whatever may be that determination, and whatever its effect on our political connection, I feel assured that nothing can occur to diminish the sincere friendship and regard with which I am always, my dear Lord Goderich, very truly yours,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

Lord Goderich to Mr. Herries.

'(Confidential.)

'Downing Street: August 18, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—I have received your letter of last night, which is all that at this precise moment I can say, upon the very important matter contained in it, and upon which you are very naturally solicitous for a speedy and explicit answer. Ever yours,

'GODERICH.'

Mr. Herries to his Sister.

'Great George Street: August 21.

'I have made no way since I left you, in my own affairs. That is to say, I have *myself* done nothing that has brought me nearer to a *dénouement*: but I suspect it is coming fast upon us in the inevitable course of things.

'I met on my road yesterday a line from Lord G., desiring to see me, but without a word on the subject of my letter to him.

'I saw him late in the afternoon. It was again a scene of unmanly perplexity. I could not learn from him what his real intentions were; nor could he give me any good or clear reason for the difficulty he felt in

writing the precise answer which I require to my letter.

'It appeared quite clear, however, that the Whigs had threatened to resign if my appointment were persisted in: and he threw out some indistinct hints of his own disposition to resign if *they* did.

'I told him I could not understand his feelings in that respect; because it appeared to me that the Whigs would resign on account of a proceeding adopted by him (Lord G.) and the King in opposition to their wishes, and it would therefore be a strange thing that *he*, whose measure would be carried, should resign also.

'He seemed puzzled by this: but he said there were circumstances which I did not know, and which he could not explain to me, so that I had nothing to answer. He finally proposed to write a draft of a letter to me and to allow me to consider whether it would satisfy my feelings, as a reply to my letter before he made it a final communication.

'This was hardly a fair proposal under the circumstances: but in order to convince him that I was dealing with him on the most friendly and straightforward footing, I consented to it.

'The letter was to have followed me yesterday, immediately. I have at this moment (5 o'clock of this day) not received it. In the meantime the King is come to town; and I much suspect the affair will thereby be brought to a crisis.

'Either the Whigs will give way, or he will turn them out. Such, at least, is my expectation from some hints which Lord Bexley has given me.

'The Whigs are disseminating lies about me, and about the proceedings which have taken place; and I have some fears lest the weakness and timidity of Lord Goderich should have given a countenance to their misrepresentations. But the documents which I possess will remove every doubt whenever it may be necessary to produce them.

'I think it best not to leave London to-day. Something *must occur* between this and to-morrow at noon.'

The promised answer not having arrived, Mr. Herries, on the 22nd, wrote, but apparently did not forward, the following letter:—[6]

'My dear Goderich,—You have not yet sent me the answer to my letter of the 17th instant, which, when I saw you on the 20th, you promised me I should receive immediately after that interview; but I will not now press you any further for the declaration of your intentions which I solicited of you by that letter.

'I feel, after maturely reflecting upon all that has passed, that there is but one course left to me to pursue, consistently with a due regard to my public duty and to my private character. I must beg leave finally to decline the office which you proposed that I should fill, and which, upon your recommendation, was so graciously offered to me by the King.

'My first refusal of that offer was founded upon the state of my health.

'When I afterwards allowed myself to be overruled

[6] The draft is marked, 'Proposed, but not sent.'

upon that ground, and was induced to accept the office, subject to the condition of being allowed to relinquish it if I found my health not speedily restored, I had no anticipation of the opposition which a part of your Cabinet would make to my appointment to it.

'I cannot believe that, with such elements of discordancy between the Whig members of your Government and myself as are indicated by this determined opposition on their part, it could be for the advantage of the King's service, or for the interests of the country, that we should be joined in the same Cabinet.

'This circumstance, therefore, affords such strong reasons, in addition to those upon which I originally requested his Majesty's permission, through you, to decline the office, that I now feel it imperative upon me to desire that you will lay at the feet of the King my humble request to be excused from undertaking the highly honourable and arduous situation to which he has been so graciously pleased by your advice to call me.'

Mr. Planta to Mr. Huskisson.

'Whitehall: August 21, 1827.

'My dear Mr. Huskisson,—Lord Goderich desires me to state to you what has taken place here with respect to the formation of the Government since he last addressed you.

'I do not know whether you are aware that the first person thought of for the Chancellorship of the Exchequer was Mr. Sturges Bourne; the King sent for him at the time that he commanded Lord Goderich to

Windsor and pressed him to accept the office, which, however, Bourne decidedly refused.

'Herries was the person then proposed for the office, and Lord G., knowing that he would be agreeable to the King, made the proposal to him.[7]

'Herries was very much gratified by the offer, and only expressed his doubts whether his state of health would permit him to perform the duties of the office, he being about to proceed to the Continent immediately for the recovery of his health.

'Herries passed a sleepless night, and felt himself so much worse the next morning that he wrote confidentially to Lord Goderich to say he must decline the offer.

'Much persuasion, however, was used with him in the course of the day and the morning after, and he remained in an undecided state, leaving it to Lord Goderich to act as he might think best. Herries still wished to be allowed his leave of absence, and said to Lord G. that he trusted that it would not be considered fickleness on his part if, on his return to England, he should find himself too unwell to take the office.

[7] This authoritative statement, establishing the order in which the successive offers of the post were made by Lord Goderich, effectually disposes of Mr. Walpole's account. 'Goderich desired to complete the arrangement which Canning had contemplated, and to secure Palmerston as Chancellor of the Exchequer. . . . Immediately on his own appointment he offered Palmerston the office.' This is borrowed from the *Autobiography*; but if Mr. Walpole had read with common attention the volume of Bulwer's *Life*, &c., which contains it, he would have found therein two letters from Lord Palmerston himself to his brother, on August 14 and 15, 1827, showing, in contradiction to the *Autobiography* and in accordance with Planta's letter, that the Exchequer was offered to his Lordship not in the first but in the third instance, and only in default of, first, Sturges Bourne, and, secondly, Herries.

'Goderich, taking all these circumstances into consideration, thought that a better arrangement would be to offer to Lord Palmerston the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and to let Herries succeed Lord P. in the less arduous duties of Secretary at War, and not to be in the Cabinet. This was the arrangement decided on when Lord Goderich wrote to you, and Lord G. submitted it to the King.[8]

'On the next morning there came an answer from his Majesty (it was the day of Mr. Canning's funeral),[9] stating that though he would be very happy to do anything which might be agreeable to Lord Palmerston, yet his Majesty conceived Mr. Herries to be so exactly the fittest person for the situation of Chancellor of the Exchequer that he still wished him to be appointed to it, and the King wrote a letter to Mr. Herries with his own hand, desiring him to come down to Windsor the next day, when his Majesty proposed to give him the Exchequer Seals.

'Lord Goderich went to Windsor on the evening of this Thursday, the 16th; but he found his Majesty still as determined as ever in the course which his Majesty had decided on. I should here tell you that, after writ-

[8] But without the knowledge of Mr. Herries, to whom the proposed arrangements were not communicated.

[9] The *Autobiography*, mentioning a conversation on this memorable occasion between Lord Goderich and Lord Palmerston concerning the King's answer, makes it occur before the 12th. But Canning's funeral took place on the 16th. It is astonishing that Palmerston, who professed to be an ardent Canningite, should have forgotten the date of so solemn an event, and consequently also that of the death of his great friend. This seems to prove that when he wrote the *Autobiography*—if he did write it—he must have lost all distinct recollection of the transactions of the time to which it relates, and that he did not take the trouble to refresh his memory.

ing to the King, Lord G. had sent for Lord Palmerston, and had offered him the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, which Palmerston had consented to accept; but on hearing the next day of the wishes of the King, and that Herries had been commanded down to Windsor, Palmerston in the handsomest manner withdrew any pretensions he might have and put himself in Lord Goderich's hands. Lord Goderich, on his return from Windsor on the evening of the 16th, saw Herries again; and at that interview, and another early on the morning of the 17th, it was arranged that Herries should go down to Windsor on that day, conformably to his Majesty's commands, and receive the seals.

'As our friends Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Tierney, &c., now appear upon the scene, I must tell you what they had been about during the occurrences.

'Lord Lansdowne had, from the first nomination of Lord Goderich by the King, acted towards Lord Goderich with the greatest kindness and courtesy, expressing himself well satisfied with the arrangement and as having no difficulties with respect to his own position. In the name of his friends, however, he had been very anxious for the admission of Lord Holland into some Cabinet situation.

'To this proposal Lord Goderich has no inclination to accede, and the King had decided objections to it. His Majesty, in a paper written in his own hand, declared that he had no personal objection to Lord Holland, *on the contrary*; but that his Majesty had a *fixed opinion* that the Cabinet should be reconstructed of the materials of which it (or at least the Government)

was already composed, and not of new ones; but that hereafter (without specifying any time) his Majesty would not object to consider the wishes of Lord Holland's friends.

'While these discussions were going on, Lord Lansdowne asked Lord Goderich in a note whether Herries's appointment was a matter settled between Lord G. and the King, or whether it was one open to discussion.

'Goderich answered that it was one settled by him with the King, for the better carrying on of the department over which he (Lord G.) was called upon to preside. Before Lord Lansdowne saw Lord Goderich the next morning (the 15th) the intentions as to Herries were changed, and Lord G. therefore told Lord L. that the state of Herries's health would probably not permit him to accept the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that he (Lord G.) had therefore recommended Lord Palmerston for that office. Lord Lansdowne made no particular remark on this being said to him.

'Thus matters stood when, on the morning of the 17th (Friday) the Council assembled at Windsor for proroguing the Parliament. Herries came down there to have his audience of the King. Lord Goderich was, of course, there, and Lords Lansdowne and Carlisle, and Mr. Tierney, among others.[1] It was here that the first decided opposition appeared to Mr. Herries's appointment. Tierney strenuously objected to it on Parliamentary grounds, as he said the second lead would devolve upon Herries, and they all objected to him as opposed, and known to be opposed, to them.

[1] Lord Palmerston was one of the Ministers present.

Lord Goderich had to communicate this opposition to Herries. Herries disclaimed all wish to have any lead in the House of Commons, and said he was ready to make any arrangement on that subject which might be satisfactory. Lord Goderich obtained further an assurance from Herries that he would not take the Seals until he (Lord G.) had seen his Majesty. Lord G. had his audience with the King; but his Majesty still persisted, and in his audience afterwards with Herries offered him the Seals, which, however, Herries, according to his promise to Lord G., firmly declined.

'Lord Goderich, on a second interview, then proposed to the King that the whole question of Herries's appointment should be adjourned until an answer should be received from you to the communication made to you, or until your return, if you should be immediately coming home. This proposal was agreeable to Lord Lansdowne, and was acquiesced in by his Majesty; and in this state the matter was left.[2]

'The King seems very determined in his choice, and our new friends are very much opposed to it. They consider themselves as not treated with favour, or even justice, in the refusal of Lord Holland and the adoption of Herries; and they do not attempt to disguise their feelings on the subject.

'The matter being thus hung up until something is heard from you, Lord Goderich is very anxious that you should be fully acquainted with all the circum-

[2] The *Autobiography* says, 'Goderich then asked the King if he would not see me, to explain the matter to me. I went in, and George assured me . . .' Neither Mr. Planta's letter nor Mr. Herries's narrative makes any mention of this incident.

stances of the case, which I have endeavoured to detail to you in as short a space as possible.

'Lord Goderich will be very glad to hear from you on the subject, and to have from you as full a statement as you can give him of your opinions upon it. Believe me, &c. &c.,

'JOSEPH PLANTA.

'P.S. Seven o'clock in the evening. The King has been up for the Recorder's report. His Majesty is still entirely determined as to Herries, and has communicated his determination to Lord Carlisle, as well as to Lord Goderich.

'His Majesty, however, adheres to his determination of not pressing for a decision until an answer shall be received to the communication already made to you.'

Lord Goderich to Mr. Herries.

'Downing Street: August 22, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—Under the peculiar circumstances of the case to which your letter of the 17th refers, I am sorry that I do not feel it to be possible for me to give a more positive answer to your question than the following, viz.: that although the final settlement of the business is postponed till we can know something of Huskisson's intentions in regard to himself, the grounds upon which I settled with his Majesty that the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer should be offered to you remain unchanged, notwithstanding the difficulties which have in the meantime occurred, and

which have occasioned the delay.[8] Believe me, my dear Herries, most sincerely yours, 'GODERICH.

'The Right Hon. J. C. Herries.'

Lord Goderich to Mr. Herries.

'Downing Street: August 23, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—The King desires me to communicate to you that he wishes you not to leave the neighbourhood of London at present without his Majesty's permission. Ever yours, 'GODERICH.'

Mr. Hill to Mr. Herries.

'Treasury Chambers: August 24.

'You will, I am sorry to say, see a scurrilous attack upon you to-day in the "Chronicle." Lord Goderich is very indignant about it, and has directed that a contradiction should be inserted in the "Courier" of to-night, and he has written to you upon the subject. . . .'

The same to the same.

Same date.

'I wrote the enclosed this morning, intending to send it by your messenger, but I was interrupted and he was gone. I understand Holmes is gone to you. I can assure you there is but one sentiment in the mouths of all those I have seen respecting the paragraph in the "Chronicle." It is universally reprobated, and I trust your speedy appointment to the office will afford the most convincing proof to the world of the falsehood of the statement, and it will certainly be to the authors of the scandal the most bitter of all convictions.'

[8] Compare this declaration with Lord Palmerston's assertion—'the King's Chancellor of the Exchequer, and not Goderich's.'

Mr. Hart Davis, M.P., to Mr. Herries.

'Conduit Street: August 24, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—I have read with deep disgust and abhorrence the leading article to the "Morning Chronicle" of this day. Do not suffer it to affect the tranquillity or the *firmness* of your mind. The "Evening Herald" and the "Morning Chronicle" should *immediately* (under good advice) be prosecuted.

. . . . . .

'I shall in every company mention my abhorrence of this slander, and my utter disbelief of its having any foundation. Ever my dear Herries, with unfeigned regard, your sincere Friend,

'R. HART DAVIS.'

Sir Henry Hardinge to Mr. Herries.

'Wynyard: August 27, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—I have read with the greatest indignation a most infamous attack against you in the "Morning Chronicle." Common squibs are to be treated with contempt and silence, but this is so atrocious that I cannot resist, from a sincere respect for you, expressing my abhorrence of it, a feeling common to all in this house, and which, with very few exceptions, will be the sentiment of the country at large. Ever sincerely yours,

'H. HARDINGE.'[4]

[4] The signal services rendered to his country by this illustrious man entitle him to the respect of every Englishman; but they have not secured for him that of Mr. Spencer Walpole, who, in describing the Duke of Wellington's Government in 1828, mentions him in a tone of contemptuous flippancy as 'Sir Henry Hardinge, an officer in the Guards.'

Mr. Herries to his Sister.

'Great George Street: August 28, 1827.

'Huskisson is come and goes to the King to-morrow. It appears that his orders were to be at Windsor on Sunday, and that not being able to obey them for that day, he did not feel that he could go to Windsor without a special appointment.

'I have avoided seeing him, and you will, I think, agree with me that it was better I should not see him. I am in the whole of this business quite passive, and I should not like to have the air of soliciting the suffrage of Huskisson in a matter between me and the Whigs. He must advise the King (if his advice is indeed asked) as he thinks best.

'I hear to-day that the Whigs have made up their minds to resign if my appointment is persisted in. I think they can now hardly do otherwise. But their followers are very much incensed against them, and do not approve of the grounds of the quarrel.

'Maberly has behaved well about the "Morning Chronicle." The editor is very penitent, and we have hopes of discovering the clue between him and the Whig party. He owns that he received instructions from one of them.

'At the clubs, however, the matter has taken a decided turn in my favour. So much of the story has oozed out that they are generally aware of the part which I have acted and of the manner in which I have been used by our vacillating Premier. They (the Whiglings) are incensed against him. It will indeed

be to him that they will owe the loss of their bread and butter, if they are ultimately driven away from it. . . .'

Mr. Herries to Mr. Huskisson.

'Great George Street: August 29, 1827. .

'My dear Huskisson,—I should have called on you to ascertain how far my very sincere wishes for the restoration of your health had been realised by the short and disturbed tour which you have been allowed to make, if the manner in which I have been mixed up (most reluctantly on my part) in the business on which you were going to Windsor had not induced me to think that it would be more convenient to all parties that I should not see you until you had been there.

'I shall be very glad, however, to have some conversation with you as soon as you can appoint a time for it.

'In the meantime I will only say that I rejoice much to learn that you are better than when you left us. Most truly yours,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

Mr. Planta to Mr. Herries.

'August 30, 1827,
'Thursday morning, half-past 9.

'I saw Huskisson last night as late as twelve o'clock; and as I find that you are to be with him and Goderich as early as ten to-day, I must give up getting to you before you see them; but I will be down at the Treasury by eleven, and will find you out wherever you are.

'(Most confidential.)

'It appears to me that this whole question of the Government now resolves itself into whether you can

think it consistent with your honour and character to take some other office in the Government instead of the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, equally in the Cabinet and equally high in rank.

'If you *can* do this things may go on, but if you cannot Mr. Canning's Government and system are likely to be dissolved and discontinued; and God only knows what will happen next. You must be well aware on which side my *wishes* are, but still I can never forget that you have been drawn into a very distressing situation by no adequate act of your own; and I always will maintain that you, and you *only*, are the judge of what you can *properly* do.'

Mr. Herries to his Sister.

'Great George Street: August 30.

'I am come from a long interview with Huskisson, the Chancellor, Sturges Bourne, and Goderich. The purpose of it was to communicate to me what had passed at Windsor, and to make to me the proposition which was the result of it.

'Huskisson stated the whole matter at great length. The substance of it was that the King had explained in a speech of an hour and a half his views of the whole transaction and his feelings upon what had taken place. He adverted strongly to the attacks in the newspapers both upon himself and upon me, and he ended by declaring that he would consent to nothing that should compromise either his own just and constitutional authority or the character of the person whom he had approved of for an office for which his Minister had

recommended him as being particularly well qualified.

'Huskisson, who appears to have viewed the subject in its proper light with respect to me, but who had not been quite fairly informed of the circumstances of the case as to the part which Goderich had acted in it, acquiesced in all that the King had said, but lamented that the difficulty which had arisen between the King and a part of his Government should have become apparently so insuperable at a time when the greatest obstacles would present themselves to the satisfactory formation of any new Government.

'He appears to have dwelt very strongly upon this point, and to have made the King see the personal embarrassment which must arise to himself if the difficulty could not be got rid of.

'The King, however, held most firmly by the two conditions which he had mentioned as the only ones on which he would hear of a compromise, viz. the clear maintenance of his own honour and my character, and the affair ended in a hopeless manner after a conversation of four hours. Before the Ministers came away it was, however, suggested to the King that if his original nomination in the person of Sturges Bourne could be carried into effect, by the withdrawal of the refusal given by Bourne, *his* honour would be saved, and that my character would be upheld if Bourne's appointment were made avowedly *pro tempore* until I could take the office, I being in the interim put into the high office of President of the Board of Trade (in the Cabinet), for the express object of conducting the

business of the Committee of Finance and presiding over it in the next session.

'The King, it was said, was disposed to acquiesce in this if I agreed to it.

'I immediately stated, on this proposition being made to me, that there was a much more simple solution of the difficulty. I would quit office altogether and take care of my character myself. This roused Huskisson, who started up and protested that if I took that step he would not only take no further trouble in this business, but that he would have nothing to do with the Government, and it must be broken up.

'I told him I meant nothing hostile or unkind; but that, situated as I was, I must defend my character in this conjuncture or incur the hazard of sinking in the public estimation for ever.

'Bourne here interposed, and said there was another obstacle to the project—namely, that no power on earth should induce him to accept the office under any condition or for any time whatever.

'This brought us to a conclusion. Nothing was left but for Huskisson to communicate to the Whigs that the only expedient which had been suggested for removing their difficulties was impracticable, and they must therefore make their election to submit or to resign. The result of this communication I am now waiting to receive.

'In the meantime I have heard from various quarters that the Whigs are not unlikely to give way. Brougham has written from the North to several of them that they must be mad to stand on such a point,

and that if they have any wisdom left they will acquiesce and go on. The line thus taken by Brougham is probably attributable to his particular hatred of Tierney, by whom the stand has been chiefly made. On the other hand, the under Whiglings were in a state of high bluster all yesterday, and vehement for resignation. What is to become of it God knows.

'Of one thing I feel quite assured. I shall come out of this mess quite straight in point of honour, because *my* case has not a flaw in it. In proportion as it becomes more and more known (by those gradual oozings which ultimately convey the whole of such matters to the public) I receive from all quarters assurances that I must stand entirely clear in the public opinion. If it be necessary to publish my documents it must unquestionably be so.'

Mr. Herries to Sir William Knighton.

'Great George Street: August 31.

'Dear Sir William,—In the course of my anxious reflections during the night the suggestion which is contained in the enclosed letter to Lord Goderich has occurred to me.

'If the King's service can be conducted to his Majesty's satisfaction by such an arrangement, and Huskisson can be induced to acquiesce in it, I should trust that the business of his Majesty's Government might go smoothly and comfortably on. No efforts on my part should be wanting towards that object, whereby I should best prove my sense of the duty

which I owe to the King, and my profound gratitude for his Majesty's most gracious condescension towards me.'

Mr. Herries to Lord Bexley.[5]

'Montreal, Sevenoaks: August 31
'(at night).

'After having tried every possible mode of obviating the difficulties in which the opposition of Tierney and his friends has involved the King and his Government with respect to my appointment, the protracted negotiations have been closed this day by my acceptance of the office.

'The King sent for the Chancellor, Lord Goderich, Huskisson, Sturges Bourne, and myself to Windsor this day.

'He saw them all together first, and having agreed with them as to the course to be pursued, Lord Goderich came out to me and communicated the King's desire, and his own, that I should now take the office. I then had an audience of the King, in which he said everything that is kind and gracious, and we came away.

'Lord Lansdowne is to go to-morrow to Windsor to be informed of the proceedings, and to hear the King's reasons, and those of his principal advisers, for the course which he has adopted, and the party with which Lord Lansdowne acts must then determine for themselves whether they will acquiesce or not.

'I believe they would now gladly do so if Tierney

[5] Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Formerly The Right Honorable Nicholas Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

had not absurdly committed himself at Brookes's and elsewhere; but I fear that he will not be able to make an honourable retreat, and must therefore resign.

'I wish it may prove otherwise; for I am strongly of opinion that it is most desirable that the present Government should, if possible, be maintained for some time at least, even if it be not calculated for any very considerable duration. A change just now will lead to much embarrassment. Huskisson and Canning's other friends will not join with those persons who quitted the Government on the ground of a personal objection to Canning; so that a Tory Government would be of very difficult formation.

'A Whig Government seems quite out of the question.

'In the event of the secession of Lord Lansdowne, Tierney, and Lord Carlisle, Goderich and Huskisson seem determined to carry on the Government without seeking any new junction with either of the extreme parties; and they appear confident of being able to do so.

'You will, I suppose, see or hear from some of them in the course of to-morrow.'

Sir W. Knighton to Mr. Herries.

'Saturday, late at night, London.

'The interview with Lord Lansdowne this morning has ended very satisfactorily. His Lordship remains in office, you being Chancellor of the Exchequer. There will be a Council held at Windsor Castle on

Monday at *two*, for the purpose of delivering seals, &c. I shall send this off very early in the morning, as my messengers are now all in bed and I am almost worn out.

Lord Goderich to Mr. Herries.

'Downing Street: September 1, 1827.

'My dear Herries,—All is settled: they remain in, and you are to be at Windsor Castle to receive the seals at two o'clock on Monday. The King has behaved admirably, and has shown his sincere desire to keep Canning's Government together upon the principles upon which it was formed. It is our duty to do our part to preserve it as long as we can, and to do all in our power not to disappoint his Majesty's expectations, or to thwart his genuine objects. We must forget all that is unpleasant in what has occurred, and act cordially and frankly together. If we do, and start well, depend upon it the country will support the King in his resolution to support us, particularly if we exert ourselves *bonâ fide* to get rid of, or at least to nullify, the odious distinctions of Whig and Tory, and to get the press, if possible, to support the Government, not so much on account of its individual composition, but because it is the King's Government and founded upon just and honourable principles. Ever, my dear Herries, most sincerely yours,

'GODERICH.'

Mr. Herries to Lord Goderich.

'Montreal: Sunday, September 2, 1827.

'My dear Goderich,—Your letter has been most welcome to me. It has removed the very painful

impression under which I have been lately suffering that I might, however innocently and unwillingly on my part, be the occasion of the breaking up of a Government the continuance of which is, in my own opinion, of very great importance to the interests of the country.

'I quite concur in all the sentiments expressed in your letter, and I hope we shall all endeavour to act strictly upon the principle of subduing all distinctions of parties on which you desire that your Government should be conducted. I espouse that principle heartily, and I am prepared to maintain it constantly and cordially. Ever most truly yours,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

Lord Bexley to Mr. Herries.

'Foot's Cray Place: September 1, 1827.

'I began to think that the settlement of affairs was too long deferred for the King's honour or comfort, when your messenger this morning brought me the agreeable intelligence that it had been effected in the only manner which, after all that has passed, I should have thought consistent with the King's honour or yours. While I congratulate you on the event I cannot conceal my sense of the difficulty of the task in which you and Lord Goderich are engaged, and I greatly wish that Lord Lansdowne and his friends may be conciliated. As long as they act with you the Whig party will be too much divided to be formidable, and we have the best chance possible (though certainly a doubtful one) of the Catholic question being kept quiet for some time. If Lord L. resigns, the Whigs

will reunite and press it forward with the utmost violence, with the view of embarrassing the King and the Government, and I do not see what sufficient strength you can have but in the support of Lord Liverpool's friends, and particularly of Peel. On their part there can be no personal feeling adverse to Lord Goderich, and Canning's personal friends will act very unwisely if they perpetuate feelings which ought to be buried with him. It must be our business to conciliate as much as possible; and we should bear in mind that the provocation which poor Canning most deeply felt was Lord Grey's speech. Even if Lord Lansdowne remains with us, we must (in conformity with the principles on which the King has formed the Government) look that way — I mean towards the Tories—and in that case I have no doubt that in a short time the separation between Lord L. and the Radicals will become wide enough to bring him pretty much over to our side.

'I have not yet heard from anybody but you. On Monday I shall go to town to enquire what turn affairs have then taken; and I feel much obliged to you for writing me so much information at a time when you must have been so much fatigued and hurried.

'I need not say that any advice or assistance I can give you will, at any time, be at your service.'

Mr. Herries to his Sister.

'September 3.

'. . . . I have got the seals after a very satisfactory interview with the King. Most of my colleagues, not

positively Whig, attended on the occasion; and they behaved to me with much kindness. Huskisson has distinguished himself by his friendly and manly conduct in this affair.[6] Lord Lansdowne is quite satisfied. Tierney is subdued. Wynn is extremely civil. Bexley is delighted.

'The King is highly pleased with his own successful management of the affair, which has, indeed, been at once able and dignified. . . .'

Mr. Planta to Mr. Herries.

'September 3, 1827.

'At length I have the gratification of congratulating you, as I do most sincerely, on your full and undisputed possession, with circumstances redounding greatly to your honour, of the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and of assuring you of the true satisfaction which I shall feel in serving under you and giving you every assistance which it is in my power to afford. . . .

'I think your offer to continue to serve as secretary[7] to Huskisson, if he had accepted the seals of the Exchequer, was, after all that had passed, one of the best exertions of good feeling and true magnanimity which I have witnessed; and it is, I can assure you, so esteemed by him. . . .'

Mr. Wallace to Mr. Herries.

'London: September 12.

'My dear Herries,—I was very much disappointed

[6] Compare this statement with Mr. S. Walpole's invention concerning Huskisson's conduct. See previous remarks, written before the discovery of the above letter.

[7] Secretary to the Treasury.

to find, on my arrival this morning in town, that you had left it, and were not expected to return before your intended visit to the Continent.

'In the expectation of seeing you I have abstained from writing to assure you of my sincere gratification at your appointment, both on your own account and with reference to the department you are so perfectly qualified to fill; but on another also, perhaps in some views of still more importance both to you and to the country—I mean the successful termination of the factious struggle by which the Whigs, those consistent sticklers for the King's rights with respect to the appointment of his Ministers, endeavoured to prevent the fulfilment of his avowed intentions and wishes towards you. Had they unhappily triumphed the Whig yoke would have been riveted on the Government. As it is I hope we are not only rescued for the present from what I should deem the worst of public calamities, but that, by your efforts and influence in co-operation with others, we may be effectually preserved from it in future. Ever, my dear Herries, very truly yours,

'T. WALLACE.'

Mr. Herries to the King.

'Mr. Herries presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and solicits your Majesty's gracious permission to go abroad for a few weeks for the re-establishment of his health.

'Mr. Herries begs to assure your Majesty that he would not presume to request this indulgence if he did

not feel confident that no inconvenience can arise to your Majesty's service from his absence for a short time, because the presence of Lord Goderich, who remains in London, will render Mr. Herries's attendance at the Treasury of less importance.'

The King to Mr. Herries.

'The King sends his very kind regards to Mr. Herries, and most truly hopes that Mr. Herries's health will be entirely re-established by his proposed little tour upon the Continent.

'G. R.

'Royal Lodge: September 9, 1827.'

Some comments upon the facts brought to light by the documents which have been produced may not be superfluous.

Upon the death of Mr. Canning the combination formed by him alone, and of which he alone was, or could be, the centre, might have been considered as dissolved. Parliament was not sitting, and the King had nothing to guide him but his own views of public opinion and the state of parties. It rested with him entirely to determine whether he should retain as his advisers the colleagues of the late Premier or seek others. His choice of a new Prime Minister was absolutely unfettered. He might, if he had deemed such a course to be conducive to the public interests, have sent for the Duke of Wellington or Mr. Peel, and charged either of them with the formation of a Tory Government. A Whig Ministry was at that time out of the question.

In the exercise of his discretion George IV. thought proper to confide to Lord Goderich the care of reconstructing the Cabinet of which he had been a member; but in so doing the King had a manifest right to require that its basis should not be altered, which was that of a mixed Government, neither exclusively Tory nor principally Whig, and to prevent any deviation from its essential principles—united opposition to Parliamentary reform and freedom of individual action on the Catholic Question. There was no reason whatever why he should have allowed to be imposed upon him a Whig Cabinet in disguise, for which he had no desire. He hated the Whigs as bitterly as the Whigs hated him, and, although he had admitted a few of them into his Councils, his aversion was hardly concealed. 'The King means to support Canning to the utmost, but he loathes the Whigs.' This report, probably resting on the best authority, was conveyed to Mr. Herries in a letter giving an account of a visit paid to Windsor in July 1827 by the Duke of Wellington, in whose confidence the writer was. Such being the King's sentiments, it was perfectly natural, and quite reasonable, that he should have been anxious to prevent the Whig section of the Cabinet from acquiring an increase of strength. It behoved him, therefore, to pay great attention to the filling up of the vacant office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, one of the most important posts in the Administration. The first choice made, with the King's concurrence, by the Prime Minister, was the unexceptionable one of Mr. Sturges Bourne, a man of moderate and liberal views, but not a Whig. That the King

personally pressed him to accept the office we know from the testimony of Lord Goderich himself, who was present at the audience. But he refused the offer.

These facts are destructive of Mr. Spencer Walpole's theory, borrowed from Lord Palmerston.[8] He says, 'The King, intent on building palaces in London and on making fresh improvements at Windsor, was anxious to have a creature of his own [i.e., according to the historian, Mr. Herries] at the Exchequer.' It would be interesting to learn where the palaces (how many?) with which the King intended to adorn the metropolis were to be situated, and what was the character of the designs for these edifices. No light is thrown upon this matter by any work on modern architecture. But, in a letter to the Buckingham Palace Committee of the House of Commons in 1831 from Nash, the King's architect, there does exist authentic evidence showing that, so far from being intent on palatial plurality, George IV. never really wished to build a single palace in London. 'His late Majesty's intentions and commands,' says Nash, 'were to convert Buckingham House into a private residence for himself. . . . The late King constantly persisted that he would not build a palace. . . . One day . . . . his Majesty took me to Lord Farnborough and said good-humouredly, "Long, now remember, I tell Nash before you at his peril ever to advise me to build a palace. If the public wish to have a palace I have no objection to build one, but I must have a *pied-à-terre*" . . . .'

[8] See the passage of the *Autobiography* already animadverted upon.

Buckingham Palace itself was already approaching completion, in its substantial parts, in 1827. It could not, therefore, have been one of the projected structures spoken of by Mr. Walpole. As to the other 'gorgeous palaces' which have left 'not a rack behind,' perhaps it may be concluded that

> 'Of its own beauty is' his 'mind diseased,
> And fevers into false creation: where,
> Where are the forms the' writer's 'soul hath seized?
> In him alone. Can' London 'show so fair?'

With regard to the 'fresh improvements at Windsor,' with a view to which it is affirmed that the King was anxious to have Mr. Herries as a creature of his own at the Exchequer, it is sufficient to remark that during the whole of Mr. Herries's tenure of that office no estimate for any additional works was passed by the Windsor Castle Commission.[9]

In support of his idle tale, Mr. Walpole, having nothing else to show, cites the Greville and Colchester diaries. In the former, Mr. Greville mentions that, on August 17, before the strange scenes above described had taken place, he walked round the Castle with the architect, Lord Bexley, Mr. Wynn, and Mr. Herries, when, he says, 'some conversation occurring about the elevation of the Round Tower, which Wyattville was anxious to accomplish, Herries said to him, "But it is my business now to ask you what you will do it for, how much it will cost. Will you do it for 10,000*l.*?" Wyattville said, "You must give me 15,000*l.*;" so that I

[9] See *Report of House of Commons Committee on Windsor Castle Improvements*, 1830, Appendix *D*.

could have no doubt that Herries was Chancellor of the Exchequer.' To any candid mind it must be obvious that the whole pith of this insignificant anecdote lies in the last words. The casual observations exchanged on the subject of estimates were noted by Greville simply because they removed, as he thought, all uncertainty as to the fact of a nomination concerning which he had been in doubt. No one but Mr. Spencer Walpole would find in this bit of harmless gossip a proof of his accusation. 'At the Council,' he says in connection with the passage about the King's creature, &c., 'at which Herries was appointed [as a matter of fact he was not then appointed] to the Exchequer, the architect of Windsor Castle applied to him for 15,000*l.* for the Round Tower.'[1] The innuendo is patent. Mr. Walpole's next citation, which is not more happy, is that of an incomplete extract from an entirely irrelevant letter addressed by Lord Colchester to Lord Amherst in India, giving, together with sundry other scraps of intelligence, a brief notice of various public works in progress, from the roofing in of Buckingham Palace to the pumping out of the Thames Tunnel. The mention of this last operation is judiciously omitted. Lord Colchester's letter contains no allusion to royal profusion or Treasury jobs, does not once name Mr. Herries, and has no bearing whatever upon any of the assertions in proof of which it is adduced. It has been thought necessary to bestow so much criticism upon Mr. Spencer Walpole's

[1] In reality the estimate for the Round Tower was not considered by the Commission until April 8, 1828—eight months after the conversation reported by Greville, and three months after Mr. Herries had ceased to be Chancellor of the Exchequer.

injurious allegations, which could not be allowed to remain uncensured; but their inanity is sufficiently demonstrated by the established priority of Mr. Sturges Bourne's nomination to the Exchequer—unless, indeed, the good fame of this highly respectable gentleman is to be exposed to the same slanderous imputation as that of the person next chosen.

The selection of Mr. Herries fulfilled exactly all the conditions which the circumstances required, and it is therefore needless to search for occult and improper motives where a legitimate cause is visible on the surface. He was well known to be adverse to Whig ascendency, while at the same time his temper was conciliatory, and his Tory principles, though decided, were not extreme. He had belonged to the Government of Mr. Canning, whose confidence he had enjoyed, and with all, but the Whig, members of the Cabinet, he had been for many years on terms of friendly intercourse. With Huskisson in particular—the most conspicuous, and, with the exception of Lord Lyndhurst, by far the most able among them—he had worked cordially, as every person connected with the Treasury knew—and no one better than the First Lord—in the preparation and execution of commercial and maritime reforms. His administrative ability and special capacity in financial matters were recognized by all who had any practical acquaintance with public affairs.

The words of Mr. Planta, in his letter of August 13, 'The country looks to you to fill this situation,' are amply borne out by contemporary evidence. That Mr. Herries would be placed in it was undoubtedly the

expectation generally entertained in official and political circles at the moment of Canning's death.

All the leading newspapers of the day, apart from the specifically Whig organs, such as the 'Morning Chronicle,' designated him with approval as the person most likely to be chosen.[2]—'a circumstance strongly remarked upon by Lord Goderich as a confirmation of his own opinion.'

Numerous letters from directors of the Bank of England and the East India Company, as well as from heads of great mercantile houses, testify that the feeling prevalent in the higher regions of the City of London, among the representatives of the great monetary and commercial interests of the country,[3] was strongly in his favour. The money market was affected in July by the announcement of his approaching retirement even from the place of Secretary to the Treasury—a rumour which, according to the 'Times,'[4] disquieted the stockholders almost as much as Portuguese convul-

[2] Even Mr. Walpole is compelled to admit that such was the case, but he endeavours to diminish the value of the fact by suggesting a doubt of the sincerity of the general praise. Surely nothing can be more absurd than the supposition of the concordant insincerity of many rival journalists of different shades of colour agreeing together to mystify the public for the benefit of Mr. Walpole's ideal 'Tory clerk.' In the following year, 1828, when a complete change of Ministry (the Duke of Wellington being then in office) was believed to be imminent, the name of Mr. Herries, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, figured in two newspaper lists of a conjectural new Cabinet.

[3] The most eminent among them at this period, Alexander Baring—the first Lord Ashburton—afterwards assigned to Mr. Herries the first place among all the Finance Ministers of England whom he had known. He repeatedly expressed this opinion to Lord Brougham, who communicated it to Mr. Herries at the close of his political life in a remarkable letter, which will appear hereafter.

[4] See Article already cited.

sions and the instability of Mr. Canning's position. In August a fall in the funds was caused by the news that obstacles had been raised to his promotion.[5]

Such a concurrence of testimony is not to be lightly blown away by the breath of malevolence. What demonstration of public opinion could be more complete? What further proof could be needed of the general belief in the fitness of a public man for a public station?

The selection made by the Prime Minister and the King only ratified the public choice. Whether it was first suggested by Lord Goderich to George IV., or by the King to his chief adviser, cannot be positively ascertained, and is indeed wholly immaterial. That the assumption of the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer was proposed to Mr. Herries by the Prime Minister is a fact established by Lord Goderich's own repeated declarations, leaving no room for further controversy. It is asserted that he wished to give the post to Lord Palmerston (whose candidature was by no means supported by public opinion). Such may possibly have been his desire, though the balance of evidence is against the supposition. The early letters of Mr. Planta, who was in confidential communication with him, and his own expressions, lead rather to the conclusion that Lord Goderich had Mr. Herries in his mind's eye from the beginning of his arrangements.

On the other hand, nothing can be more clearly proved than the reluctance of Mr. Herries, with his im-

[5] *Times* City article, August 20.

paired health, to undertake the arduous charge allotted to him. Having at first declined to do so, he yielded only to a pressing invitation from the King, which, according to his old-fashioned Tory notions (now perhaps thought obsolete) of duty to the Crown, he could not properly resist. But no sooner had he found that the necessary conditions with which his acceptance was coupled would be inconvenient to the head of the Government than he instantly declared his readiness to withdraw it. His final decision to comply with the King's wishes was determined by Lord Goderich himself saying, 'There is no other alternative; you must accept the office.' If the theory of constitutional government and ministerial responsibility be not a mere fiction, the summons to Windsor to take the seals was unquestionably the act of the Prime Minister.

Up to this time no objections had been raised, and there was no reason to anticipate any opposition. None had been offered by any of the members of the Cabinet (all of whom must have been made aware of the fact) to the admission of Mr. Herries when it was proposed to him by Lord Goderich with the King's sanction, nor had any intimation been conveyed to the Premier by Lord Lansdowne in the course of the ensuing five days, when the arrangement remained uncertain, that it would be likely to meet with any obstacle on the part of himself or his Whig friends. Their resistance was reserved until the moment when, all being definitively settled, the formal appointment was about to take place. Then, without previous warning, on the threshold of the royal closet, they suddenly interposed their unexpected veto.

That men of such high rank and character as Lord Lansdowne and Lord Carlisle should have allowed themselves to be dragged by Mr. Tierney into so indecorous a course, the glaring impropriety of which they must have felt, is astonishing. That a person in the exalted position of Prime Minister of England should have meekly tolerated such an affront, not only to himself, but also to his Sovereign, is incomprehensible. If Lord Goderich's spirit had been equal to his station, he would have peremptorily refused to listen to Mr. Tierney's tardy injunctions (how Canning would have treated them !), and advised the King—as he was afterwards emboldened by Huskisson to do—to disregard the Whig prohibition. If Mr. Herries had not been a man of more than common self-denial and fortitude, he would, without yielding to inopportune supplications, have persisted in doing what the Premier, an hour or two before, had urged him to do, and not have incurred the risk of giving just offence to the King by declining to take the seals when they were almost forced upon him. 'The King was greatly ruffled,' and no wonder, for in Windsor Castle no such indignity as that put upon him by Mr. Tierney and his friends had been suffered by any English King, at least since the Revolution. A private gentleman, treated with so much disrespect in a matter of ordinary business, must have shown resentment. The King said that 'he would not be dictated to,' and in truth there was no reason why he should have submitted to the dictation from which he ought to have been protected. The nomination which he had made by the advice of his Prime Minister

was approved by public opinion, and had the assent of the majority of the Cabinet.[6] Its opponents were no more than a small fraction of the Cabinet, of which they were not the founders, and they represented merely a fraction of a party, which, when united, composed only a minority in either House of Parliament. Though their pretensions were very great, their effective strength was very small. Nevertheless the King so far controlled his anger as to consent to suspend his decision, leaving the question temporarily in abeyance; and it seems impossible to deny that his conduct on this occasion deserved commendation. Nor can any impartial enquirer refuse to admit that, in the very delicate and difficult position into which he was driven, Mr. Herries's behaviour and language were such as became a man of honour.

By a singular mistake the 'Court Circular' of the 17th (probably composed beforehand) announced that the appointment in dispute had actually been made on that day; but the error was soon discovered, with what effect upon the public mind may be gathered from the City article of the 'Times' of Monday, the 20th:—'The decline in consols to-day [i.e. the previous Saturday] was from 88⅞ to 88⅜; the closing price was 88⅜ to ½. Late in the day some rumours were afloat that the appointment of Mr. Herries as Chancellor of the Ex-

[6] The Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor (who was very active in the business), and Lord Bexley (an old friend) were decidedly favourable to Mr. Herries; Mr. Sturges Bourne, and Mr. C. Grant presumably were so; Lord Palmerston's real hostility did not openly manifest itself; Mr. Huskisson, as afterwards appeared, was very friendly; the other non-Whig members were not dissentient.

chequer is not absolutely concluded on, and that a secret intrigue is at work to place Lord Palmerston in that office. We know not how far this latter fact is deserving of attention, but the individuals who have assisted in its circulation are of the most respectable class. . . .' The leading article of this journal of the same day had the following remarks:—'Notwithstanding the announcement in the "Court Circular" of Friday night, we learn that Mr. Herries has not yet received the seals of office as Chancellor of the Exchequer, though he was on that day sworn in as a member of the Privy Council. For our own part, we should wish that the present delay in his promotion may be shortly terminated. With respect to the nomination of Lord Palmerston to that financial office, surely nothing so ridiculous can have been thought of.'

It seems that the public had no more confidence in his Lordship's financial capability[7] than the King had in his political principles.

A letter of the same date from a director of the East India Company and member of Parliament to Sir William Knighton strengthens the impression conveyed by the 'Times' as to the feeling in the City.

[7] Until this time Lord Palmerston, who was very far from being ranked among the leading speakers in Parliament, had not acquired a high reputation for administrative ability. His management of the War Office does not seem to have commanded admiration. During the Peninsular war especially —when despatch and accuracy were of transcendent importance—many passages in Mr. Herries's correspondence with the Treasury, the Horse Guards, and various official persons, give indications of a prevalent opinion that the conduct of the business of Lord Palmerston's department was slow and slovenly. Then on what ground ought the King and the public, who alike objected to him, to have been compelled to accept him as Chancellor of the Exchequer?

'From the situation I hold, and the opportunity thereby afforded me of hearing the opinions of influential men in this great city, I am only performing a duty in mentioning to you . . . . that there is an intense feeling of anxiety at present agitating the public mind upon the subject of the completion of the appointment, which has been announced in all the public journals, of Mr. Herries as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He is considered here the fittest—I may say, the only fit —man to manage and inspire confidence in this department, for people naturally look to his long-tried experience and practical knowledge of the finances of the country for the arrangement of plans for placing those finances in the ensuing session of Parliament on a footing that will give general and permanent satisfaction. . . . Whatever may be thought elsewhere, men of business, who are capable of justly appreciating the results to the country of the decision that may be come to on this question, look upon his appointment as one of the most momentous importance in the formation of the Government at this critical conjuncture, and it is no wonder, therefore . . . . that that individual should be the universal favourite. There is, indeed, in the public estimation so wide an interval between the qualifications of Mr. Herries and those of any other person who could be proposed to fill that important situation that no comparison can be made.'

A few days previously Mr. Herries had received from a director of the Bank of England since 1790[8] the

[8] Mr. Pearse, M.P. for Devizes, Deputy-Governor of the Bank in 1808 and Governor in 1810.

following strong declaration :—'I am not a fellow to pay compliments, but I will venture to say, if you will take the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, it will tend more to raise the funds and give financial confidence than the restoration of poor Canning's life.' And on August 31 another Bank director[9] wrote to him a letter containing the words, 'With the exception of one, you have the voice of all the Bank.'

The mine sprung at Windsor by Mr. Tierney had produced only a partial and temporary effect. It had not destroyed his enemy's position, or the King's resolution, and the cabal was in a critical situation. There was manifest peril that it might be reduced to the alternative of humiliating capitulation or of retreat—without bag and baggage—whereby the standpoint painfully gained by a portion of the Whig party would be lost, and the chance of the recovery of Whig power by gradual infiltration thrown away. In these circumstances it occurred to some ingenious disciples of Don Bazile that the best way of averting the danger would be to ruin the credit of the adversary in the eyes of the public by odious imputations; and although the plan ('*Singulier moyen de se défaire d'un homme!*') failed, the revival of the calumny, with hardly doubtful intention, fifty years after its apparent consignment to oblivion, shows on the part of its contrivers a profound knowledge of the truth that '*il n'y a pas de plate méchanceté, pas d'horreurs, pas de conte absurde, qu'on ne fasse adopter aux oisifs d'une grande ville en s'y prenant bien : et nous avons ici*

[9] Mr. Irving, M.P. for Bramber, a West India merchant of high standing.

des gens d'une adresse! '—even here in this most respectable metropolis.

The false statement, which, as the editor admitted, was published in the 'Morning Chronicle' under 'instructions,' was the work of a skilful hand. Though meant to inflict the utmost injury, it afforded, in the opinion of Mr. Herries's adviser, the Lord Chancellor, no sufficient ground for legal proceedings likely to be effectual. Its malicious innuendo was indeed hardly tangible enough to be brought before a jury. The assertion, indignantly contradicted by Lord Goderich, might have been excused as a mistake, and the suggestion that intimacy with Baron N. M. Rothschild should be a bar to the occupation of the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer represented as merely the expression of the opinion of the writer. 'No offence in the world.' As to the fact of the intimacy on which so much stress was laid for a base purpose, it was perfectly true that, in connection with the great capitalist, and by means of his confidential agency, Mr. Herries had, as we have pointed out, during a considerable period, conducted very difficult operations for the benefit of the public, for whom immense sums had been saved through the skill, knowledge, and labour of those two persons acting in concert. It was also quite true that Mr. Herries had been for a long time, as he continued to be until the death of that estimable gentleman, on very friendly terms with Baron Rothschild, for whose sagacity and honourable character he entertained a high regard. His sentiments were expressed with perfect sincerity in a letter (a copy of which appears among his papers) addressed

by him to Baroness Rothschild on the occasion of her husband's death. It says, 'The friendship which existed for so many years between me and N. M. Rothschild, uninterrupted by a single instance of disagreement, is sufficient to convince you that I must not only sympathize cordially with you, but feel the event deeply on my own account also. From the first moment when it was my fortune to come into communication with Mr. Rothschild, and through him to execute public services of the greatest importance and upon the largest scale, my high estimation of him as a man of business and as a man of worth was never diminished by a single action of his life. I, who knew him so well, and who, in the discharge of my public duty, received so much assistance from him, can safely pronounce him to have been most capable, skilful, upright, and liberal in the whole course of his employment as an agent of the State. . . .'

Lord Lansdowne's vehement condemnation of the abominable libel, which, emanating from a Whig quarter, was published for party (perhaps also for personal) purposes by a Whig party organ, has already been recorded, together with similar expressions of reprobation on the part of other honourable men. To these may be added, as showing the manner in which the scandalous attack was viewed by quite impartial foreigners, the following remarkable extract from the 'Journal des Débats' of August 28, 1827 :—

'Nous avons parlé hier de la perfide attaque du "Morning Chronicle" contre M. Herries. Il paraît que cet article avait une signification plus étendue

qu'on ne l'aurait cru à la première vue. Il se terminait ainsi: "Les membres du Cabinet pensent unanimement que les objections relatives à M. Herries sont d'une nature insurmontable."

'La fausseté de cette assertion est démontrée d'une manière non équivoque par la lettre de Lord Goderich à M. Herries, que nous trouvons dans le "New Times" de ce matin, et qui est l'expression des honorables sentimens que SS. a éprouvés à la lecture de l'article en question. [A translation of the letter is here inserted.] Nous ne nous étendrons pas davantage sur ce sujet, parce que nous voulons éviter avec soin tout ce qui pourrait tendre à faire naître des dissensions. Le caractère public et privé de M. Herries est placé trop haut dans l'opinion pour être atteint par de méprisables insinuations que l'on met en avant dans le but de servir un parti aux dépens d'un individu.'

Such was, and must have been, the judgment of all those in whose minds a sense of rectitude had not been obliterated by the spirit of faction. The deplorable transaction upon which it was pronounced would not have needed further animadversion after the lapse of half a century, if a writer of our own day had not been urged by the over-zeal of a convert to bring again into light a very black spot in English party history, which, with more discretion, he would have allowed to remain unseen in the obscurity of the past.

After Mr. Huskisson's return the King, while displaying a proper determination to maintain his own dignity and to defend the character of the chosen Minister whom he felt bound not to abandon, showed a

praiseworthy readiness to lend himself to any honourable compromise, such as that suggested by Huskisson with the best intention, and, as there is every reason to believe, in an amicable spirit towards Mr. Herries, who probably would have acceded to it but for the defamatory attacks to which he had just been exposed. The conduct of his assailants, and a sense of self-respect, which no man can be required to sacrifice to any political convenience, dictated his refusal. His desire to remove the impediment, of which he had been made the involuntary cause by others, was sufficiently manifested by his eagerness to withdraw altogether from the scene of contention. Those who are most interested in his reputation cannot but rejoice at his inflexible resolution not to admit the validity of the Whig prohibition by accepting any other official station than that to which he had been called, in a constitutional manner, by his Sovereign. His subsequent spontaneous offer to serve for a time under Huskisson had quite another signification.

The factious frivolity of the opposition prompted by Tierney was demonstrated by the proposal, strongly pressed by Lord Lansdowne, in the name of his friends as well as in his own, that Mr. Herries should, after a temporary occupation of another office,[1] be appointed to the very post which they refused to allow him to take immediately. It was thus avowed that their objection was neither grounded on the antagonism of his political principles, which would have undergone no change, nor on any pretence of his want of financial

[1] Not, as first understood, with a seat in the Cabinet.

ability, which could not have been acquired in an interval of a few months. The course taken by them, therefore, could have been nothing but mere obstructiveness, the motive for which was clearly traceable to a desire to thwart the King and to compel him to give way to a repugnant demand for the addition of Lord Holland to the list of his advisers. The Herries difficulty was in reality a Holland difficulty.

After having, for such a purpose, during the space of a fortnight, flouted the Crown, suspended the Government, harassed their colleagues, and disturbed the public, the Whig minority, when at last met with the firmness which should have been displayed at the outset, exhibited the weakness alike of their cause, their position, and their will, by acquiescing in what they had declared inadmissible, and retaining the places they had threatened to resign. That they were able to do so with any appearance of dignity was owing mainly to the exertions of the man whom they had endeavoured to injure. Instead of triumphing over his defeated foes, he opened the way for their honourable retreat from the untenable ground they had rashly taken up. He it was who persuaded the 'reluctant' King to send for Lord Lansdowne and 'explain to him fully what he had been advised to do' (by Huskisson and other Ministers); and the King, acting upon his recommendation, 'wrote to Lord Lansdowne in his presence.' A more vindictive, or a more timorous, man would have given a contrary advice, which the King, in his then disposition, would readily have followed. Without the softening explanations which His Majesty was

induced personally to offer, the Whigs must, for the sake of their own credit, have carried into effect their announced intention to retire. Their places might then have been filled with moderate Tories, and the subsequent disputes, which brought the Ministry to an untimely end, would never have occurred. We are obliged to confess that on this occasion, as on many others in the course of his life, Mr. Herries did not give proof of much 'wisdom for a man's own self.' How his generosity towards his antagonists was requited will be seen in the sequel.

A review of all the incidents which have been described leads to the conclusion that his conduct was throughout upright, candid, fair, disinterested, and conciliatory; that the conduct of his opponents was unfair, illiberal, self-seeking, and overbearing; and that the conduct of the King was just, reasonable, and constitutional. 'The King,' Lord Goderich truly said, 'has behaved admirably.' He exercised his rights with moderation, and discharged his duties with firmness. Had he acted otherwise, had he shown as much feebleness as his Prime Minister, and succumbed to an unwarrantable pressure, he would have abdicated the functions entrusted to him by the Constitution, and handed over the royal authority to a 'personal government' of three Whigs, establishing themselves, *motu proprio*, as a supreme council above the Crown and the Cabinet, and wielding the powers of the State for the benefit of a party, by and with the advice and consent of sundry lords and commoners in Brookes's Club assembled. The transformation of the British

Constitution into an absolute oligarchy would have been complete.

One of Lord Palmerston's unworthy insinuations, as groundless as all the rest, demands particular notice.

After his statement,[2] proved by his own correspondence to be untrue, that Lord Goderich, on being appointed First Lord of the Treasury, 'immediately requested him to be his Chancellor of the Exchequer,' and that at Canning's funeral (for which he gives a wrong date) Lord Goderich informed him of the King's refusal, he says, 'Herries, on being spoken to by Goderich [i.e. subsequently, as it would seem, to that funeral, which in reality took place four days after the offer made by Lord Goderich to Mr. Herries], affected to decline [he did certainly decline], pleaded bad health, and begged to be excused. *The King, between whom and Herries Goderich was made to suppose himself the only channel of communication,*[3] said . . . .'

The falsity of this allegation is positively proved by the documentary evidence already produced. No sort of deception was practised by anyone upon Lord Goderich in the course of this negotiation. He did not suppose himself to be the only channel of communication. He knew that in the first instance the Lord Chancellor was the channel of a communication exactly similar to that which he himself made on the same day. On the following day he was made aware of the fact that a letter to the same effect as that addressed to himself had been sent by Mr. Herries to Sir William Knighton.

[2] In the *Autobiography*.

[3] The italics are ours.

'I have sent a messenger to Sir W. Knighton to apprise him of the reason of my not coming, and I have also informed him that I should write to you on the general subject and request you to communicate to the King.' Again, when a message from the King was afterwards brought to Mr. Herries by Sir W. Knighton, the answer was communicated through the same channel to Lord Goderich before it went to Windsor. On August 15 Mr. Herries thought it advisable, in order to guard against mistakes, to write to Knighton a correct account of what had passed between himself and Lord Goderich, whose duty it also was, of course, to report to the King the result of the same interview. This precaution was not superfluous, for the Prime Minister's forgetfulness was inconvenient. A very important communication from the King to Mr. Herries, of which Lord Goderich had undertaken to be the channel, was kept back, and its nature was not made known to Mr. Herries through any other channel. Obviously that of the Prime Minister could not be relied upon. It was probably for the same very sufficient reason that Mr. Herries deemed it expedient, on August 31, to convey to Sir William Knighton, 'for the information of the King,' a copy of his letter of that date to Lord Goderich, making the offer of serving under Huskisson. Later, on the same day, he communicated simultaneously to Lord Goderich and to Windsor the private intelligence he had received respecting the Whig consultations; and he did so in the hope of promoting a reconciliation. Lastly, he received, on September 2, almost together with Lord Goderich's letter announcing the final settle-

ment, another from the King's secretary to the same purport, and in similar terms.

That is all. 'You must have observed how scrupulous I have been,' wrote Mr. Herries to Lord Goderich on August 17, 'throughout this transaction, as to availing myself of the King's favour in any other manner than through your hands.' The truth of this statement is demonstrated by the whole tenor of the papers before us.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

Report from Mr. Herries on the results of his Mission to Paris. *See Vol. I. page* 89.

To George Harrison, Esq.

'(Confidential.)

'July 1, 1814.

'Sir,—Upon my return to this country from the important and confidential mission in which I have been employed by the Lords, &c., I conceive it to be my duty to lay before their Lordships a general report of my proceedings in the execution of their Lordships' instructions, the most material points of which I have already submitted for their Lordships' approval in the separate despatches which I have had occasion to address to them.

'Upon my arrival at Paris, I found the state of the exchange not only very much depressed (under 17 francs 50 cents for the pound sterling) but exceedingly unpromising owing to negotiations which had been set on foot by the Allied Powers in that city, partly for the sale of their own paper at such rates as afforded the strongest inducements to English speculators to remit funds from England to engage in them, and partly by their own endeavours to negotiate paper upon England on account of subsidies due to them.

'My first object was to endeavour to prevent the mischievous effect of the last-mentioned circumstance, and I trust that their Lordships will be satisfied by the reports which I have made to them of my conferences and transactions with the agents of the different Powers, and of the advances which I

have succeeded in inducing two of them to take from me, in preference to having recourse to their own negotiations in the money market, that my efforts in this considerable branch of my commission were successfully as well as zealously applied.

'The payments and remittances provided for by the arrangements which I made during my stay at Paris have amounted to 404,400*l.* sterling, and 12,736,000 francs, distinguished as follows:—

For Subsidies	Cash	Bills of Exchange	Total
	£	£	£
King of France . . .	116,900	—	116,900
Prussia	100,000	137,500	237,500
Austria	50,000	—	50,000
			404,400

For the Armies	Francs
Bordeaux	9,800,000
On march to Calais . . .	336,000
Brussels	2,600,000
Francs	12,736,000

'Of these funds the portion provided in cash on the spot was raised at a rate gradually improving from 17·50 to 21 francs, without its having been known, I believe, on the Paris Exchange that a single bill had been negotiated on my account; and the drafts upon Frankfort and Berlin, though given at a rate very satisfactory to Prussia because rather better than the then existing course, are likely to yield some profit to the Treasury by the improved exchange at which they may now be covered, and which I confidently expected would result from the general measures adopted by their Lordships when I granted them. The effect of these measures is already manifest, and the present appearance of the exchanges justifies the hope that they will shortly be restored to the level at which they have been ascertained to stand in ordinary times, if the Allied Powers, in drawing the remainder of the subsidies due to them, will act in conformity with the assurances which I received from their respective Ministers at Paris, who appeared

to be entirely satisfied by my representations that the measures proposed for that purpose by the British Treasury embraced the common interest of all parties.

'The Ministers of Austria and Prussia have given proofs of a disposition to co-operate effectively in these measures by receiving the payments which I have already reported to their Lordships, and I have received from the Baron de Bülow on the part of Prussia, and M. de Barbier, Vice-President of the Chamber of Finance, on that of Austria, the most positive promises that no negotiation of drafts upon England for the receipt of the subsidies remaining due shall be made except with the previous concurrence of the British Treasury.

'With respect to Russia the appearance is not quite so satisfactory. M. de Gervais, the Russian Commissioner at Amsterdam, arrived in Paris shortly after me, expressly, as I understood, for the purpose of conferring with me, but after a single meeting in which he merely expressed his general concurrence in the principle which I stated to him, and explained to me that he had no authority except what he derived from the Minister of Finance at St. Petersburg, he suddenly announced his intention to leave Paris, and at the same time informed me that he could not accept the 200,000*l.* in French gold which I held at his disposal at Amsterdam in part of the subsidy of 1814.

'I was induced by this circumstance to request a conference with M. de Nesselrode, the Russian Minister at Paris, and having explained to him the object of their Lordships' commission entrusted to me, he requested that I would deliver an official note to him on the subject, expressing at the same time his conviction that a proposal so reasonable and so considerately framed for the mutual interest of the two Powers would not fail to receive due attention from the Minister of Finance at St. Petersburg. I accordingly delivered to him the note of which the inclosed is a copy, and of which I hope their Lordships will approve.

'The refusal of M. de Gervais to accept the money lying at Amsterdam, and the intimation which I received of their Lordships' determination to carry the advances made to Russia and

Prussia in Bills of Exchange upon the Bills of Credit to the account of the subsidy due to those Powers for 1814, induced me to avail myself of their Lordships' permission to return through Holland in order that I might conclude the arrangement for the application of the money in question to the use of the army in France as announced in my letter of the —th June last and come to an understanding with the agents of the Allied Powers at Amsterdam respecting the proposed alteration in the accounts of the subsidy.

'I was not fortunate enough to meet M. de Niebuhr, the Prussian Commissioner at Amsterdam, but I learnt from Sir George Burgmann that he was satisfied with the arrangements proposed by their Lordships. M. de Gervais was equally so.

'The steps which I ventured to take at this place for the liquidation of the first six monthly payments due to the Russian Government on account of the Bills of Credit are explained in a separate despatch in which I have had the honour of laying the whole of that important transaction fully before their Lordships.

'Having thus submitted a summary of my proceedings in the discharge of the important and confidential commission entrusted to me, I have only to express my hope that I may receive through you the assurance of the sanction and approval of their Lordships for my humble endeavours to carry their instructions into effect. I have, &c.,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

APPENDIX B.

Plan proposed by Mr. Herries for raising money on the Continent. See Vol. I. page 104.

To George Harrison, Esq.

'(Confidential.)

'June 30, 1815.

'Sir,—Having been directed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to consider and report to the Treasury upon the expediency of raising in Germany or Holland a part of the

supplies of money required for foreign expenditure, either by way of loan or by bills payable in foreign currency at distant periods, I have now the honour of submitting to the consideration and decision of the Lords, &c., my opinion that such a measure would have the most beneficial effects, and that it will be practicable to a very considerable extent at Frankfort and Amsterdam, and in the same degree likewise at Hamburg. The inquiries which I have caused to be made at the two former places, confidentially and with as much secrecy as possible, induce me to conceive that the most simple and efficacious method of carrying a measure of this nature into effect will be that of negotiating bills at long dates (at a discount of 5 or 6 per cent. per annum) payable at each of them in their respective currencies, with the alternative of payment in London at the ordinary par of the exchange. These bills should in my opinion be drawn by a British functionary upon the Lords, &c., and be accepted by their Lordships in order to obtain the confidence of moneyed men on the Continent. I have the honour of inclosing specimens of the forms which I conceive to be most applicable to the purpose both in Holland and in Germany; and if their Lordships should approve of the measure and of the mode in which I have proposed to carry it into execution, I shall be ready to proceed immediately to Frankfort with such bills as they may be pleased to accept, in order there to make arrangements for the negotiation of them, which I apprehend would not require a stay of many days in that city; it being one of the chief advantages of this method of proceeding as compared with that of contracting a loan by subscription, or raising money upon bills of credit, that the execution of it will be in the nature of a simple mercantile operation, and that it may be gradually extended as opportunity may serve without the necessity of announcing or fixing in the outset the limits of the transaction. It would be superfluous, I presume, in me to attempt to point out to the consideration of their Lordships the benefits which must arise from the successful execution of a plan of this nature. The advantage of commanding immediately a considerable sum of specie on the Continent, with the power of providing for it gradually hereafter, as the state of

the exchange might render most expedient; the diminished issue of Exchequer Bills to a corresponding amount in the interim; the relief of the mercantile exchange from the extraordinary pressure of our political and military expenditure abroad; and the facilities which may arise out of it for enabling the Bank of England to prepare to resume its payments in specie, will all be obvious to the judgment of their Lordships. I have, &c.,

'J. C. HERRIES.'

APPENDIX C.

The following extracts are taken from a paper headed 'Memorandum from Mr. Herries for Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart, June 12, 1816.' *It was found after that portion of the present volume which relates to services connected with the war had been completed.*

'In consequence of the material change which is proposed to be made in the constitution of the Commissariat Department, or rather in the particular situation now held by Mr. Herries, he thinks it right at this moment to recall the attention of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Vansittart to the circumstances of peculiar labour and responsibility which have of late years devolved upon him. . . .

. . . . 'With respect to the duties properly belonging to his office, their great weight and the manner in which they have been extended (by gradual improvements of the system) and discharged in his hands, he has only (now that they are about to cease) to throw himself upon the testimony of those under whose immediate directions he has acted. Mr. Vansittart and the Secretaries of the Treasury can best judge whether he has zealously performed his duty to the public, and whether the numerous regulations for imposing checks upon expenditure and controlling it in its progress abroad, which have been suggested by him and enforced under their authority, have been productive of beneficial effects.

'Upon the extra services, viz. those which have only been connected with his office upon grounds peculiar to himself, and which have been of vast magnitude and importance, he hopes it will not be improper that he should offer a few observations more in detail. These services relate to the providing of specie for defraying the military expenditure abroad, and for the discharge of subsidies to foreign Powers; and they embrace purchases of bullion, coinages, and operations of exchange which have been executed and accounted for, in great detail, by Mr. Herries to the extent of more than twenty millions sterling in the last three or four years.

'The course pursued in this branch of business has been new in the practice of the Treasury. The charge of providing specie for foreign service had gradually devolved entirely upon the commissariat officers abroad, from the time (about the beginning of the war) when those officers were made the agents and accountants for the extraordinary expenditure in almost all its branches. Their only mode of procuring money for that expenditure was by the sale of their bills upon the Treasury; and the shipments of specie from home were so trifling, and so precarious too, that those negotiations of paper might be considered as their only resource. Under any circumstances a system of raising money by so many different hands, and in so many different places at once, would require, on the part of the Treasury, a very careful superintendence, and an active control, in order to prevent injurious competition, and to make the superabundant means of one market subservient to the deficiencies of another; but in the case of a demand for money to an extraordinary extent, and much beyond the natural resources of any foreign market whatever—such as that of our military expenditure in the latter years of the war—it is calculated to produce the most injurious effects upon the course of the exchange, by inundating the Continent with an unlimited and universal sale of British paper. . . . These evils were experienced in the highest degree in the few years preceding the close of the late war. The expense of raising money became enormous, and the difficulty of procuring specie in sufficient quantities was most embarrassing. The

subject passed so much under the view of the Commissary-in-Chief (although he was not officially charged with the cognisance of it), and he was so much in the habit of confidential communication with the Treasury, that he was induced from time to time to point out the evil, and to suggest such remedies as occurred to him. These suggestions were probably, for the most part, anticipated by the superior knowledge of Mr. Vansittart and the other persons who presided at the Treasury; but as no other means presented themselves so readily for the execution of the measures to which they led, Mr. Herries was requested to undertake them, and thus became gradually charged with a very extensive line of additional duty connected with a most anxious responsibility.

'The first step was to regulate the proceedings of the officers abroad empowered to draw upon the Treasury so as to make them co-operate, instead of competing, with each other. But no improvement or good management in that mode of procuring specie could be of much avail under the then pressing demands of the service, without considerable assistance from home. It therefore became the chief object of Mr. Herries's exertions to supply the first wants of the armies employed in France and Spain by the purchase of coin and bullion, and afterwards by the more extensive plan of exchange operations in London connected with measures for collecting specie on the Continent. The bullion purchased by him at home in the last three years has amounted to nearly seven millions sterling; and the sums raised, in 1814 and 1815 only, by the remittance of bills of exchange, under his directions, to collect specie abroad, have been about fifteen millions.

'In order to extend the means of remittance to the army, and to appropriate in the most advantageous way the gold bullion which could be procured in the home market, Mr. Herries proposed in 1813 a coinage of guineas, which he was accordingly authorised to cause to be effected at the Mint. Above half-a-million (519,000) guineas, the fruit of this operation, were remitted to the Peninsula, and proved a considerable relief to the exchange, while at the same time they yielded a profit of 6 per cent. over any other mode of remittance then

'available. The accounts for this coinage, which were very intricate, have already been audited and declared. The success of this experiment led to a plan, in the same year and the following, for affording assistance to the operations in Germany by a coinage of Hanoverian money, which, after communication with Count Münster, was laid by Mr. Herries before the Treasury and carried into execution by him under the authority. . . . One million and a half of 5-thaler pieces were coined and applied under this plan, with considerable advantage to the public. This was followed in 1815 by a coinage of Louis-d'or, to the extent of nearly 900,000 pieces (870,000 Louis), the proposal of which originated likewise with Mr. Herries, and which was superintended and accounted for by him. . . .

'But notwithstanding the utmost exertions, the extent to which specie could be supplied from home fell much short of the wants of the army when it entered France in the spring of 1814. It became at that time of the most urgent importance that a large quantity of French money should be poured into the military chest to enable the Duke of Wellington to prosecute his successes. Operations were undertaken for that object through the agency of Mr. Rothschild, under the direction and responsibility of Mr. Herries, which proved highly efficacious. The chest . . . was furnished . . . so rapidly and completely that the Commissary-General was abundantly supplied for all his wants, without having occasion to negotiate a bill; and from that time no military debt . . . was created on the Continent. The success of this new measure . . . led to the adoption of the same course for providing the specie afterwards required. . . . Its advantageous effect upon the exchanges as compared with the former practice was sufficiently obvious . . . but there remained a considerable obstacle to the improvement of the exchange in the nature of the Treaties of Subsidy. . . . To obviate this evil a proposal was made to the Ministers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia that the British Government should undertake the remittance of their subsidies. . . . This proposal proved abortive, because the Ministers here did not feel authorised to decide upon such an important point

without a reference to their Courts. Upon this Mr. Herries was sent by the Treasury to Paris. . . . The result of this journey was the entire acquiescence and concurrence of Prussia . . . and an engagement on the part of Austria to the same effect, which though not invariably observed at first, was latterly, after a good deal of negotiation with the Austrian Embassy here, fully adhered to. Russia evaded any positive declaration . . . and only in one instance resorted to the proffered agency; but the event has since shown that her subsidies remained here for the most part unremitted, and they are now being invested in this country in the purchase of clothing for her armies . . . The whole conduct of the exchange operations for the expenditure of the British armies . . . and for subsidies was concentrated in the hands of Mr. Herries. . . . The payment of the bills of credit . . . has likewise devolved upon him; and having returned from Paris by Amsterdam he was enabled there to make an arrangement for the payment of part of these bills due to Russia upon advantageous terms, and, in consequence of a bargain afterwards negotiated by him for the redemption of the remainder at a most favourable rate of exchange, a profit of not less than 120,000*l.* was made upon the Russian bills. . . .

'Another measure of public utility and economy which originated with Mr. Herries, and was executed by him, was the circulation of bills of exchange at long dates payable on the Continent . . . and he had the satisfaction of carrying into effect this first successful attempt to raise money on British credit on the Continent for the public service. About 1,300,000*l.* of these bills were circulated for the payment of subsidies when the exchange was much below par, and the clear profit upon this transaction . . . may be stated at 70,000*l.* to 80,000*l.*

'Having thus enumerated the most prominent points of these new and extensive transactions . . . it is scarcely necessary that he should say anything of the anxious labour and deep responsibility . . . nor, after what Mr. Vansittart has kindly stated in the most public manner concerning him, is it requisite that he should expatiate upon the public benefit derived from the successful execution of them. The agency of

Mr. Rothschild and his brothers on the Continent could alone, perhaps, have enabled him to direct the exchange operations so favourably as they have been managed. The greatest credit is due to these gentlemen for their exertions, which have been devoted entirely to the public service; and the remuneration which they will receive for them . . . will have been fairly and honourably earned. But it is to be borne in mind that although capable of executing by their credit and their industry any—the most extensive—pecuniary transactions, they neither have, nor pretend to have, any fitness for the superior direction of a public service, and that every step they have taken has been under the orders and responsibility of Mr. Herries. . . . Mr. Herries has only in conclusion to state that without the entire confidence and support of the Treasury, such as they were extended to him, his exertions must have been fruitless, and that their beneficial results must therefore be most materially attributed to Mr. Vansittart, who gave him the authority to act on each occasion, and to Mr. Harrison, with whom he communicated in the execution of the several transactions under that authority.'

APPENDIX D.

Letter from Mr. Herries to the Treasury, inclosing Statements of Payments to Foreign Powers. (*See Vol. I. p.* 108.)

'Treasury Chambers: February 28, 1822.

'Sir,—In consequence of an intimation which I have received from the Auditors of the Public Accounts, that in the examination of the last of my separate accounts for Foreign Payments now before them, they should require, in addition to your general letter of authority of March 21, 1817, a specific sanction from the Treasury for the payment of certain sums on account of subsidy to various foreign Powers comprised in that account, I have now the honour of inclosing a schedule of the payments in question, and I have to request that you will move the Lords of the Treasury to make such communication

to the Auditors as may enable them to admit those payments upon the regular receipts of the Ministers or agents of the several Powers, and the production of all the necessary vouchers to establish the proof of the actual payments, and also the correctness of the charges in foreign currency for such of them as were made on the Continent.

'I have in this schedule annexed to each item of payment the date of the Treaty under which it was paid, or of the special orders which I received for it; and to enable their Lordships to refer more easily and satisfactorily to the subject, I have the honour of transmitting at the same time another account, in which is shown the manner in which the whole of the subsidies, of which these payments formed a part, was liquidated.

'As the audit of these accounts is now brought so nearly to a termination as to render it probable that this may be the last occasion of my troubling you upon the subject of them, I feel it to be my duty, before the final close of this service, to request that you will call the attention of their Lordships to the circumstances under which the disbursements thus accounted for were made. The sums noticed in the schedule which accompanies this letter form part of a total sum exceeding 17,700,000*l.*, of which separate accounts, entirely distinct from those of my expenditure as Commissary-in-Chief, have been rendered to the auditors.

'It was entrusted to me by their Lordships to effect the application of this very large sum in the discharge of foreign subsidies and in providing for our military expenditure abroad, by an arrangement entirely new, which consisted principally in providing the specie required for these services through a single and confidential agency, by means of which it was collected with greater certainty and more economy, and much of the difficulty and embarrassment which had then arisen in this branch of the public service was removed. The details of this arrangement embraced every mode by which foreign currencies could be obtained for British money or credit; such as the purchase of specie in all the markets of the world; the conversion of bullion into coin at our own and at foreign mints;

the coining of foreign money in England; the purchase of bills for remittances in such manner as to conceal that they were for a public account; the negotiation of British paper on the Continent at long dates to avoid the pressure upon the exchange, &c., &c. The management of this complicated agency necessarily imposed upon me a very laborious and a very anxious duty; and I need hardly add that the having to account for these immense pecuniary transactions, in the most exact detail to the auditors, involved me in a serious responsibility, which commenced in the year 1813, and of which I am even now not entirely relieved.

'Their Lordships are aware that in order to derive from this system the full benefit of which it was susceptible it became necessary to stop the exchange operations of the subsidised Powers, by inducing them to receive in foreign currency through the British agency the sterling sum for which they were empowered by treaties to draw, at their own discretion, on Great Britain. The task of inducing them to second the views of the Treasury in that respect was confided to me, with an authority from their Lordships to conclude with the Ministers or agents of all those Powers upon the subject. In discharge of this duty I proceeded in 1814 to Paris and Amsterdam, where I laid the foundation of an understanding and concert with the agents of the greater Powers, which was afterwards maintained by constant communications with them, and with those of the minor Powers, until the subsidies were closed by the termination of the war. As most of these communications were in writing, and frequently attended with long discussions in detail, the correspondence to which this service gave occasion was very voluminous.

'I have the satisfaction of knowing that their Lordships have approved of the manner in which this service has been executed by me, and that they consider it as having been advantageous to the public; and having adverted to the part which the foreign Powers were induced to take in it, I think it right here to add that I have received from the principal of those with whom I negotiated the most distinct testimonials of a similar satisfaction on their part.

'Having recalled the attention of their Lordships to these prominent circumstances of my employment in this important agency, I trust I may be allowed to add that I believe there will be found no other instance of a special commission of such magnitude and duration executed without remuneration of any kind. I have received none; it is not my intention to claim any; and, so far as I am myself concerned, my object in referring to these transactions is merely, in justice to myself, to bring the circumstances of this service (before its final closure) to the recollection of the Treasury, and more particularly the First Lord and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, under whose immediate direction it was for the most part conducted.

'But I feel myself called upon to urge more distinctly the claims of the person to whom I have been indebted for most valuable assistance in the correspondence, the accounts, and all the most laborious part of the arrangements incidental to this agency. Mr. Spearman has devoted his time and labour to them with no ordinary zeal and intelligence. The preparation of the accounts after the close of the service has fallen principally upon him, and has proved a very laborious and difficult task, of the extent of which, and the manner in which it has been performed, their Lordships may be readily satisfied by a reference to the Auditors of Public Accounts.

'I should feel it to be due to Mr. Spearman to take this opportunity of bringing his general character and merits as a public servant more at large before their Lordships if I were not aware that they are so well known to yourself and to other leading persons in the Treasury as to render that wholly unnecessary. I shall therefore confine myself to the recommendation of Mr. Spearman, upon the grounds above stated, to their Lordships, for some reward commensurate with the service which he has rendered, and the severe labour which he has undergone during eight years as my assistant in these extensive, confidential, and important transactions.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient and humble servant,

'J. C. HERRIES.

'George Harrison, Esq.'

ENCLOSURE IN MR. HERRIES'S LETTER TO THE TREASURY, FEBRUARY 28, 1822.

A Statement of Payments made by J. C. Herries, Esq., under the directions of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, in the years 1815 *and* 1816, *in discharge of Subsidies to Foreign Powers, &c., included in separate Accounts for those years rendered by him to the Auditors of Public Accounts.*

		£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
TO AUSTRIA		—	—	1,721,587 5 10
UNDER THE TREATY OF MARCH 1, 1814.				
	1815			
By payments in London in Sterling	May 18	1,464 6 11		
	July 11	1,876 12 3		
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—				
Francf. fl.				
1,462,900	Feb. 17 / July 28	139,000 0 0		
691,884·4	,,	70,000 0 0		
507,771	Aug. 10	50,357 9 2		
629,112·19 (part of 1,768,504·27 Francf. fl.)	July 19 / Aug. 3	70,000 0 0		
			332,698 8 4	
UNDER THE TREATY OF APRIL 30, 1815.				
	1815			
By payments in London in Sterling	May 31	1,000 0 0		
	July 5	138,888 17 9		
	,, 31	30,000 0 0		
	Aug. 1	108,888 17 9		
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—				
Francf. fl.				
1,330,163·2	June 30	150,000 0 0		
1,139,392·8 (part of 1,768,504·27 Francf. fl.)	July 19 / Aug 3	126,777 15 6		
2,878,421·48	Sept. 8	277,777 15 6		
1,439,210·55	Oct. 20	138,888 17 9		
520,908·2	Dec. 22 / 1816 / April 3	416,666 13 3		
			1,388,888 17 6	
			1,721,587 5 10	
Carried forward . .		—		1,721,587 5 10

		£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
TO RUSSIA.		—	—	2,083,333 6 4
UNDER THE TREATY OF APRIL 30, 1815.				
	1815			
	June 21	277,777 15 6		
	Aug. 16	277,777 15 6		
	Sept. 6	138,888 17 9		
	Oct. 12	138,888 17 9		
By payments in London in	Nov. 15	138,888 17 9		
Sterling	Dec. 16	138,888 17 9		
	1816			
	Jan. 10	138,888 17 9		
	Feb. 15	138,888 17 9		
	March 14	138,888 17 9		
	April 13	138,888 17 9		
			1,666,666 13 0	
UNDER THE TREATY OF OCTOBER 4, 1815.				
	1816			
By payments in London in	Jan. 24	208,333 6 8		
Sterling	Feb. 15	104,166 13 4		
	March 19	104,166 13 4		
			416,666 13 4	
			2,083,333 6 4	
TO DENMARK		—	—	138,750 0 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JULY 14, 1815.				
	1815			
By payments in London in Sterling	Sept. 6	28,000 0 0		
	„ 16	27,500 0 0		
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—				
Hamb. marcs Bo.				
167,367·3	„ 22	13,875 0 0		
169,101·9 . . .	Oct. 6	13,875 0 0		
170,835·15 . . .	Nov. 6	13,875 0 0		
173,437·8 . . .	Dec. 5	13,875 0 0		
173,871·1·6 . . .	„ 31	13,875 0 0		
	1816			
174,304·11 . . .	Feb. 6	13,875 0 0		
			138,750 0 0	
TO PRUSSIA		—	—	1,686,781 2 3
UNDER THE TREATY OF JUNE 29, 1814.				
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—	1815			
Pist.				
91,686 . . .	May 20	350,000 0 0		
Thal.				
1,250,000 . . .				

		£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
TO PRUSSIA—*continued.*										
By payments in London in Sterling (part of £33,250)	1815 July 3	5,333	6	8						
					355,333	6	8			
UNDER THE TREATY OF APRIL 30, 1815.										
By payments in London in Sterling (part of £33,250)	1815 July 3	27,916	13	4						
	Aug. 19	38,888	17	5						
By payments on the Continent in Currency:										
Pist. 378,000 . . . Dutch guild. 900,000 . . .	May 26	470,197	17	1						
Thal. 1,388,888·21·4 . . .	July 7	277,777	15	6						
550,000 . . .	Aug. 4	100,000	0	0						
781,249·8 . . .	„ 19	138,888	17	5						
810,181·12 . . .	Sept. 30	138,888	17	5						
844,907·7·1 . . .	Nov. 1	138,888	17	5						
					1,331,447	15	7			
					1,686,781	2	3			
TO BADEN		—			—			133,200	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF MAY 19, 1815.										
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—										
Francf. fl.	1815									
415,847·50 . . .	June 29	44,400	0	0						
298,466·40 . . .	Aug. 1	29,600	0	0						
451,239·8 . . .	Sept. 2	44,400	0	0						
156,311·35 . . .	Nov. 11	14,800	0	0						
					133,200	0	0			
TO HANOVER		—			—			145,940	0	0
BY A TREASURY AUTHORITY OF OCTOBER 3, 1815.										
By payment in London in Sterling	1815 Oct. 10	25,000	0	0						
					25,000	0	0			
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 26, 1815.										
By payment in London in Sterling	Oct. 13	47,680	0	0						

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
TO HANOVER—*continued.*									
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—									
Hamb. marcs Bo.									
154,473·12 . . . Nov. 2	12,420	0	0						
149,250 . . . . „ 2	12,000	0	0						
305,250 . . . . „ 29	24,420	0	0						
306,013·1·6 . . . Dec. 20	24,420	0	0						
				120,940	0	0			
				145,940	0	0			
TO SARDINIA	—			—			46,550	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF MAY 2, 1815.									
1815									
By payments in London in Sterling . . . . May 20	550	0	0						
Sept. 12	250	0	0						
By the payment at Turin of 865,500 francs . . . June 15	45,750	0	0						
				46,550	0	0			
TO BRUNSWICK	—			—			30,000	0	0
BY A TREASURY AUTHORITY OF AUGUST 26, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—									
Hamb. marcs Bo. 1815									
118,125 . . . . Aug. 17	10,000	0	0						
235,000 . . . . Sept. 21	20,000	0	0						
				30,000	0	0			
TO BAVARIA	—			—			552,774	11	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JUNE 7, 1815.									
1815									
By payments in London in Sterling . . . . Oct. 16	219,774	11	0						
„ 20	277,500	0	0						
Dec. 14	55,500	0	0						
				552,774	11	0			
TO HESSE CASSEL	—			—			62,437	10	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency :— 1815									
Francf. fl.									
364,275·22 . . . July 13	40,000	0	0						
Dutch fl.									
89,906·5 . . . Oct. 10	8,562	10	0						
Francf. fl. 1816									
155,389·56 . . . March 26	13,875	0	0						
				62,437	10	0			

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
TO HESSE DARMSTADT . . .	—			—			66,600	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—									
Francf. fl. 1815									
220,000 . . . July 17	23,000	0	0						
66,813·5 . . . Aug. 4	6,600	0	0						
76,386·13 . . . Sept. 5	7,400	0	0						
78,745·39 . . . Oct. 4	7,400	0	0						
79,630·26 . . . Nov. 1	7,400	0	0						
80,367·45 . . . „ 5	7,400	0	0						
80,367·45 . . . Dec. 31	7,400	0	0						
				66,600	0	0			
TO SAXONY	—			—			66,600	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JULY 14, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—									
Francf. fl. 1815									
451,239·8 . . . Aug. 6	44,400	0	0						
79,040·34 . . . Nov. 23	7,400	0	0						
80,220·18 . . . Dec. 12	7,400	0	0						
1816									
80,220·18 . . . Jan. 8	7,400	0	0						
				66,600	0	0			
TO SAXE GOTHA	—			—			18,315	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—									
Francf. fl. 1815									
152,153·7 . . . Oct. 11	14,245	0	0						
21,736·10 . . . Nov. 20	2,035	0	0						
21,411·44 . . . „ 29	2,035	0	0						
				18,315	0	0			
TO SAXE WEIMAR	—			—			13,320	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency:—									
Francf. fl.									
126,464·55 . . . Oct. 24	11,840	0	0						
15,631·9 . . . Nov. 29	1,480	0	0						
				13,320	0	0			

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
TO SAXE COBURG, &c. . . .	—	—	15,018 6 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JUNE 15, 1815.			
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—			
Francf. fl.			
102,951·32 . . . Sept. 7	10,012 4 0		
53,337·54 . . . Nov. 26	5,006 2 0		
		15,018 6 0	
TO ANHALT BERNBURG . .	—	—	3,996 0 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JULY 10, 1815.			
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—			
Francf. fl.			
38,361·36 . . . Oct. 25	3,552 0 0		
1816			
4,795·31 . . . Jan. 9	444 0 0		
		3,996 0 0	
TO ANHALT DESSAU . . .	—	—	9,324 0 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JULY 10, 1815.			
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—			
Francf. fl. 1815			
89,846·44 . . . Oct. 24	8,288 0 0		
10,941·49 . . . Nov. 9	1,036 0 0		
		9,324 0 0	
TO FRANCFORT	—	—	6,243 15 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.			
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—			
Francf. fl.			
51,206·47 . . . Oct. 3	4,856 5 0		
7,575·57 . . . „ 4	693 15 0		
1816			
7,520·39 . . . Jan. 22	693 15 0		
		6,243 15 0	

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
TO NASSAU	—	—	25,391 5 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JUNE 16, 1815.			
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—			
Francf. fl. 1815			
198,739·41 . . . Sept. 7	19,748 15 0		
29,909·20 . . . Oct. 14	2,821 5 0		
29,234·41 . . . Nov. 18	2,821 5 0		
		25,391 5 0	
TO WURTTEMBERG. . . .	—	—	166,500 0 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF MAY 10, 1815.			
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—			
Francf. fl.			
332,530·48 . . . June 5	37,000 0 0		
178,431·9 . . . „ 6	18,500 0 0		
187,279·9 . . . Aug. 6	18,500 0 0		
190,965·35 . . . „ 31	18,500 0 0		
197,232·47 . . . Sept. 30	18,500 0 0		
200,550·43 . . . Oct. 31	18,500 0 0		
199,076·5 . . . Dec. 1	18,500 0 0		
1816			
199,076·5 . . . Jan. 1	18,500 0 0		
		166,500 0 0	
TO MECKLENBURG SCHWERIN .	—	—	31,635 0 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF JULY 29, 1815.			
1815			
By the payment of 342,941·44 Francf. fl. at Francfort . Dec. 7	—	31,635 0 0	
TO MECKLENBURG STRELITZ .	—	—	6,660 0 0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 8, 1815.			
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—			
Hamb. marcs Bo.			
74,185 . . . . Nov. 25	5,920 0 0		
1816			
9,273·2 . . . . Jan. 12	740 0 0		
		6,660 0 0	

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d	£	s.	d.
TO HOHENZOLLERN HECHINGEN	—			—			1,615	1	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—									
Francf. fl. 1815									
15,313·4 . . . . Oct. 24	1,435	12	0						
1,914·8 . . . . Nov. 29	179	9	0						
				1,615	1	0			
TO HOHENZOLLERN SIGMARIGEN	—			—			3,213	9	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—									
Francf. fl.									
30,468·16 . . . Oct. 24	2,856	8	0						
3,808·32 . . . Nov. 29	357	1	0						
				3,213	9	0			
TO THE HANSE TOWNS . .	—			—			24,975	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—									
Hamb. marcs Bo. 1815									
163,898·7 . . . Aug. 30	13,875	0	0						
69,028·3 . . . Nov. 3	5,550	0	0						
1816									
69,548·7 . . . Jan. 5	5,550	0	0						
				24,975	0	0			
TO HOLSTEIN OLDENBURG . .	—			—			13,320	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1815.									
1815									
By payment on the Continent of 128,852·8 Hamb. marcs Bo. Nov. 3	10,360	0	0						
By payments in London in Sterling . . . . Dec. 5	1,480	0	0						
1816 Jan. 2	1,480	0	0						
				13,320	0	0			
TO LIPPE AND LIPPE SCHAUMBURG	—			—			10,822	10	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
1815									
By payment on the Continent of 27,056·15 Francf. fl. . Nov. 20	2,497	10	0						

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
TO LIPPE, &c.—*continued.*									
1815									
By payments in London in Sterling . . . . Nov. 23	1,850	0	0						
1816									
Jan. 30	6,475	0	0						
				10,822	10	0			
TO REUSS GREITZ	—			—			7,492	10	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
1815									
By payments in London in Sterling . . . . Nov. 23	5,827	10	0						
Dec. 5	832	10	0						
1816									
Jan. 2	832	10	0						
				7,492	10	0			
TO SCHWARZBURG-RUDOLSTADT, AND SONDERSHAUSEN	—			—			10,822	10	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—									
Francf. fl. 1815									
51,376·23 . . . Nov. 23	4,810	0	0						
6,350·9 . . . . ,,	601	5	0						
51,948·0 . . . . Oct. 25	4,810	0	0						
1816									
6,350·9 . . . . Jan. 24	601	5	0						
				10,822	10	0			
TO WALDECK AND PYRMONT .	—			—			6,660	0	0
UNDER THE TREATY OF AUGUST 1, 1815.									
1815									
By payments in London in Sterling . . . . Nov. 23	5,180	0	0						
Dec. 5	740	0	0						
1816									
Jan. 2	740	0	0						
				6,660	0	0			
TO SWEDEN	—			—			27,160	10	8
BY TREASURY AUTHORITIES OF OCTOBER 27, 1815, AND JUNE 6, 1816.									
1815									
By payments in London in Sterling . . . . Oct. 30	21,061	17	1						
1816									
June 8	6,098	13	7						
				27,160	10	8			

		£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
RUSSIAN DUTCH LOAN . . .		—	—	121,964 12 8
BY TREASURY AUTHORITIES OF JULY 5 AND OCTOBER 22, 1816.				
By payments on the Continent in Currency :—				
Dutch fl.	1816			
256,250 . . .	June 27	21,762 4 1		
1,237,500 . . .	Oct. 8	100,202 8 7		
			121,964 12 8	
TO SICILY		—	—	117,748 6 8
BY TREASURY AUTHORITY OF FEBRUARY 10, 1816.				
	1816			
By payments in London in Sterling	June 17	60,000 0 0		
	„ 25	50,000 0 0		
	„ 30	7,748 6 8		
			117,748 6 8	
				7,376,751 11 5
TO PRUSSIA.				
UNDER THE TREATY OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1813, FOR BILLS OF CREDIT.				
	1815	Thalers		
By payments at Berlin . .	Feb. 15	350,833 8	60,166 6 5	
	March 15	352,500 0	60,027 15 6	
	April 1	60,000 0	77,466 12 0	
	„ 15	334,166 16		
	May 15	335,833 8	71,613 5 10	
	„ 30	25,000 0		
	June 15	337,500 0	66,783 4 3	
	July 15	339,166 16	61,604 9 3	
	Aug. 15	340,833 8	58,758 5 6	
	Sept. 15	342,500 0	58,154 18 7	
	Thalers	2,818,333 8	—	514,574 17 4

ENCLOSURE IN MR. HERRIES'S LETTER TO THE TREASURY, FEBRUARY 28, 1822.

An account showing how all the Subsidies due to Foreign Powers by Great Britain, under Treaties concluded in the years 1814 *and* 1815, *and of which any portion was paid by the Commissary-in-Chief, have been liquidated.*

AUSTRIA.

DUE.	£	s.	d.		PAID.	£	s.	d.
Under the Treaty of March 1, 1814 . .	972,222	4	6		*By the Treasury.*			
„ „ April 30, 1815 . .	1,388,888	17	6	1814	Lord Castlereagh's and Lord Clancarty's bills	486,666	13	4
					By the Commissary-in-Chief.			
				1814	At Paris and Francfort 152,857 2 10			
				1815	At London and Francfort . . . 1,721,587 5 10			
						1,874,444	8	8
	2,361,111	2	0			2,361,111	2	0

RUSSIA.

Under the Treaty of March 1, 1814 . .	1,250,000	0	0		*By the Treasury.*			
„ „ April 30, 1815 . .	1,666,666	13	0	1814	Messrs. Harman & Co. 200,000 0 0			
„ „ October 4, 1815 . .	416,666	13	4	1815	Sir G. Burgmann— Bills on that Board 83,031 7 10			
						283,031	7	10
					By the Commissary-in-Chief.			
				1814	At Amsterdam. . 372,524 3 3			
					In London . . 594,444 8 10			
				1815	„ . . 1,111,111 2 0			
				1816	„ . . 972,222 4 4			
						3,050,301	18	5
	3,333,333	6	4			3,333,333	6	3

PRUSSIA.

DUE.	£ s. d.		PAID.	£ s. d.
			By the Treasury.	
Under the Treaty of March 31, 1814 . .	972,222 4 4	1814	In London . . . 466,666 13 4	
„ „ June 29, 1814 . .	355,333 6 8	1820	„ . . . 9,022 8 11	
„ „ April 1, 1815 . .	1,388,888 17 9			475,689 2 3
			By Commissary-General Dunmore.	
		1815	Provisions supplied in Belgium to the Prussian army	13,104 16 9
			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
		1815	Provisions shipped for the Prussian army in the Netherlands . .	38,369 7 6
			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
		1814	Payments on the Continent . . 487,500 0 0	
		„	Payments in London 15,000 0 0	
		1815	„ on the Continent . . 1,614,642 4 10	
		„	Payments in London 72,138 17 5	
				2,189,281 2 3
	2,716,444 8 9			2,716,444 8 9

This subsidy was settled in accounts between the two Governments by the payment in 1820 of the above £9,022 8*s.* 11*d.*, the provisions supplied by Mr. Dunmore having been admitted by Prussia at the above-stated sum of £13,104 16*s.* 9*d.*

DENMARK.

			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
		1815	In London . . . 55,500 0 0	
		„	At Hamburg . . . 69,375 0 0	
		1816	„ . . 13,875 0 0	
Under the Treaty of July 14, 1815 . .	138,750 0 0			138,750 0 0

BADEN.

Under the Treaty of May 19, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 16,000 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	133,200 0 0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort	133,200 0 0

SARDINIA.

Under the Treaty of May 2, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 15,000 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	124,875 0 0	1815 „	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At London . . . 800 0 0 At Turin . . . 45,750 0 0	46,550 0 0
		1815 1816	*By Dep. Commissary-General Forbes.* At Turin . . . 64,250 0 0 „ . . . 13,875 0 0	78,125 0 0
		1815	*By Commissary-General Dunmore.* At Brussels	200 0 0
	124,875 0 0			124,875 0 0

BAVARIA.

Under the Treaty of June 7, 1815, being ten months' subsidy from April 1, 1815, to January 31, 1816, for 60,000 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	555,000 0 0	1815 „	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* Rum and rice shipped for Bavarian armies . . . . . . Payments in London in Sterling .	2,225 9 0 552,774 11 0
	555,000 0 0			555,000 0 0

HESSE CASSEL.

DUE.	£	s.	d.		PAID.	£	s.	d.
					By the Commissary-in-Chief.			
Under the Treaty of July 15, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 7,500 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	62,437	10	0	1815	At Francfort and Amsterdam . . .	48,562	10	0
				1816	At Francfort . .	13,875	0	0
						62,437	10	0

HESSE DARMSTADT.

					By the Commissary-in-Chief.			
Under the Treaty of July 15, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 8,000 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	66,600	0	0	1815	At Francfort	66,600	0	0

SAXONY.

					By the Commissary-in-Chief.			
Under the Treaty of July 14, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 8,000 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	66,600	0	0	1815	At Francfort . . .	59,200	0	0
				1816	„ . .	7,400	0	0
						66,600	0	0

SAXE GOTHA.

					By the Commissary-in-Chief.			
Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 2,200 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	18,315	0	0	1815	At Francfort	18,315	0	0

SAXE WEIMAR.

Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 1,600 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	13,320 0 0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort		13,320 0 0

SAXE COBURG, &c.

Under the Treaty of June 15, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 1,804 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	15,018 6 0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort		15,018 6 0

ANHALT BERNBURG.

Under the Treaty of July 20, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 480 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	3,996 0 0	1815 1816	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort . . 3,552 0 0 „ . . 444 0 0		3,996 0 0

ANHALT DESSAU.

Under the Treaty of July 10, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 1,120 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	9,324 0 0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort		9,324 0 0

FRANCFORT.

Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 750 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	6,243 15 0	1815 1816	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort . . 5,550 0 0 „ . . 693 15 0		6,243 15 0

NASSAU.

DUE.	£	s.	d.		PAID.	£	s.	d.
Under the Treaty of June 16, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 3,050 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	25,391	5	0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort	25,391	5	0

WURTTEMBERG.

Under the Treaty of May 10, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 20,000 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	166,500	0	0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort . . 148,000 0 0			
				1816	„ . . 18,500 0 0			
						166,500	0	0

MECKLENBURG SCHWERIN.

Under the Treaty of July 29, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 3,800 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	31,635	0	0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort	31,635	0	0

MECKLENBURG STRELITZ.

Under the Treaty of August 8, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 800 men at £11 2s. per man per annum	6,660	0	0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort . . 5,920 0 0			
				1816	„ . . 740 0 0			
						6,660	0	0

HOHENZOLLERN HECHINGEN.

Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 194 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	1,615 1 0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort		1,615 1 0

HOHENZOLLERN SIGMARINGEN.

Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 386 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	3,213 9 0	1815	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort		3,213 9 0

THE HANSE TOWNS.

Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 3,000 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum . . .	24,975 0 0	1815 1816	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort . . „ . .	19,425 0 0 5,550 0 0	24,975 0 0

HOLSTEIN OLDENBURG.

Under the Treaty of September 5, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 1,600 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum . .	13,320 0 0	1815 „ 1816	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Francfort . . In London . . „ . .	10,360 0 0 1,480 0 0 1,480 0 0	13,320 0 0

LIPPE AND LIPPE SCHAUMBURG.

DUE.	£ s. d.		PAID.	£ s. d.
			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 1,300 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum . . .	10,822 10 0	1815	At Francfort . . 2,497 10 0	
		„	In London . . . 1,850 0 0	
		1816	„ . . . 6,475 0 0	
				10,822 10 0

REUSS GREITZ.

			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 900 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	7,492 10 0	1815	In London . . . 6,660 0 0	
		1816	„ . . . 832 10 0	
				7,492 10 0

SCHWARTZBURG RUDOLSTADT AND SONDERSHAUSEN.

			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 1,300 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum . . .	10,822 10 0	1815	At Francfort . . 10,221 5 0	
		1816	„ . . 601 5 0	
				10,822 10 0

WALDECK AND PYRMONT.

			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
Under the Treaty of August 1, 1815, being for nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 800 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	6,660 0 0	1815	In London . . . 5,920 0 0	
		1816	„ . . . 740 0 0	
				6,660 0 0

BRUNSWICK.

Under the Treaty of August 28, 1815, being nine months' subsidy from April 1 to December 31, 1815, for 7,149 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum	59,515	8	6		*By the Commissary-in-Chief.*		
				1815	At Hamburgh	30,000	0 0
					By Commissary-General Dunmore.		
				1815	In the Netherlands and France .	22,417	9 8
						52,417	9 8
					Balance due to Brunswick .	7,097	18 10
	59,515	8	6			59,515	8 6

The Brunswick Government claimed their subsidy upon a different principle. Their account is under examination before the Comptrollers of Army Accounts.

HANOVER.

Under the Treaty of December 5, 1813, being part of a subsidy of £600,000 for the year 1814, the remainder having been paid by Holland	500,000	0	0		*By the Treasury.*		
				1814	In London . . . 525,000	0	0
				1815	„ . . . 125,000	0	0
						650,000	0 0
Under an arrangement between England and Hanover, communicated to the Treasury by Lord Bathurst on January 7, 1815	125,000	0	0		*By the Commissary-in-Chief.*		
				1815	In London . . . 72,680	0	0
				„	In Hamburgh . . 73,260	0	0
						145,940	0 0
Under the Treaty of August 26, 1815, being for seven months' subsidy from May 25 to December 24, 1815, for 26,400 men at £11 2*s.* per man per annum . . .	170,940	0	0				
	795,940	0	0			795,940	0 0

RUSSIA.

BILLS OF CREDIT.

DUE.	Thalers		PAID.	Thalers
			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
Under the Treaty of September 30, 1813, $\frac{2}{3}$ of 15,000,000 Thalers	10,000,000 0	1814	At Warsaw . . . 1,000,000 0	
Interest on the seventh monthly payment, the interest upon the other fourteen months having been saved to the public by the arrangements communicated to the Treasury in Mr. Herries's Letters of June 20, September 23, and October 10, 1814 .	31,666 16	„	At Hamburgh . . 1,750,000 0	
		„	At Dresden . . . 750,000 0	
		„	At Amsterdam . . 1,198,333 8	
				4,698,333 8
			By the Treasury.	
		1815	In London under the arrangement concluded by Mr. Herries with Mr. Rothschild	5,333,333 8
	10,031,666 16			10,031,666 16

PRUSSIA.

BILLS OF CREDIT.

			By the Commissary-in-Chief.	
		1814	At Amsterdam . . 339,166 16	
Under the Treaty of September 30, 1813, being $\frac{1}{3}$ of 15,000,000 Prussian Thalers with the interest thereon	5,227,500 0	„	At Berlin . . . 2,070,000 0	
		1815	„ . . . 2,818,333 8	
				5,227,500 0

SWEDEN.

	£ s. d.			£ s. d.
Under the Treaty of August 13, 1814, being the difference of exchange upon the pay-			Expenses incurred in England for Norwegian Prisoners of War . .	3,653 13 5

ment of 24,000,000 francs, between the rate at which the monthly payments were made by the Treasury and the Exchange on the day of each successive payment .	30,814 4 1	1815 1816	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* In London . . . 21,061 17 1 „ . . . 6,098 13 7	27,160 10 8	
	30,814 4 1			30,814 4 1	

SICILY.

The subsidy under Treaties with this Power was paid principally in the Mediterranean, by Sir G. Burgmann; the payment in London was under a Treasury authority to Mr. Herries, dated February 10, 1816, to close the subsidiary account . .	117,748 6 8	1816	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* In London	117,748 6 8	

RUSSIAN DUTCH LOAN.

	Florins			Florins	
1816 Interest and Sinking Fund of 1 per cent. upon the capital under the Treaty of	1,493,750	1816	*By the Commissary-in-Chief.* At Amsterdam	1,493,750	

The payments on this debt have subsequently been made by the Treasury. The cost of the remittance for the above sum was £121,964 12*s.* 8*d.*

RECAPITULATION.

	£	s.	d.
Austria	2,361,111	2	0
Russia	3,333,333	6	4
Prussia	2,716,444	8	9
Denmark	138,750	0	0
Baden	133,200	0	0
Sardinia	124,875	0	0
Bavaria	555,000	0	0
Hesse Cassel	62,437	10	0
Hesse Darmstadt	66,600	0	0
Saxony	66,600	0	0
Saxe Gotha	18,315	0	0
Saxe Weimar	13,320	0	0
Saxe Coburg, &c.	15,018	6	0
Anhalt Bernburg	3,996	0	0
Anhalt Dessau	9,324	0	0
Francfort	6,243	15	0
Nassau	25,391	5	0
Wurttemberg	166,500	0	0
Mecklenburg Schwerin	31,635	0	0
Mecklenburg Strelitz	6,660	0	0
Hohenzollern Hechingen	1,615	1	0
Hohenzollern Sigmaringen	3,213	9	0
The Hanse Towns	24,975	0	0
Holstein Oldenburg	13,320	0	0
Lippe and Lippe Schaumburg	10,822	10	0
Reuss Greitz	7,492	10	0
Schwartzburg-Rudolstadt, and Sondershausen	10,822	10	0
Waldeck and Pyrmont	6,660	0	0
Brunswick	59,515	8	6
Hanover	795,940	0	0
Sweden	30,814	4	1
Sicily	117,748	6	8
Total	10,937,693	12	4

FOREIGN CURRENCY.

	Thalers	
Russia—Bills of Credit	10,031,666	16
Prussia „ „	5,227,500	0
	15,259,166	16

	Florins	
Russian Dutch Loan	1,493,750	0

APPENDIX E.

Treasury Minute on the winding-up of Mr. Herries's Accounts for Foreign Payments. (*See p.* 108.)

'Treasury Chambers: April 25, 1822.

'Sir,—Having submitted to the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury your letter of February 28 last, relative to your transactions in the discharge of foreign subsidies, and in providing for military expenditure abroad, I am commanded to transmit to you a copy of this Board's minute of the 29th ultimo, expressive of the high sense which their Lordships entertain of your services in the important and confidential transactions referred to, and also expressing their approbation of the zealous and efficient assistance rendered by Mr. Spearman in the preparation of the accounts thereof.—I am, sir, your obedient servant,

'GEO. HARRISON.

'J. C. Herries, Esq., &c.'

Copy of a Treasury Minute dated March 29, 1822.

'My Lords have under their consideration a representation from Mr. Herries of February 28 last.

. . . . . .

'My Lords read also the statement and account accompanying, and referred to in the said letter.

'The Earl of Liverpool and the Chancellor of the Exchequer feel it incumbent upon them, in the winding-up of these important pecuniary transactions which were confided to Mr. Herries under their immediate, and in many instances confidential directions, to express in the strongest manner the very high sense which they entertain of the zeal, diligence, and ability with which Mr. Herries conducted himself through the whole course of these transactions, and of the benefits which the public have derived from his services, both in respect of public economy and of the success of the most important military and political operations.

'They feel that their success has been greatly promoted by the conciliatory manners of Mr. Herries, and the confidence which he established with the agents of the different Foreign Powers with whom he was concerned. They further desire to call the attention of their Lordships to the liberal and disinterested manner in which Mr. Herries disclaims any pecuniary remuneration for services in many respects out of the line of his official duties, and for which, on similar occasions, a liberal compensation has usually been granted.

'My Lords entirely concur in the view which the Earl of Liverpool and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have entertained of Mr. Herries's important and meritorious services in the conduct of these transactions.

'My Lords are fully sensible of Mr. Spearman's general character and merits as a public servant, and learn with great satisfaction from this testimonial of Mr. Herries of the extraordinary zeal and intelligence with which he has devoted his time and labour to the arduous and difficult task of preparing these accounts.

'And as a mark of their Lordships' approbation of these services, my Lords will direct Mr. Hill to pay to Mr. Spearman the sum of 1,000*l.* out of any monies in his hands arising out of the pecuniary indemnities paid by France.

'Transmit copies of Mr. Herries's letter, and of the statement and account which accompany it, together with extract of this minute, to the Commissioners of Audit, for their information; and referring them to the letter of this Board of March 21, 1817, authorise them to admit the several payments specified in the said schedule upon the regular receipt of the ministers or agents of the several Powers, and the production of all the necessary vouchers to establish the proof of the actual payments, and also the correctness of the charges in foreign currency for such of them as were made on the Continent.' . . .

[Endorsed by Mr. Herries:—'This will be an interesting document, and may be an important one to my children—to be carefully preserved.—J. C. H.']

APPENDIX F.

Observations on some reflections on Mr. Herries in Greville's Diary.

In the account given in Mr. Greville's diary of the difficulties in the way of Lord Goderich's ministerial arrangements, there is the following passage:—

August 20, 1827. . . . 'Yesterday, however, I discovered that it was all about Herries and his appointment. The appointment was the King's, with whom Herries had ingratiated himself by transacting some of his pecuniary business, and getting for him odds and ends out of *droits*,' &c.

It appears, from a subsequent remark, that Greville's informant was Mr. Tierney, the part taken by whom (so far at least as his proceedings are known to us) in this affair has already been exhibited.

To a man of Mr. Tierney's disposition, any attention to the wishes of a King must have appeared reprehensible; but Mr. Herries, who belonged to a different school, and whose character was wholly different, did not think that rudeness to his Sovereign was one of the duties of a public servant. If called upon—as, for aught we know, he may have been—to lend his useful assistance in smoothing difficulties for the King's convenience, without any sacrifice of public interests, we have no doubt that he would readily have afforded it, even at the risk of incurring the displeasure of censors such as Mr. Tierney. This is all that need be said concerning the 'transaction of some of the King's pecuniary business.'

The rest of Mr. Tierney's charge requires a more critical treatment.

It is by no means surprising that a positive assertion made by a Cabinet Minister, respecting matters of which he might fairly have been supposed to have had official cognizance, should have been accepted and recorded by his hearer without hesitation. Nor is it strange that a story so told, and so trans-

mitted, should be readily admitted by posterity as a proof of bygone Tory malversation. Greville, in all probability, knew nothing of the nature and origin of the sources of income which a Secretary of the Treasury was alleged by a Minister of the Crown to have tampered with for the King's benefit. Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of those who now take his gossip on trust are equally ignorant. Thus the injurious tale handed down to us without criticism is unhesitatingly absorbed by the general reader, whose imagination in perusing it immediately conjures up a vision of a 'king's creature' creeping stealthily up one or two pair of familiar back stairs under the guidance of a Chiffinch of the period, and carrying concealed beneath an ample cloak a Treasury box bursting with jobs.

But Mr. Tierney was by no means ignorant of the subject. He knew very exactly what we now find it necessary to explain. The so-called *droits* of the Crown and Admiralty, which arose out of captures in war—and, particularly, of those made before a formal declaration of war; the receipts from what were known as the four and a half per cent. duties on the produce of certain West India Islands (Barbadoes, Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, Tortola, and St. Christopher); the surplus revenues of Gibraltar; together with a variety of other items of casual revenue recognized as belonging to the Crown, were left entirely at the disposal of the Sovereign until the accession of the late King William IV., when for the first time they were surrendered to the public. (See, among other documents, the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Civil Government Charges, &c., October 14, 1831.)

When the settlement of the Civil List of George IV. came under discussion in the House of Commons at the beginning of his reign, a resolution was moved by Mr. Brougham that 'it is expedient, with a view to the arrangement of his Majesty's Civil List, to take into consideration the *droits* of the Crown and Admiralty, the four and a half per cent. West India Duties, and other funds not usually deemed hitherto to be within the immediate control of Parliament, and to make such provisions touching the same as may be consistent with the honour and

dignity of the Crown, the interests of the subject, and the maintenance of the constitution.' After an exhaustive debate, in which Mr. Canning, Sir James Mackintosh, and other eminent speakers took part, the motion was rejected by a majority of 118, Mr. Tierney's name being in the list of the minority. In the new Civil List Act, soon afterwards passed, these casual funds were expressly mentioned as being reserved to the use of the Crown, subject, however, to the condition of an annual account to be laid before Parliament of their amount and application. And that the requirements of the Act were complied with, we know from the testimony of the late Mr. Joseph Hume, who, in moving for certain additional returns on February 8, 1830, said:—

'By a clause in the Bill for settling the Civil List of his present Majesty, it was enacted that these accounts should be regularly laid before the House. This has been done; but what I want is an abstract,' &c. . . .

From these facts it is clear that the 'odds and ends,' by getting which for the King, Mr. Herries is said to have ingratiated himself with his Majesty, were monies lawfully belonging to the Crown, and which neither Mr. Herries nor anyone else could have kept from the use of the Crown. The Secretary of the Treasury had no choice in the matter. He was obliged (with the sanction of course of the Board) to render unto Cæsar the things which were declared by Act of Parliament to be Cæsar's.

It is, moreover, manifest that Mr. Tierney, who had been actively engaged in the debate, at every stage, on the Civil List Bill of 1820, who had listened to Mr. Brougham's elaborate arguments on the particular question of *droits*, and who had himself brought forward the same question in an immensely long speech some years previously (he seems to have suffered from chronic pressure of *droits* on the brain, leading to a species of monomania), must have been thoroughly conversant with the terms of the latest settlement of it; and, consequently, that when he dropped into the receptive ear of a Greville the defamatory insinuation, which we have proved to be absurd, against the man whom he desired to crush, he did

so well knowing that the charge was frivolous, and that the impression to be made by his words would be wholly false.

According to the return moved for, as above mentioned, by Mr. Hume, the total amount of all sums received from *droits* of the Crown and Admiralty, Gibraltar revenues, and other casual sources, during the period from January 5, 1820, to January 5, 1830, was 326,055*l.* 6*s.* 9*d.*, the application of which is exhibited under the several heads of—The King's Journeys to Scotland, Ireland, and Hanover—State Rooms at St. James's—Repairs of the Royal Lodge at Windsor—Repairs of Stables at Brighton—Royal Mews at Pimlico—Privy Purse—Charities—Furniture for Windsor Castle—Visit of the Queen of Wirtemberg—Apartments of the Duke of Clarence—and money (6,440*l.*) advanced to the executors of the Duke of York.

Papers laid before Parliament on the accession of George IV., together with explanatory statements in the House of Commons, show that 'the total produce of all funds at the disposal of the Crown, and usually deemed not to be under the immediate control of Parliament' since the accession of George III. in 1760, amounted to 12,705,461*l.* 11*s.* 7*d.*; viz.:—

	£	s.	d.
Droits of the Admiralty and of the Crown	9,562,614	4	6½
4½ per cent. duties	2,116,484	0	0
Surplus Revenues of Gibraltar	124,256	10	7
Surplus of the Scotch Civil List	207,700	0	0
Escheats in cases of Illegitimacy, &c.	214,647	15	0
Escheats of Property of Alien Enemies	108,777	17	8
Sale of Lands in French West India Islands, ceded in 1763	106,300	0	0
Revenues arising from Minorca, Martinique, &c. &c.	150,816	0	7
Quit rents, &c., in British colonies, and other sources not enumerated	104,865	3	2½
	£12,705,461	11	7

Out of these receipts there were paid to captors and claimants, and for law expenses concerning *droits* of Admiralty, 5,372,000*l.* 2,600,000*l.* were contributed to the public service. Certain sums were appropriated at various times, with the knowledge of Parliament, to the discharge of Civil List Debts, and to other public purposes. There remained to be accounted for a residue of 385,000*l.*, which 'was applied in various

payments for the purpose of the privy purse, as directed by his Majesty.'

With regard to the 4½ per cent. West India Duty, in particular, Mr. Spencer Walpole says:—'A sum of money wrung from the colony for local objects was recklessly wasted on pensions lavished on the favourites of the Court and the supporters of the ministry.' This charge was made by Mr. Brougham. In repeating it, Mr. Walpole might also have cited Mr. Canning's answer. 'This was a singular character of a fund, one of the first names on which was the illustrious William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, and one of the last, Edmund Burke.' He might likewise have pointed out that the revenue 'wrung,' &c., was charged with the payment of the salaries of the Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and other public functionaries of Antigua, Tobago, the Bahamas, Dominica, the Virgin Islands, Grenada, St. Vincent, Bermuda, Barbadoes, Montserrat, St. Christopher, the Leeward Islands, &c. See accounts laid before Parliament, April 8, 1830, at which date the principal items in this pension list on these duties were still, one of 3,000*l.* to the Earl of Chatham, and one of 2,500*l.* in the name of the executors of Mr. Burke.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

LONDON: PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
AND PARLIAMENT STREET

00023435

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018